Culwell v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 03 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2:13-0126,2:13-0126
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Parties: TIMOTHY CULWELL v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

TIMOTHY CULWELL v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

No. 2:13-0126

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

November 3, 2015

To: The Honorable Kevin H. Sharp, Chief District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), as provided by the Social Security Act ("Act").

Upon review of the administrative record as a whole, the Court finds that the Commissioner's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record (Docket Entry No. 14) should be DENIED.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI on August 19, 2010. See Transcript of the Administrative Record (Docket Entry No. 10),¹ at 82. He alleged a disability onset date of April 8,2010. He asserted that he was unable to work because of a total reconstruction of his right ankle, a bulging disc, knee problems, right shoulder problems, high blood pressure, and a mental disorder. AR 88, 96. His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 82-83, 94-96. A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") J. Dennis Reap on April 12, 2012. AR 35-63. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on June 4, 2012. AR 18-30. On September 27, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, AR 1-5, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Of note, Plaintiff previously filed for SSI on November 29, 2007. AR 21. That application was denied on April 7, 2010, following a hearing before ALJ Joan A. Lawrence. AR 64-77. Plaintiff filed his second application for SSI on August 19, 2010, as referenced above.

II. THE ALJ'S FINDINGS

The ALJ issued his unfavorable decision on June 4, 2012. AR 18-30. Based upon the record, the ALJ made the following enumerated findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 19, 2010, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: status post right ankle surgical procedures for fractures sustained in a motor vehicle accident, history of closed head injury (CHI), dysthymic disorder, anxiety disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

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3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

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4. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) that is further limited by standing and/or walking one hour in an eight-hour workday, and occasional climbing of stairs, balancing, stooping, bending, crouching, crawling, or kneeling. He can never climb ladders. The claimant can understand and remember one to three step tasks, maintain attention and concentration for two-hour periods, relate to the public on a superficial basis, adapt to gradual change, and set limited goals.

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5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

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6. The claimant was born on December 25, 1968 and was 41 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).

7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).

8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

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10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since August 19, 2010, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 415.920(g)).

AR 23-30.

III. REVIEW OF THE RECORD

The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and testimonial evidence of the administrative record. The Court will therefore discuss those matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties' arguments.

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standard of Review

The determination of disability under the Act is an administrative decision, and the only questions before this Court are whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner employed the proper legal standards in reaching his conclusion. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (adopting and defining substantial evidence standard in context of Social Security cases); Kyle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010). The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, "even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion." Blakely v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003); Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scintilla" and "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241(6th Cir. 2007); LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Sixth Circuit opinions adopting language substantially similar to that in Richardson).

A reviewing court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See, e.g., Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)). The Court must accept the ALJ's explicit findings and determination unless the record as a whole is without substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See, e.g., Houston v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1984).

The Commissioner must employ a five-step evaluation process in determining the issue of disability. See, e.g., Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Abbot v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990)). The original burden of establishing disability is on the plaintiff, and impairments must be demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D); 20 CFR §§ 404.1512(a), (c), 404.1513(d). First, the plaintiff must show that he is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" at the time he seeks disability benefits. Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). A plaintiff who is performing substantial gainful activity is not disabled no matter how severe the plaintiff's medical condition may be. See, e.g., Dinkel v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 910 F.2d 315, 318 (6th Cir. 1990).

Second, the plaintiff must show that he suffers from a severe impairment that meets the twelve month durational requirement. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also Edwards v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 113 Fed. Appx. 83, 85 (6th Cir. 2004). A "severe impairment" is one which "significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Barnhartv. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24, 124 S. Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed.2d 333 (2003) (citing 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)). Basic work activities are "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs," such as "walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; [c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; [u]se of judgment; [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and [d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting." 20 CFR § 404.1521(b). The Commissioner is required to consider the combined effects of impairments that individually are not severe but cumulatively may constitute a severe impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 1988).

Third, if the plaintiff is not engaging in substantial gainful activity and is suffering from a severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and his impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the plaintiff is presumed disabled without further inquiry, regardless of age, education or work experience. Id. (citing 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d)). The plaintiff may establish that he meets or equals a listed impairment, and that the impairment has lasted or is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in death. See Listenbee v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff is not required to show the existence of a listed impairment in order to be found disabled, but such a showing results in an automatic finding of disability. See Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122 (6th Cir. 1989).

Fourth, if the plaintiff's impairment does not prevent him from doing his...