Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 23700,23700 |
| Citation | 422 S.E.2d 91,309 S.C. 243 |
| Parties | , 123 Lab.Cas. P 57,084 Gerald CULLER, Appellant, v. BLUE RIDGE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Hal J. Warlick, Easley, for appellant.
G. Edward Welmaker and Henry F. Floyd, Pickens, for respondent.
This is an action for wrongful discharge. Gerald Culler ("Culler") appeals the trial judge's order in favor of Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative ("Blue Ridge"). We affirm.
Prior to the early 1980's, Blue Ridge maintained several pay-roll deduction plans for its employees. One of the pay-roll deduction plans allowed employees to have funds deducted from their checks to be used by the "HELP" fund. At its inception, the HELP fund was an employee fund to aid needy families of injured employees. The fund also contributed to local charities. Blue Ridge also maintained a pay-roll deduction plan for employees to join "PAC." PAC is an organization which gives money to campaigns of politicians who support cooperative utilities. PAC funds political campaigns on the State and National level.
Blue Ridge is prohibited by 2 U.S.C.A. 441b (West 1985) from directly contributing to political campaigns. Blue Ridge employees testified, however, that it encouraged its employees to contribute to the PAC fund. Sometime in the early 1980's, Blue Ridge became concerned that the pay-roll deduction plan for PAC violated federal law, and they discontinued the practice. As a result of discontinuing the pay-roll deduction plan for PAC, PAC membership at Blue Ridge dropped substantially. To increase the membership in PAC, a program was established where employee PAC membership was pay-roll deducted through the HELP fund.
Culler began working for Blue Ridge in 1982. At that time, Culler joined PAC and the membership dues were deducted from his pay check. When PAC dues were no longer pay-roll deducted, Culler discontinued his membership. When Blue Ridge reinstated pay-roll deduction PAC membership through the HELP fund, Culler refused to join. About the time that Culler first refused to join PAC, he was transferred from a line crew to a right of way crew. Subsequently, Culler was fired.
Culler claims that he was fired because he refused to join PAC. The trial judge held that as a matter of law, Culler did not have an actionable claim under the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will. Further, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that the evidence did not support Culler's claim.
Two issues are presented on appeal. First, whether an employee has an action for wrongful discharge when the employee is terminated for refusing to contribute to a political fund. Second, did the trial judge err in finding the evidence did not support Culler's claim.
The doctrine of employment at will has been recognized in this State since Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936). The doctrine in its pure form allows an employer to discharge an employee without incurring liability for good reason, no reason, or bad reason. Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 221, 337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1985) (citing H.G. Wood, Master and Servant (1877)).
In Ludwick, supra this Court joined a growing majority of states that recognize the "public policy" exception to the doctrine of employment at will. Under the public policy exception, an employee has a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge where there is a "retaliatory discharge of the at-will employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy." Id. at 219, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
The employee in Ludwick was forced to choose between disobeying a subpoena or losing his job. In Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 299 S.C. 23, 382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct.App.1989) cert. denied 302 S.C. 518, 397 S.E.2d 377 (1990), the Court of Appeals interpreted Ludwick to apply only to those situations where the employee must choose between a possible jail sentence or being fired. 1 Ludwick, however, is not so limited. The "public policy" exception in Ludwick extends to "violation of a clear mandate of public policy."
Chapter 17 of Title 16 defines "Crimes Against Public Policy." Section 16-17-560 makes it a "crime against public policy" to fire any person in this State because of their political beliefs. 2 We believe that Ludwick's prohibition of retaliatory discharge in violation of clear mandate of public policy of this State extends at least to legislatively defined "Crimes Against Public Policy." Thus, if Culler was discharged because he refused to contribute to a political action fund, he would have a cause of action for wrongful discharge under Ludwick and S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-560 (1976).
The trial judge, however, found that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bauer v. Summey
...policy that people should not be fired for their political beliefs. Bauer, ECF No. 17 at 13 (citing Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1992) ). Plaintiffs explain that they believe "that the right to control their own medical destinies is both expressiv......
-
Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc.
...the relevant South Carolina case law, we find additional support for this reading of the statute. In Culler v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91 (1992), the Supreme Court of South Carolina first recognized that a discharged employee may sue his employer for ......
-
Mellen v. Lane
...at law." Longshore v. Saber Sec. Servs., Inc., 365 S.C. 554, 560, 619 S.E.2d 5, 9 (Ct.App.2005) (citing Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop. Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 246, 422 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1992)). In an action at law decided by a Master-in-Equity, "this Court will correct any error of law." Sea Cab......
-
Gleaton v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., C.A. No. 2:09-cv-01667-MBS.
...at-will employee, as a condition of retaining employment, to violate the law”. Id., at 216. See also; Culler v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 91 (1992). “This exception is generally applied in a situation in which an employer requires an employee to violate......