Cumbie v. State
| Decision Date | 17 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 49134,49134 |
| Citation | 345 So.2d 1061 |
| Parties | Marvin Leroy CUMBIE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Donald G. Nichols of Dawson, Galant, Maddox, Sulik & Nichols, Jacksonville, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
We have before us for review upon a writ of certiorari a decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported at 327 So.2d 67 which on its face directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971). We have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
The sole issue before us is whether the trial judge committed reversible error when he allowed into evidence the surprise testimony of two law enforcement officers concerning statements made by the petitioner. We hold that he did.
The defense had requested discovery under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(a)(1)(iii) of any oral statements made by the defendant which were known to the prosecution. The state responded that no statements had been made and did not amend its answer at any time before the trial. This response was either false at the time it was made, or became false in violation of the state's continuing duty to disclose under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(f). The state did inform the defense that the two officers would be called as witnesses but the existence of the statements was not disclosed during depositions taken by the defense. When one of the officers was deposed he stated that the petitioner had not made any statements. The other officer was not questioned in regard to possible statements, defense counsel having no reason to suspect any had been made. The trial judge allowed the officers to testify as to petitioner's statement and found those statements voluntary. The judge stated, however, that the state's violation of our rules would have caused him to prohibit the testimony except for the fact that the petitioner was the one who made the statements. Obviously the trial judge misconceived the effect of our rules and the significance of Richardson.
In Richardson we held that a violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure by the state would require an appellate court to reverse a conviction unless the trial court made an inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the breach, with the state having the burden of showing to the trial court that there was no prejudice to the defendant. In affirming the petitioner's convictions, the district court reviewed the record anew and found that 'although the state violated two discovery rules, and the trial court did not make the inquiry into the surrounding...
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Smith v. State
...386, 389 (Fla.1979); Smith v. State, 372 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla.1979); Wilcox v. State, 367 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla.1979); Cumbie v. State, 345 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Fla.1977). Both legal and practical considerations dictate, once again, an affirmative answer to the question First, from a practical pe......
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Peri v. State
...prejudice, if any," sustained by defendant who was not present during exercise of peremptory challenges requires reversal); Cumbie v. State, 345 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1977) (trial court's failure to make full inquiry into the question of prejudice resulting from a discovery violation is reversibl......
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Johnson v. State
...based on our assumption that ‘no appellate court can be certain that errors of this type are harmless.’ ” Id. (quoting Cumbie v. State, 345 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Fla.1977)). But Schopp presented a case where a review of the record revealed that this type of error could be found harmless. As in ......
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Davis v. State
...appellate court can be certain that errors of this type [the failure to conduct a Richardson hearing] are harmless." Cumbie v. State, 345 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1977), receded from by Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016. The court later receded from that approach recognizing that there are cases where......