Culp v. Price
| Decision Date | 18 January 1899 |
| Citation | 77 N.W. 848,107 Iowa 133 |
| Parties | B. F. CULP, Appellant, v. WILLIAM W. PRICE AND WATKINS W. PRICE, Intervener |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Van Buren District Court.--HON. T. M. FEE, Judge.
ACTION against William W. Price on a promissory note for fourteen thousand dollars, executed September 2, 1892, payable one year after date. As the defendant was a non-resident of the state, a writ of attachment was sued out and levied on six hundred and thirty acres of land supposed to belong to him. Watkins W. Price filed a petition of intervention, alleging ownership of the lands attached, and that those in the name of William W. Price were held in trust. Issue was joined on this petition of intervention, and the cause transferred to the equity side of the calendar. The district court adjudged one hundred and ten acres of the land and an undivided one-fourth of four acres the property of William W. Price and subject to the attachment lien, and that the remainder belonged to Watkins W. Price, and, as to that, dissolved the writ of attachment. The plaintiff appeals.--Modified and affirmed.
MODIFIED and AFFIRMED.
Amos Miller and Wherry & Walker for appellant.
Mitchell & Sloan and Ben Johnston for appellee.
As the evidence shows, without dispute, the fifty acres of land bought of Woodward and the forty acres bought of the referees to have been paid for by Watkins W. Price, and the title to have been taken in his name, and that the four acres containing the quarry and bought of Woodward, were purchased and paid for by the partnership composed of William W., Watkins W., John M., and John R. Price, and William held the title thereto as trustee, we may eliminate these from our investigation, and confine our attention to the remaining land involved in this appeal. At the outset it may be well to call attention to the controlling principles of law applicable to the case. It is the contention of Watkins W. Price that he negotiated the purchase of each parcel of land, paid the entire consideration therefor, and took the conveyance in his son William's name in trust for himself. The objection of the plaintiff to all evidence tending so to prove, because of section 1934 of the Code of 1873, must be overruled. That section expressly excludes from its provisions, requiring any declarations or creations of trusts or powers in relation to real estate to be executed in writing, trusts resulting from the operation or construction of law. There was no arrangement whatever between the father and William with reference to the son taking the title. The evidence tended to show that Watkins W. Price had purchased and paid for the land, and taken it in his son's name, without consultation with the latter. That this would constitute a resulting trust, if not held to be an advancement, is settled by the authorities, Lindley v. Martindale, 78 Iowa 379, 43 N.W. 233; Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa 43; Dunn v. Zwilling, 94 Iowa 233, 62 N.W. 746; Noel v. Noel, 1 Iowa 423; Byers v. Johnson, 89 Iowa 278, 56 N.W. 449; Sunderland v. Sunderland, 19 Iowa 325; Cecil v. Beaver, 28 Iowa 241; 1 Perry Trusts, sections 126-145. Before the legal title will be disturbed, however, the resulting trust must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence, and the presumption which the law raises, that the conveyance is by the way of an advancement when taken in the name of a child, must be overcome by proof of a contrary intention.
II. As to lands paid for by the intervener, the important inquiry is whether the presumption of an advancement, raised by the conveyance to the son, has been overcome by the evidence. This is purely a question of intention. What was the purpose of the father at the time the deeds were taken? His testimony of his intention in having the conveyance made to William is competent, as are also his declarations made at the time. Devoy v. Devoy, 3 Smale & G. 403; Stone v. Stone, 3 Jur. (N.S.) 708; 1 Perry Trusts, section 147. The explanation of so taking the deed to the eighty acres bought of Fullmer W. Fellows by the intervener is, in substance, the same as that given concerning each parcel: He made similar declarations at the time of receiving several of the deeds. To him, illiterate and unable to write his own name, these reasons may well have seemed satisfactory. Certainly they do not indicate a purpose of depriving himself and family of all their property, and conferring it on a son, who was well educated and capable of caring for himself. This Fellows land was purchased with the proceeds derived from the sale of his homestead at Beacon, and had been occupied by him since 1885. At that time it was all the property he had. His family consisted of his wife, two daughters, and a son, other than William, under the age of majority. The fact that the child is already provided for, though not alone sufficient, has been deemed a circumstance to be considered in such cases. We are of the opinion that the circumstance that the father and other children were left unprovided for, in event the conveyance is construed to be an advancement, is to be given weight in determining his purpose. At that time William is shown to have had large amounts of money in his possession. Moreover, the deeds of these lands were never in the possession of William, but were delivered by his father, upon their execution, to John M. Price, as a sort of security for the payment of two thousand one hundred dollars borrowed by intervener from him. While this transaction did not furnish the security intended, it was a contemporaneous act of the purchaser, somewhat inconsistent with the idea of an advancement and proper to be considered. 1 Perry Trusts, section 146. While possession of land by the parent may well be accounted for on the score of the submission and respect due from the adult child, the circumstances thereof may throw some light on the intention of the parties. Much of this land was overgrown with brush and timber, and the evidence shows that it has been reduced to a state of cultivation at an expense of seven or eight dollars per acre, and that valuable buildings have been constructed. These expenditures, while explainable because necessary to obtain the profits of the land, are not such as would ordinarily be made by one not the owner. It is true that William aided in the erection of a new house. This appears to have been done to insure his aged parents a comfortable dwelling rather than to improve property claimed by him. Besides, at that time he was debtor to his father for more than the amount expended. From a careful examination of the record, we are constrained to hold that none of the conveyances were taken in William's name by way of an advancement. Any one of the circumstances, taken alone, may be insufficient to rebut the presumption raised by the law, but when considered together quite satisfactorily indicate that Watkins W. Price was acting, in his judgment, for his own benefit, and without the intention of giving anything to William.
III. What is known as the "Miller Land," being sixty acres deeded by Jacob Miller and wife, March 12, 1889, to W. W. Price, is claimed by the intervener, and he insists that he paid for it, though he is unable to say from what source he obtained any of the money. On the contrary, Miller testified that the intervener told him that William was to furnish the money for the land. At that time one Carry Fisher was working for the intervener, and she also testifies that he told her that his son William was furnishing the money. These conversations are not denied. The intervener conceded that some of this money may have come from William through his mother, but insists that it was in payment of the debt due his father. There is not the slightest evidence tending to show that William sent any money in payment of a debt due Watkins. The latter had told Snyder and Duffield that he owned the eighty on which he lived, and the evidence tends to show that he had said to others that William had an interest in the land. Miller testified that William had talked to him several times about buying it. While the bank books were not offered in evidence and the money received by Mrs. Price was not traced to this land, it is yet a curious coincidence that on February 27, 1889, a draft of one thousand dollars from William was deposited to her credit, and on April 8th one thousand dollars was drawn therefrom by her in favor of Jacob Miller. Of the one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars, the price of the land, two hundred and fifty dollars was paid at the date of the deed. We think the intervener has failed to show that he made the payment for this land, by that clear and satisfactory proof required.
IV. A deed of one hundred and sixty acres was executed to William W. Price by Williams and Griffith October 2, 1889. That...
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