Culvahouse v. State
Decision Date | 29 December 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02-0404-PC-356.,49A02-0404-PC-356. |
Citation | 819 N.E.2d 857 |
Parties | Sherman CULVAHOUSE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Hilary Bowe Ricks, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-Petitioner Sherman Culvahouse ("Culvahouse") appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Culvahouse raises two issues, which we consolidate as whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Culvahouse did not receive ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
The facts recited by this Court on direct appeal are as follows:
Culvahouse v. State, No. 49A05-0004-CR-144, slip op. at 2-3, 2000 WL 1935444 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
On July 16, 2003, Culvahouse filed his petition for post-conviction relief, which he amended on September 10, 2003. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on November 13, 2003. On March 8, 2004, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Culvahouse's petition. This appeal ensued.
Post-conviction procedures do not afford defendants the opportunity for a "super-appeal." Benefiel v. State, 716 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987, 112 S.Ct. 2971, 119 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992). Rather, they are "special, quasi-civil remedies whereby a party can present an error which, for various reasons, was not available or known at the time of the original trial or appeal." Berry v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1369, 1373 (Ind.1985). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing the grounds for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind.1993), reh'g denied. As such, a petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief faces a rigorous standard of review. Benefiel, 716 N.E.2d at 912. To prevail on appeal, the petitioner must demonstrate that the evidence as a whole "leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial court." Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708 (Ind.2001), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841, 119 S.Ct. 104, 142 L.Ed.2d 83 (1998). Stated differently, we will disturb a post-conviction court's decision only where the evidence is uncontradicted and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion. Miller v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Ind.1998), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S.Ct. 806, 145 L.Ed.2d 679 (2000).
Upon reviewing a petition for post-conviction relief, we may consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the judgment of the post-conviction court, i.e., the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Blunt-Keene v. State, 708 N.E.2d 17, 19 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Moreover, our supreme court has emphasized that "[i]n post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal." Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002).
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether Culvahouse received effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Effectiveness of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We evaluate Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance under the two-part test announced in Strickland. Id.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Wesley v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind.2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,104 S.Ct. 2052), reh'g denied. To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must show that his or her trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the errors were so serious that they resulted in a denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Wesley, 788 N.E.2d at 1247 ( )(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88,104 S.Ct. 2052). Prejudice exists when a claimant demonstrates that 1 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind.2002),reh'g denied, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830, 124 S.Ct. 69, 157 L.Ed.2d 56 (2003).
The two prongs of the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Id. Further, under the Strickland test, counsel's performance is presumed effective. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind.2002). A petitioner must present convincing evidence to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In the present case, Culvahouse argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. We separately address each of these arguments.
Culvahouse argues that trial counsel was ineffective when counsel: (1) filed a motion to continue the trial date after Culvahouse had, pro-se, asked for a speedy trial under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B); and (2) failed to present an alibi defense. We address each issue in turn.
Culvahouse argues that trial counsel was ineffective when counsel moved for a continuance after Culvahouse had filed a pro-se motion for a speedy trial. Culvahouse cites to Broome v. State, 694 N.E.2d 280 (Ind.1998), for the contention that counsel can be ineffective for failing to file a motion for a speedy trial.
In Broome, our supreme court held that it was improper to classify a decision not to move for a speedy trial as relating solely to the "means of representation," and not as an "objective of representation." Broome, 694 N.E.2d at 281. Nevertheless, the Court found that Broome's counsel was not ineffective, finding that the decision not to move for a speedy trial was a reasonable tactical decision to allow the defense time for trial preparation. Id.
Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics. Martin v. State, 760 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind.2002). When evaluating such claims, we strongly presume that counsel's assistance was adequate and that all significant decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. Moreover, in general, deliberate choices made by attorneys for tactical or strategic reasons do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel, even where such choices are subject to criticism or ultimately proved to be detrimental to the defendant. See Driver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 465, 469 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). This approach is based upon our disinclination to second-guess the propriety of counsel's tactics. See Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ind.2002),reh'g denied, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1122, 123 S.Ct. 857, 154 L.Ed.2d 803 (2003). Counsel must have latitude in "choosing a strategy which, at the time and under the circumstances, he or she deems best." Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 751 (Ind.2001),reh'g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1082, 151 L.Ed.2d 982 (2002). However, a strategic decision may be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel if it "is so deficient or unreasonable as to fall outside of the objective standard of reasonableness." Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind.1997).
Here, Culvahouse's initial attorney, Dennis Lopes, moved to continue the trial date because otherwise, "I couldn't get the...
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