Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson

• Decision Date: 26 February 1912
• Docket Number: 14534
• Citation: 57 So. 559,101 Miss. 1
• Parties: CUMBERLAND TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. v. J. F. WILLIAMSON
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

57 So. 559

101 Miss. 1

CUMBERLAND TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. v. J. F. WILLIAMSON

No. 14534

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 26, 1912

APPEAL from the chancery court of Panola county, HON. I. T. BLOUNT Chancellor.

Suit by Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., against J. F. Williams et al. From a decree dismissing the bill complainants appeal.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Harris & Potter and Tim. E. Cooper for appellant.

We take it that the third and fourth grounds of the motion for the dissolution of the injunction are intended to present the same objection to the jurisdiction of the equity court, viz that the plaintiffs in the action at law had demanded punitive damages, which damages, it is now said, will not be awared by a court of equity, wherefore, relief which a court of equity would ultimately give if the defendants to the present suit were found entitled to damages, would not be as full and complete as they might recover at law. This objection is fully answered by the fact that the precise question has been distinctly decided by this court. Whitlock v. Railroad, 91 Miss. 779.

In that case fifty plaintiffs had brought suit against the railroad company in actions of tort and in each case actual and punitive damages were demanded.

Ordinarily of course, courts of equity do not entertain suits for torts. But it is the settled law of this state by this decision that to prevent a multiplicity of suits, a court of equity will draw to its jurisdiction actions of tort brought by many plaintiffs, each seeking both actual and punitive damages.

In Tisdale v. Insurance Companies, 84 Miss. 709, one plaintiff had brought suit against three disconnected defendants on three separate policies of insurance. The contracts were, of course, independent and unrelated. It was held in that case that these separate defendants might enjoin the prosecution of the several suits and transfer the whole cost to an equity court, the court saying: "The property insured was the same, and the principles of law governing the three cases were the same, and the facts were substantially identical."

In Railroad v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, actions of tort had been brought against the railroad company by seven individuals. The actions seem to have been based upon the obstruction of the valley of Bear Creek by the railroad company. Judge Whitfield, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In every one of these cases--past, present and future--the liability of the railroad company depends upon whether it has properly constructed its railroad. The determination of that question will settle all cases so long as the embankment remains unchanged in its condition. Here there is plainly a "common right" asserted by the railroad against all these various parties, and Tribette v. Railroad in such case, maintains the jurisdiction. Surely on these facts, the jurisdiction of the chancery court to convene all the parties in one suit, and to determine therein the single question on which liability, past, present and future depends, so as to prevent this endless multiplicity of suits with its attendant useless consumption of time and costs, is too well settled by modern authorities to be doubted."

Shands & Montgomery for appellee.

Equity will never enjoin on the ground of multiplicity of suits, unless it be made to appear that equity can enforce all remedies and grant all rights which could be secured, if several suits could have been prosecuted to conclusion. 16 Cyc. 61; 48 C. C. A. 517.

It is true that no plaintiff has a right to punitive damages as a matter of law; but he has a right to have a jury say under proper instructions, whether or not they will award punitive damages in a given case, if there be any evidence of oppressive conduct. Under the facts stated in the pleadings in this case, a circuit judge would submit the case to a jury under proper instructions authorizing the infliction of punitive damages. If this is true, and the appellees are denied the right of having this question submitted to the jury, by reason of an injunction and the consequent removal of the causes to a court of equity then the relief given them by a court of equity is not as full as they could have had at law, and the record does not present a proper case for interposition on the ground of multiplicity of suits. In no state of case are punitive damages recoverable in a court of equity. Freeman's Note, 28 A. S. R. 874, past paragraph; Bird v. Railroad, 64 Am. Dec. last paragraph opinion of court, page 746; Sanders v. Anderson, 10 Rich. Eq. (South Car.) 232; Livingston v. Wordworth, 14 U. S. (Law Ed.) 809.

