Culver v. Statu

• Decision Date: 21 November 1890
• Citation: 86 Ga. 197,12 S.E. 746
• Parties: Culver . v. Statu.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

12 S.E. 746

86 Ga. 197

Culver .

v.Statu.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 21, 1890.

Swindling—Defenses—Evidence.

On an indictment for swindling under Code Ga. § 4587, whore it is shown that defendant induced prosecutor to sell him goods by representing that he was the owner of the plantation on which he lived, which representation was false, it is proper to exclude evidence on the part of defendant that he did, in fact, own other property which was of less value.

Error from city court, Richmond county; Eve, Judge.

J. T. Jordan, by Harrison & Peeples, for plaintiff in error.

C. H. Cohen and M. P. Foster, for the State.

Blandford, J. Culver was indicted under section 4587 of the Code of this state, and convicted of cheating and swindling. It appears from the evidence for the state that he represented that he was the owner of a certain plantation, of a given value, upon which he lived, under which representations the prosecutor sold to him certain goods mentioned in the indictment. He also represented the value of the plantation, and what he himself was worth over and above his debts. The state showed, by evidence which is undeniable, that he did not own the plantation upon which he lived, but that he rented the same, and that the same belonged to another person. Culver, the defendant, then offered to prove by the witness who so testified that he (Culver) owned another place of the value of $800, or some such sum, and merchandise worth $1,000. This testimony was objected to; the court sustained the objection, and this is the only error relied upon before this court by counsel for the plaintiff in error. We think the court below committed no error in refusing to allow this testimony. If the statements made by Culver to the prosecutor were false, and by reason of such false statements the prosecutor was induced to sell him the goods, for Which he failed to pay, then, we think, he could not relieve himself by showing that he owned other property, and of much less value than the property which he represented to the prosecutor was owned by him. If he, by false representations, defrauded the prosecutor of any goods, which the prosecutor was induced to sell him by reason of the false representations which were testified to in this case, we do not think it was admissible for him to attempt to relieve himself by showing that he had other property, of much less value than that which he represented to the prosecutor he was the owner of. So we think the judgment of the...