Culver Cmty. Teachers Ass'n v. Ind. Educ. Emp't Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 16 September 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 21S-PL-64
• Citation: 174 N.E.3d 601
• Parties: CULVER COMMUNITY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Decatur County Education Association, Smith Green Community Schools Classroom Teachers Association, and West Clark Teachers Association, Appellants-Petitioners, West Clark Community Schools, Intervenor, v. INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

174 N.E.3d 601

CULVER COMMUNITY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Decatur County Education Association, Smith Green Community Schools Classroom Teachers Association, and West Clark Teachers Association, Appellants-Petitioners,

West Clark Community Schools, Intervenor,

v.INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee-Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 21S-PL-64

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: April 29, 2021

Filed September 16, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: Eric M. Hylton, Laura S. Reed, Riley Bennett Egloff LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Aaron T. Craft, Section Chief, Civil Appeals, Natalie F. Weiss, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR: Jonathan L. Mayes, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 19A-PL-2989

Massa, Justice.

For the 2017–2018 school year, four Teachers Associations and their respective school corporations collectively bargained over various ancillary duties, such as supervising detention. The Indiana Education Employment Relations Board found the parties violated Indiana law, because they bargained over impermissible subjects and curtailed the schools’ unfettered authority to direct teachers’ performance of these various ancillary duties. The Teachers Associations jointly petitioned for judicial review, which the trial court denied. We are asked to decide whether teachers unions and schools may collectively bargain over a limitation on—or a definition of—ancillary duties. Because the plain language of the relevant statutes prohibits the parties from bargaining over what constitutes an ancillary duty, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

For the 2017–2018 school year, the Culver Community Teachers Association, Decatur County Education Association, Smith-Green Community Schools Classroom Teachers Association, and West Clark Teachers Association negotiated and ratified collective bargaining agreements with their respective schools.¹ Pursuant to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-6.1, the ratified agreements were submitted to compliance officers appointed by the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board. The compliance officers concluded that each agreement contained a provision that violated Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, which permits bargaining only for salary, wages, and related benefits.

The noncompliant provision in Culver's agreement defined ancillary duties as "meetings, professional development trainings, and other school activities outside the contractual day or contractual year." Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p.207. It specifically excluded lesson planning and grading from the definition and required teachers to perform ten hours of ancillary duties per school year for no additional pay. Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty, the provision was deemed noncompliant because "[w]hat constitutes an ancillary duty is not a bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5." Id. , pp. 194–95.

In Decatur's collective bargaining agreement, the noncompliant provision stated that a teacher supervising "Friday Night Detention" shall be paid a flat rate of $75.00 "for 12 students or less." Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p.33. The provision was deemed noncompliant because the "conditions of the assignment, i.e. for 12 students or less, is not a bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5." Id. , p.17.

For Smith-Green, the noncompliant provision stated that if a substitute is not available for a period of time, "upon mutual agreement, a teacher may be requested to supervise a class's instructional time during his/her preparation period." Id. , p.95. The provision was deemed noncompliant because the parties had bargained to require "mutual agreement" of the teacher before the school could assign the teacher to serve as a substitute, which is not a bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code sections 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5. Id. , p.81.

For West Clark, the noncompliant provision stated that "[i]f a teacher is asked to, and accepts responsibility for, writing lesson plans, grading assignments, and entering grades for these assignments in the absence of a certified teacher for a week or longer, the teacher will receive an additional four hours of pay per week." Id. , pp. 115–16. Again, the provision was deemed noncompliant because the teacher "must agree to accept the duty." Id. , pp. 129–30. The parties cannot bargain any limitations or restrictions on the school's ability to assign the duty.

The Teachers Associations appealed to the Board. After a hearing, the Board adopted and affirmed the compliance officers’ reports for each collective bargaining agreement. The Board found the Teachers Associations and their respective schools "impermissibly bargained for a definition of, or limitation on, what constitutes an ancillary duty, in violation of Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, which permits bargaining only for salary, wages, and salary and wage related fringe benefits." Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p.12. The Teachers Associations then jointly petitioned for judicial review. Based on its "reading of the statute and supporting Indiana law," the trial court found the Board's interpretation of Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4 to be reasonable and denied the petition. Id. , p.20. The Teachers Associations appealed.

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The panel concluded that the parties merely "agreed as to what constituted an ancillary duty and bargained regarding the compensation therefor," which "is not the same as bargaining." Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass'n v. Ind. Educ. Emp. Rel. Bd. , 153 N.E.3d 1130, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis omitted), vacated. The panel remanded to the Board with instructions to adopt the collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1143. Dissenting, Judge Riley would have affirmed the trial court because under "the plain terms of the statute, what constitutes an ancillary duty cannot be a subject for collective bargaining." Id. (Riley, J., dissenting). The Board sought transfer, which we granted. 165 N.E.3d 75 (Ind. 2021).

Standard of Review

We may set aside an agency action only if, relevant here, it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Ind. Code § 4–21.5–5–14(d)(1). The party seeking judicial review has the burden of demonstrating the action's invalidity. I.C. § 4–21.5–5–14(a). We review an agency's conclusions of law de novo. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Poet Biorefining-N. Manchester, LLC , 15 N.E.3d 555, 561 (Ind. 2014).

We also review questions of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, de novo. Pierce v. State , 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). When construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent. Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of South Bend , 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Ind. 2009). To discern that intent, we first look to the statutory language and give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning. Jackson v. State , 50 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind. 2016). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, "there is ‘no room for judicial construction.’ " Id. (quoting St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele , 766 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2002) ). We presume the legislature intended the statutory language to be applied "logically and consistently with the statute's underlying policy and goals, and we avoid construing a statute so as to create an absurd result." Walczak v. Lab. Works–Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013).

Discussion and Decision

The Teachers Associations argue "there is nothing in Indiana law that prevents the parties from describing the conditions for which the pay will be provided." Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p.185. In support of their argument, they claim the holdings in Indiana Education Employment Relations Board v. Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Association and Jay Classroom Teachers Association v. Jay School Corporation make "clear that [the] parties have the ability to agree on what constitutes an ancillary duty and specifically define the job for which the person is to be paid." Id. (citing 26 N.E.3d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) ; 45 N.E.3d 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 55 N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016) ).

We first conclude that the relevant statutes prohibit the parties from bargaining over what constitutes ancillary duties. Next, we review the holdings of Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom and conclude they allow bargaining over wages for ancillary duties, but not over the duties themselves. Because we conclude these statutes and holdings do not authorize the bargaining at issue, we affirm.

I. The General Assembly imposed strict limitations on bargainable subjects and vested schools with the authority to direct teachers’ work assignments.

Our Constitution guarantees the citizens of Indiana a tuition-free, "general and uniform system of Common Schools ... equally open to all." Ind. Const. art. 8, § 1. Because public schools ensure these constitutional rights, the citizens of Indiana have a fundamental interest in the "development of harmonious and cooperative relationships between school corporations and their certificated employees." Jay Classroom , 55 N.E.3d at 816–17 ; I.C. § 20-29-1-1(1). This fundamental interest imposes upon the State the "basic obligation to protect the public by attempting to prevent any material interference with the normal public school educational process." I.C. § 20-29-1-1(3). Recognizing that obligation, the General Assembly has enacted statutes to govern the collective bargaining process between schools and teachers, with the objective of "alleviat[ing] various forms of strife and unrest." I.C. § 20-29-1-1(2).

Prior to 2011, the law required teachers and their employers to bargain salary, wages, related fringe benefits, and hours, but permitted...