Culton v. State, 01-90-00605-CR

Decision Date03 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 01-90-00605-CR,01-90-00605-CR
Citation818 S.W.2d 839
PartiesBrian Edward CULTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Linda G. Cryer, Houston, for appellant.

John B. Holmes, Harris County Dist. Atty., Alan Curry, Randy Ayers, Asst. Harris County Dist. Attys., for appellee.

Before SAM BASS, WILSON, and O'CONNOR, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WILSON, Justice.

Appellant appeals from a 1990 adjudication of guilt that was deferred in 1987 by the judge of the 176th District Court of Harris County. In its 1990 judgment, the trial court, then the 248th District Court of Harris County, found appellant guilty of the original charge of aggravated sexual assault, and sentenced him to 12 years confinement. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Appellant's only point of error asserts that he is entitled to a reversal and a new trial because the statement of facts from the 1987 proceeding, in which he pled no contest, has been lost or destroyed through no fault of his own.

On February 23, 1987, appellant pled no contest in the 176th District Court to aggravated sexual assault. The transcript contains a "guilty" plea form signed by appellant and his attorney. In this form, appellant waived certain of his constitutional rights, in that he agreed to stipulate to the evidence against him and he judicially confessed to the allegations in the indictment. The "guilty" plea form also contains an agreed recommendation on punishment of 10 years deferred adjudication. The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on probation for 10 years.

On April 3, 1990, over three years and one month after the plea, the State filed in the 176th District Court a motion to adjudicate guilt alleging that appellant violated several probation conditions. On June 6, 1990, an order transferring the pending cause to the 248th District Court was signed. A contested hearing was held on the State's motion on July 10, 1990, in the 248th District Court. Following the hearing, the judge of the 248th District Court adjudicated appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced him to 12 years confinement.

On July 10, 1990, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Also on July 10, 1990, and directly relevant to our holding, the trial judge by signed order appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal, and further, "ORDERED that the Court Reporter of this Court (our emphasis) prepare a statement of facts in question and answer form of the testimony in said cause...." There is no limitation in the language of the order that could be fairly read to encompass only the work of the particular court reporter notified.

On July 19, 1990, appellant filed a designation of record on appeal in the 248th District Court. That record, now before us, contains documents originally generated in the 176th District Court during the prior proceeding.

On July 13, 1990, appellant, in writing, requested the court reporter of the 248th District Court to transcribe a statement of facts of the proceedings "occurring before, during and after trial." The statement of facts from the 1990 hearing in the 248th District Court on the State's motion to adjudicate guilt is part of the record on appeal, while the statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding in the 176th District Court is not.

Appellant has attached to his brief an affidavit from the former court reporter of the 176th District Court. In this affidavit, the court reporter states that she was the official court reporter for the 176th District Court when appellant pled "guilty" in 1987. She also states, "written notice to prepare the Statement of Facts was not received although Court Reporter was contacted by phone on October 26, 1990," before the statement of facts from the 1987 "guilty" plea proceeding was due. The former court reporter for the 176th District Court also documented the many steps taken in the search. She stated that she could not find her notes from the 1987 guilty plea proceeding, that she had been diligent in searching for them, and that a statement of facts from the proceeding would therefore be unavailable.

Appellant argues entitlement to a reversal and a new trial because he is unable, through no fault of his own, to obtain a statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding. The issue is whether appellant has carried his burden of showing due diligence in obtaining the statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding. More specifically, did the Court's order to the court reporter of the 248th impose a duty on that reporter to alert appellant to the missing portions and/or to gather portions of the statement of facts taken by another court reporter in a prior proceeding and in a different court.

Under TEX.R.APP.P. 50(e), if an appellant timely requests a statement of facts, but the court reporter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed without appellant's fault, the appellant is entitled to a new trial, irrespective of a showing of harm. Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The burden lies with appellant to show due diligence in requesting the statement of facts, and that his failure to obtain the statement of facts was not due to negligence, laches, or other fault of him or his counsel. Id.

We note that a portion of the missing record in Dunn was the failure of a second court reporter, not identified, to provide the statement of facts that he recorded from the punishment phase of trial. 733 S.W.2d at 215. The ultimate reversal of the death penalty conviction in Dunn was due in part to this deficiency in the record. Id. at 216. The court placed no requirement to preserve error that the appellant remember the name, locate, and notify the second court reporter. Although in Dunn, both reporters operated from the same court, we see no particular reason, given the judge's specific order in this case, to make a distinction based on the differences of courts, and require appellant to notify each and every court reporter taking testimony throughout a proceeding that took years to complete. We hold that the judge's order in this case placed a duty on the official court reporter of the convicting court at least to organize the preparation of the record. We hold further that, in light of the judge's order, timely notice to the official court reporter of the 248th was timely notice to all court reporters taking testimony under the same cause.

Relying on Corley v. State, 782 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), the State argues that appellant is not entitled to a reversal because his designation of the record on appeal, to include the hearing on his guilty plea, was not timely filed. However, Corley is distinguishable, and does not apply to this case.

In Corley, after pleading nolo contendere, defendant was convicted and sentenced. 782 S.W.2d at 859. Defendant's sentence was probated for 10 years. Id. Corley's probation was revoked shortly before the ten year period expired. Id. In his appeal from the trial court's order revoking probation, Corley claimed he was entitled to a statement of facts, that was unavailable, from the original plea hearing. Id. at 860. The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed and reversed his conviction. Id.

In reversing the Dallas Court of Appeals, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that, in his appeal from the trial court's order revoking probation, Corley's inability to obtain the statement of facts from the original plea hearing did not require a reversal because he had the right to appeal the original plea proceeding from the outset. 782 S.W.2d at 860. The Court of Criminal Appeals also stated that granting defendant a new trial under TEX.R.APP.P. 50(e) would be in clear conflict with TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.046(a)(4) (Vernon 1988), which requires court reporters to preserve their notes for future reference for three years from the date they were taken. Corley, 782 S.W.2d at 861. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Corley's attempt to designate the statement of facts from the original plea hearing to be a part of the record on appeal from the order revoking probation was untimely when made after the court reporter had properly destroyed her notes. Id. Because Corley had a right to appeal the original plea proceeding from the outset, his attempt to obtain the statement of facts from that hearing almost 10 years later in his appeal from the order revoking his probation was untimely, and TEX.R.APP.P. 50(e) did not require a reversal.

The case of Corley illustrates the distinction between probation revocation, as in Corley, and deferred adjudication of guilt, as is the situation here. When appellant pled no contest on February 23, 1987, he had no right of immediate appeal from an order deferring adjudication of guilt. See Ex parte Hernandez, 705 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). In a deferred adjudication case, such as this one, an appellant has a right to appeal from the original plea proceeding only after an adjudication of guilt has been entered. See David v. State, 704 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); TEX.CODE CRIM.P.ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp.1991). 1 Therefore, Corley does not apply to this case.

The State acknowledges two cases contrary to its position, Martinez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1990, no pet.), and McLennan v. State, 796 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g). 2 These cases, like the present case, are deferred adjudication cases where an adjudication of guilt was later entered upon an earlier guilty or nolo contendere plea. Martinez, 802 S.W.2d at 106; McLennan, 796 S.W.2d at 325. In both of these cases, the appellants made a timely, written request to the court reporters, who recorded the original plea proceedings, for the statement of facts from the...

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