Cullivan v. Shalala, 1:93-CV-336.
| Decision Date | 25 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:93-CV-336.,1:93-CV-336. |
| Parties | Daniel W. CULLIVAN v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
John Dudley Rutland, Beaumont, TX, for plaintiff.
Social Security Admin., Dept. of HHS, Office of the General Counsel, Baltimore, MD, Steven MacArthur Mason, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tyler, TX, Office of the General Counsel, Dept. of HHS, Dallas, TX, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits.
The court heretofore ordered that this matter be referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court. The court has received and considered the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge filed pursuant to such order, along with the record, pleadings and all available evidence. No objections to the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed by the parties.
Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct and the report of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. A final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the magistrate judge's recommendations.
SIGNED this 24th day of April, 1995.
This action came on before the Court, Honorable Richard A. Schell, District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly considered and a decision having been duly rendered, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that plaintiff take nothing, the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services is AFFIRMED, and this case is DISMISSED.
SIGNED this 24th day of April, 1995.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") denying plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Plaintiff claims disability due to degenerative disc disease. He now contests the Secretary's decision by asserting that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding that plaintiff was not disabled.
This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for review, hearing if deemed necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings and conclusions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrates. For the reasons discussed below, it is the magistrate judge's recommendation that the ALJ's finding be affirmed.
The limited role of the court on judicial review is to determine whether the Secretary applied the proper standards in reaching his decision, and whether the Secretary's decisions are supported by substantial evidence. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir.1987). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Marcello v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1983)).
A determination as to whether there is substantial evidence in the entire record to support the fact findings or decision of the Secretary, as the trier of facts, does not involve reweighing the evidence, or trying the issues de novo, or substituting the judgment of the court for that of the Secretary. Neal v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir.1987); Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1987); Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir.1986). Rather, this court must "scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary's findings." Ransom v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.1983). If supported by substantial evidence, the Secretary's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216-217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).
The elements of proof to be weighed in determining whether substantial evidence exists include: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant's subjective evidence of pain; and (4) claimant's educational background, age, and work history. Owens v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir.1985) (citing DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1972)).
The standard for judicial review is the same for both DIB and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") cases (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) (1982)). We, therefore, rely on DIB cases, as well as SSI cases without distinction. Lovelace, 813 F.2d at 57-58; Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1105-06 (5th Cir.1980).
Upon finding substantial evidence, the court may only review whether the Secretary has applied proper legal standards and conducted the proceedings consistently with the statute and regulations. Bormey v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3091, 77 L.Ed.2d 1351 (1983).
To qualify for disability insurance benefits, the plaintiff must meet certain insured status requirements, be under age sixty-five, file an application for such benefits, and be under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. Those claiming disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act have the burden of proving their disability. Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 428, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); Rhynes v. Califano, 586 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.1978); Kirkland v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913, 94 S.Ct. 255, 38 L.Ed.2d 155 (1973).
Establishment of a disability is a two-step process. First, plaintiffs must prove that they suffer from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A). Physical or mental impairment means "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable, clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). Second, plaintiffs must prove that an impairment renders them unable to engage either in the work they previously performed or other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2).
Consequently, proof of the existence of a disease or an impairment, by itself, does not establish a disability. The plaintiff must also show preclusion from engaging in any substantial gainful employment. Herridge v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1972); Ratliff v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.1971). Title 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) provides in part that one's physical or mental impairment must be of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, a specified job vacancy exists for him, or he would be hired if he applied for work. The burden is a heavy one, so stringent that it has been described as "bordering on the unrealistic." Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir.1981).
The administrative steps which a social security disability claimant must exhaust before bringing suit in federal district court are summarized by the Fifth Circuit as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brady v. Apfel
...unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment." Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir.1991); Cullivan v. Shalala, 886 F.Supp. 568, 577 (E.D.Tex. 1995). Moreover, allegations of pain must be corroborated by objective medical evidence. See Wren, 925 F.2d at 129; Houston......
- Schaper Company v. C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Company, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:97cv314-D-A (N.D. Miss. 12/__/1997)
- Merkel v. Federal Exp. Corp.
-
Pollan v. Apfel, CIVIL ACTION No. 3:99CV174-B-A (N.D. Miss. 12/7/2000), CIVIL ACTION No. 3:99CV174-B-A.
...set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f) (1988), 416.920(b)-(f). The application of this process is well described in Cullivan v. Shalala, 886 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.Tex.1995): First: Is the plaintiff currently engaging in substantial gainful activity? (If so, a finding of nondisability is requ......