Culpepper v. Amec Foster Wheeler Kamtech, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action H-21-0318
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
• Parties: TOMMY CULPEPPER and JOSE RESENDEZ, Individually and for Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMEC FOSTER WHEELER KAMTECH, INC., C2 LOGISTIC SOLUTIONS, LLC, and JAMES CLARK, Defendants.

TOMMY CULPEPPER and JOSE RESENDEZ, Individually and for Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
AMEC FOSTER WHEELER KAMTECH, INC., C2 LOGISTIC SOLUTIONS, LLC, and JAMES CLARK, Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-21-0318

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

January 13, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

FRANCES H. STACY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendant Amec Foster Wheeler Kamtech, Inc.'s pending Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Document No. 39)^[1] has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Memorandum and Recommendation. Having considered the motion, the response in opposition, the additional briefing, the allegations in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Document No. 23), the parties' evidentiary submissions, and the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS, for the reasons set forth below, that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

I. Background

This is a Fair Labor Standards Act case brought by two employees of Defendant C2 Logistics, LLC (“C2"), on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, who allege that they

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were not paid their regular pay or their overtime pay for the last four to ten weeks of their employment with C2, which was performing work for Defendant Amec Foster Wheeler Kamtech, Inc. (“Kamtech”) on wind turbine projects in Kansas, Wyoming and Oregon. Plaintiffs allege that C2 and Kamtech were joint employers for purposes of the FLSA and that when C2 and Kamtech had a “falling out” in October/November 2020, Plaintiffs were not paid any wages for a period of time between October and November 2020. While Plaintiffs were, following C2's termination from the project, hired and paid by Kamtech directly, neither C2 nor Kamtech has paid them the back wages they are due for the period of time they worked in October and November 2020. See First Amended Complaint (Document No. 23) at 4 (Plaintiffs “worked for Defendants during the four to ten weeks preceding the direct[ ] hiring by [Kamtech] without compensation;” “Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs any wages during the final weeks prior to [Kamtech] hiring Plaintiffs directly.”).

Defendant Kamtech, which Plaintiffs allege is “US based subsidiary of a multinational energy service company, and which Plaintiffs allege “contracts with Texas businesses and employs Texas residen[ts], and maintains a place of business of Texas, namely 17325 Park Row Suite 500, Houston, Texas 77084, ” has filed a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. According to Kamtech, the Court does not have general jurisdiction over it because it is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business in Texas, and does not otherwise have continuous and systematic contacts with Texas. As for specific jurisdiction, Kamtech maintains that Plaintiffs' claims in this case do not arise out of or relate to Kamtech's contacts with Texas - “they stem from work performed [by Plaintiffs] in Kansas, Wyoming and Oregon.” Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 39) at 9.

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II. Personal Jurisdiction Standards

A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the forum state confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with due process under the United States Constitution. See Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1993). Because the Texas long-arm statute has been interpreted to extend as far as due process permits, the sole inquiry is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with federal constitutional due process requirements. Id.

Due process requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident have been defined by the United States Supreme Court in a familiar body of case law, and have been more recently explained and applied by the Fifth Circuit in Monkton Insurance Services v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429 (5^th Cir. 2014). The due process inquiry focuses upon whether the nonresident defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 (1945). A minimum contacts analysis involves more than counting the nonresident's contacts with the forum. See Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (5th Cir. 1985). Rather, the Court "must determine whether the nonresident has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

Two types of personal jurisdiction are recognized: "specific" and "general." General jurisdiction exists when "the defendant's 'affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.'" Monkton, 768 F.3d at 432 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

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131 S.Ct. 28446, 2851 (2011)). Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, exists when the cause of action relates to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 n.8 (1984).

A three-part inquiry is used to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists. Under that three-part analysis, the Court must determine:

(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposely availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related

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