The Mississippi court has followed this doctrine, even as to the jurisdiction of a court of equity to collect a penalty. Railroad Commission v. Railroad, 78 Miss. 750.

Appellant in its brief says this question was directly presented in the Whitlock case, reported in 91 Miss. 779. But we respectfully beg leave to differ from him. In that case a bill was filed which set out a good defense to each case sought to be enjoined, and showed that if the allegations of that bill were taken as true, that there was no right in plaintiffs to recover punitive damages. There was no answer filed in that case as in this, but a demurrer was interposed to the bill, which admitted the truth of every allegation of complainant's bill, among others admitting the allegation that complainant had a perfect defense to all the actions at law sought to be enjoined. The court could have rendered no other decision than it did render in the Whitlock case, as defendant's demurrer admitted the truth of every allegation necessary to give a court of equity jurisdiction in a case of this character. But the court will notice that the power of a court of equity to inflict punitive damages was not raised in any of the briefs nor assignment of errors, nor was it adverted to by the court in its opinion. It was not an issue in that case.

Argued orally by Tim E. Cooper for appellant and A. W. Shands for appellee.

OPINION

MCLEAN, J.

J. F. Williamson and three other parties each brought separate and independent suits against the Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company. These were actions of tort, brought at law, for the recovery of damages, both actual and punitive. Each declaration alleged that the plaintiff therein was a subscriber to a local telephone company, doing business in Sardis, Panola county, known as the "Rural Telephone Company;" that the Cumberland Telephone Company purchased the plant of the Rural Telephone Company, and that then the Rural Company went into liquidation, and that subsequently the Cumberland Telephone Company continued to serve the plaintiff as before; that later it willfully, wantonly, oppressively, and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, removed the telephone from the residence of the plaintiff, disconnected the plaintiff with the Sardis exchange, and has since refused to give the plaintiff telephone service. The Cumberland Telephone Company filed its bill of complaint in the chancery court of Panola county, praying for an injunction against the suits at law, on the ground that there was a community of interest in the principles of law and fact involved in the controversy, and that equity would take jurisdiction in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The injunction was granted, and thereafter, upon motion, the injunction was dissolved, and at a subsequent term of the chancery court the bill was dismissed. From a dismissal of the bill, this appeal is prosecuted.

Within comparatively recent years there have grown up in this country what may be termed two schools upon the subject of the jurisdiction of equity relative to a multiplicity of suits. One may be termed the "school of Pomeroy," and, with great deference to Prof. Pomeroy and his disciples, it may be said that this school in many instances, while disclaiming, yet has confounded and confused the doctrine of a "multitude" with a "multiplicity" of suits. They have ignored entirely the fundamental principle that, in order for a court of equity to acquire jurisdiction in such cases, there must be something more than a community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in the judicial controversy. The question has been so fully and ably discussed by the respective adherents that nothing new upon the subject can be added, and we will content ourselves by simply referring to a few of the many leading decisions upon this question.

The leading case in America combating what may be termed the heresy of Prof. Pomeroy, is Tribette v Railroad, 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, 35 Am. St. Rep. 642, wherein Chief Justice Campbell enters fully into the subject, and demonstrates conclusively the unsoundness of Prof. Pomeroy's doctrine--not only by showing that the authorities relied upon by Prof. Pomeroy do not support and sustain him, but that this author's reasoning is totally unsound. We have taken the pains to examine all of the cases relied upon by that author and cited in the second edition of his most valuable and excellent treatise, and we unhesitatingly concur with Judge Campbell, as stated in the Tribette case, supra, that "every case he cited to support his text will be found to be either where each party might have resorted to chancery or be proceeded against in that forum, or to rest on some recognized ground of equitable interference other than to avoid a multiplicity of suits." In notes to Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, reported in 20 L.R.A. 850, the annotator, referring to Pomeroy's statement, says that "a search fails to reveal any case which on the facts sustains the proposition, if applied to actions for breach of contract...