Niccum v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-1533
• Parties: Michael C. NICCUM, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

181 N.E.3d 993

Michael C. NICCUM, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-1533

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED December 20, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Cara Schaefer Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Evan Matthew Comer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Michael C. Niccum appeals his sentence following the trial court's revocation of his probation. Niccum raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court failed to properly award him accrued time and good time credit for time he spent in jail across three days pending the revocation proceedings. The State concedes that the trial court failed to properly award Niccum his accrued time but asserts that Niccum is not entitled to good time credit because the date of Niccum's arrest should be excluded from the calculation of good time credit. On this question of first impression, we hold that the calculation of good time credit is a function of the defendant's accrued time. As Niccum's accrued time is three days, he is entitled to one day of good time credit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's omission of Niccum's credit time from its calculation of his sentence and remand with instructions for the court to award to Niccum three days of accrued time and one day of good time credit.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August of 2016, Niccum pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine and to being a habitual offender. The trial court ordered Niccum to serve an aggregate term of twelve years, with nine years executed and three years suspended to probation. However, the court provided that, if Niccum were to successfully complete rehabilitative programming while in the Department of Correction, it would modify the balance of his sentence. Niccum successfully completed that programming, and, beginning in March of 2018, the court ordered the balance of Niccum's sentence to be served as a suspended sentence of seven years, six months, and fifteen days.

[3] In January of 2021, the State filed its notice of probation violation, which it later amended. The amended notice alleged that Niccum had committed the new offense of Level 6 felony domestic battery as well as five new Class A misdemeanor offenses. At some point on February 27, 2021, Vigo County law enforcement apprehended and arrested Niccum. Niccum spent the remainder of February 27, all of February 28, and some portion of March 1 in jail before the court released him on his own recognizance.

[4] Thereafter, the court held a hearing on the State's notice of probation violation, after which the court revoked Niccum's probation and ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence of seven years, six months, and fifteen days in the Department of Correction. The trial court did not award Niccum any credit for the time he was actually in jail pending the revocation of his probation. This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[5] This appeal presents only a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass'n v. Ind. Educ. Emp. Rels. Bd. , 174 N.E.3d 601, 604 (Ind. 2021). As our supreme court has stated:

When construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent. To discern that intent, we first look to the statutory language and give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction. We presume the legislature intended the statutory language to be applied logically and consistently with the statute's underlying policy and goals, and we avoid construing a statute so as to create an absurd result.

Id. at 604–05 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, "when confronted with more than one statute on the same subject, we must try to harmonize any inconsistencies." State v. Reinhart , 112 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. 2018).

[6] And, as we have explained:

" ‘Under the Indiana Penal Code, prisoners receive credit time that is applied to reduce their term of imprisonment.’ " Rudisel v. State , 31 N.E.3d 984, 988–89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Robinson v. State , 805 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind. 2004) ). "The time spent in confinement before sentencing applies toward a prisoner's fixed term of imprisonment." Id. at 989.... "Because pre-sentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit." Perry v. State , 13 N.E.3d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Molden v. State , 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ).

Indiana treats pre-sentence imprisonment as a form of punishment. Brown v. State , 262 Ind. 629, 635, 322 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind. 1975) ; House v. State , 901 N.E.2d 598, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Williams v. State , 759 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) [ ]). By enacting statutes that award credit for pre-sentencing confinement, the General Assembly sought "to implement the guarantee of common law and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against double jeopardy." Brown , 262 Ind. at 635, 322 N.E.2d at 712. Further, with an eye toward avoiding equal protection violations, the statutes were drafted "to equalize total confinement time among inmates serving identical sentences for identical offenses by allowing those who cannot post bail before sentencing to be given credit towards their sentence for pre-sentence imprisonment or confinement." Nutt v. State , 451 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Brown , 262 Ind. at 635, 322 N.E.2d at 712 ). Accordingly, during sentencing, a trial court must strive to reach the balance between granting too little or too much credit time, while keeping in mind that the grant of credit time, as remedial legislation, "should be liberally construed in favor of those benefitted by the statute." SeeHouse , 901 N.E.2d at 601 (quoting Williams , 759 N.E.2d at 664 ) (credit time statutes, as remedial legislation, should be liberally construed in favor of those benefitted by the statute).

Purdue v. State , 51 N.E.3d 432, 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

Niccum is Entitled to Three Days of Accrued Time and to One Day of Good Time Credit.

[7] Niccum contends that the trial court erred when it imposed the entirety of his previously suspended sentence without an offset for the time he spent in jail on February 27, February 28, and March 1. The State agrees that the trial court erred when it did not award Niccum credit for his accrued time on those days. However, the State suggests that we need to remand to the trial court for it to determine Niccum's accrued time.

[8] We agree with the parties that the trial court erred when it did not award Niccum the time he accrued against his sentence while he was in jail prior to the revocation proceedings. See id. But we disagree with the State's position that we need to remand to the trial court for it to determine Niccum's accrued time. His accrued time is three days.

[9] Indiana Code section 35-50-6-0.5(1) (2021) defines accrued time as "the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined." The State does not dispute that that definition applied to Niccum on February 27 and continued to apply through February 28 and into March 1. And the State does not expressly refute Niccum's assertion that that span of time is three days.

[10] Indeed, in Purdue , the defendant was arrested at some point on January 29, was in jail for all of January 30, and was released at some point on January 31. On appeal, the State conceded that that span of time warranted "three days of credit" even though the defendant was in fact in jail for "48 hours." Purdue , 51 N.E.3d at 435 & n.7. And in Adams v. State , we relied on Purdue to conclude as follows:

[The defendant's] liberty was deprived ... for between six and eight hours. The trial court did not recognize [his] loss of liberty for that time. Further, we can only imagine the burden placed upon the Department of Correction if required to "clock in" a defendant upon his or her arrest and then "clock out" that defendant upon the posting of bond for purposes of determining the "time" spent in pre-sentence incarceration to be recognized later against any sentence imposed. We conclude that the rule of lenity informs us to implement the intent of the legislature by ... remanding the matter to the trial court for the issuance of an order awarding [the defendant] with one day of accrued time.

120 N.E.3d 1058, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Under the same reasoning, Niccum has earned three days of accrued time for the time he spent in confinement across the three days of February 27, February 28, and March 1.

[11] The question on appeal thus turns to whether Niccum is entitled to any good time credit, and the parties' dispute on this issue presents a question of first impression.¹ The parties agree that any award of good time credit here falls under Indiana Code sections 35-50-6-3.1(c) and -4(b). In particular, section 35-50-6-4(b) states:

A person:

(1) who is not a credit restricted felon; and

(2) who is imprisoned for a crime other than a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor or imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing for a crime other than a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor;

is initially assigned to Class B.

And section 35-50-6-3.1(c) states that "[a] person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time credit for every three (3) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing."

[12] Niccum asserts that, because he has three days of accrued time, those statutes entitle him to one day of good time credit. In response, the State asserts that Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c) refers to "days," and that the proper interpretation of "day" excludes the "triggering event," that is, the day on which Vigo County law enforcement arrested Niccum....