Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 81-1557,81-1633,s. 81-1557 |
| Citation | 670 F.2d 760 |
| Parties | 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 19, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,459 Alta CHRAPLIWY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. UNIROYAL, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Thomas R. Ewald, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs-appellants and cross-appellees.
Rody P. Biggert, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee and cross-appellant.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge, and BROWN, Senior District Judge. *
The plaintiffs in this case are female workers who were employed by the defendant. In 1972, they filed a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the defendant had engaged in the practices of segregated hiring and seniority rosters.
In 1979, the parties reached a settlement favorable to the plaintiffs, amounting to $9,318,000 in cash and pension benefits, in addition to reinstatement of 296 terminated class members to active employment with full seniority. The defendant also agreed to pay attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs, in an amount to be established by the district court.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs applied to the district court for an allowance of attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), with an initial amount of $1,510,768 for the number of hours worked times the hourly rates for the plaintiffs' eleven attorneys. The plaintiffs also sought additional allowances for the risks of litigation and quality of representation.
The district court allowed a fee of $833,679, which included an initial amount of $583,679 for hours times hourly rates, $50,000 for the risks of litigation, and $200,000 for the quality of representation.
The plaintiffs have appealed this fee award, claiming that the district court erred in lowering the hourly rates and number of hours worked. The plaintiffs further claim that the district court abused its discretion in awarding only $250,000 for risk and quality. The defendant has filed a cross-appeal, challenging only the additional $250,000 awarded for risk and quality as too generous.
Thus, the issues raised by this appeal concerning the district court's award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs, pursuant to Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), are as follows:
1. Did the district court err in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to refuse to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs for time spent persuading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts on account of discrimination in employment, although these efforts by the plaintiffs led to the settlement of the Title VII action?
2. Did the district court err in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to lower the hourly rates customarily charged by the plaintiffs' attorneys to rates within the range of hourly rates customarily charged by attorneys in the locality where the district court sits?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding to the plaintiffs additional fees of $50,000 for the risks of litigation and $200,000 for the quality of representation?
We find that the district court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to refuse to award attorneys' fees for the time spent by the plaintiffs persuading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts. We also find that the district court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to lower the hourly rates customarily charged by the plaintiffs' attorneys to rates customarily charged by attorneys in South Bend, Indiana, where the district court sits.
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $50,000 for risks and $200,000 for the quality of representation. However, in light of our conclusions as to the initial amount determined by the district court, it will be necessary that on remand the district court also reconsider the award of $200,000 for quality.
The plaintiffs brought a class action in 1972 pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on behalf of all female workers employed by the defendant at its plastics plant in Mishawaka, Indiana. The plaintiffs challenged the defendant's system of segregated hiring and seniority. In July of 1973, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on issues of liability, based on the defendant's continued failure to respond to requests for admissions. This decision established the defendant's general liability for sex discrimination. See Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F.Supp. 442, 445 (N.D.Ind.1981).
In October of 1974, Judge Beamer, who had been handling the case, died. His death and the resulting vacancy on the district court delayed further proceedings.
Time was passing, and there was further delay. It appeared that defendant was taking advantage of the situation, and doing nothing to provide relief for members of the plaintiff class. Beginning in 1975, plaintiffs sought to obviate further delay in the Title VII action by attempting to persuade the federal government to notice defendant's discriminating practices which were the subject of the Title VII action and to take action against defendant based on such discrimination. 1 These activities resulted in several court and administrative proceedings, involving the plaintiffs, the defendant, and the Departments of Labor, Defense, and the Interior. See Chrapliwy, supra, 509 F.Supp. at 445-448.
The defendant first attempted to use the Title VII action to stave off the government's investigation under Executive Order 11246. The Department of the Interior had issued a deficiency letter to the defendant, and the defendant's response was that since the Title VII suit was underway, it was already defending itself against the same charges of discrimination. The Department initially agreed to defer action pending the outcome of the Title VII suit, but began an active investigation of the defendant's possible violation of Executive Order 11246 when the plaintiffs continued to press the government to act. See Chrapliwy, supra, 509 F.Supp. at 445-446.
In February of 1976, the defendant moved to dismiss the Title VII action, claiming that the plaintiffs' pursuit of relief through enforcement of Executive Order 11246 amounted to misconduct. 2 The court denied the motion, upholding the plaintiffs' right to pursue the defendant's debarment, which involved issues identical to the basic issues in the Title VII action itself. 3 The court noted that "(a)s representatives of the class, (the plaintiffs) were charged with the responsibility of initiating what ever action would be necessary to vindicate the rights of the entire class against the alleged discriminatory employment practices of Uniroyal." 4
In October of 1979, less than one week before the defendant was to lose a large federal contract as a result of the government's investigations of a violation of Executive Order 11246, the parties settled the Title VII action. The district court found that the plaintiffs' efforts to persuade the government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts directly contributed to the settlement of the Title VII action. See Chrapliwy, supra, 509 F.Supp. at 451. The defendant admitted that it would not have settled the suit if the threat of debarment did not loom near. Id.
In making the award of attorneys' fees, the district court first determined that it should calculate fees by the "lodestar" method. Id., at 449-450. 5 The court evidently found that the number of hours requested by the plaintiffs had been reasonably expended, reducing those hours only to the extent necessary to preclude the plaintiffs from receiving attorneys' fees for the hours spent in persuading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts. Likewise, the court evidently determined that the hourly rates requested by the plaintiffs were reasonable, ranging from $200 and $175 per hour for counsel from New York and Washington, D. C., respectively, down to $50 to $70 per hour for counsel from around the South Bend area, where the district court sits. The court noted that:
The caliber of counsel here was equally matched. This is not the case of a small, relatively unsophisticated corporate defendant, suddenly faced with high priced counsel running up the clock at an exorbitant hourly rate. The rate on both sides reflects the price talented lawyers can command. It would not advance the congressional policies ... to arbitrarily limit plaintiffs' attorneys to the local billing rate when the defendant has utilized the resources of equally expensive, and presumably equally talented, attorneys. If Uniroyal had primarily used local counsel in its defense, it would have a far better argument in favor of restricting (plaintiffs) to the local billing rate.... The legal profession no longer operates in a strictly local product market, and the attorney's fee provision of Title VII cannot be utilized to unrealistically tie the fees paid to the locality's wage scale.
Chrapliwy, supra, 509 F.Supp. at 456.
The district court further decided to use present instead of historical billing rates, to offset inflation which had increased the price levels above those in effect at the time the suit was instituted in 1972. 6
After determining that the rates and hours were reasonable, however, the district court decided that the requested billing rates had to be "balanced" against the local billing rates in the South Bend area. Id., at 456-457. Based on affidavits submitted by the defendant, the court found that the local rates ranged from a low of $35 per hour in 1973 to $85 per hour in 1980, depending, however, on the skill of the attorney. Id., at...
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