Cummings v. Moore
| Decision Date | 01 February 1940 |
| Parties | CUMMINGS v. MOORE et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; J. L. Hurley, Judge.
Action by Bertha I. Cummings against Annie C. Moore and another for alleged conversion and damages to household articles. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.M. H. T. McGregor and J. M. McGregor, both of Taunton, for plaintiff.
No argument nor brief for defendant.
The declaration is in two counts. The first count is for conversion of various household articles. The second count alleges that, on or about October 4, 1935, the defendants unlawfully entered the plaintiff's apartment in Taunton, removed her household goods and placed them in a storehouse, and that the goods were damaged and broken by the unskillful and negligent manner in which they were placed there. The exceptions are based solely upon the exclusion of evidence offered by the plaintiff.
The judge found that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proving that the defendants or either of them wrongfully took or converted the plaintiff's property; that although the defendant Laffan, as agent of the defendant Moore, did remove the plaintiff's property from the apartment, he placed it in a proper storage warehouse for the benefit of the plaintiff; that he was not negligent in the handling or storage thereof; that the property was not damaged or lost; and that the plaintiff suffered no injury.
The bill of exceptions states as facts that, prior to June 11, 1935, the plaintiff had occupied the premises at a rental of $10 per month; that at that time the property was sold to a co-operative bank; that the bank never gave the plaintiff notice to vacate; that the property was deeded by the bank to the defendant Moore by deed dated August 8, 1935, and recorded September 10, 1935; and that the first knowledge the plaintiff had of this defendant having acquired the property was when the plaintiff received on October 1 a notice from this defendant ‘to make arrangements before October 2, 1935 to vacate the premises.’ The date of the removal of the plaintiff's goods does not appear, except from the allegation in the second count of the declaration and from the fact that the writ was dated October 15, 1935.
The plaintiff called as a witness an attorney at law, who testified that she had been the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff then offered to show through this witness statements made to her shortly after the bank acquired title by the treasurer of the bank, who had charge of its real estate, and who had died before the trial, to the effect that the plaintiff could remain on the premises at the same rental of $10 a month. This evidence was excluded. At the trial and in her brief before us the plaintiff contended that the evidence was competent as the declarations of a deceased person under the statute, and that it was material to the issues in order to show that the plaintiff became a tenant at will of the bank, as, in that event, by reason of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 186, § 13, she could not be ‘dispossessed’ after the termination of her tenancy by the deed to the defendant Moore until after the expiration of a period equal to the rent period from the time she...
To continue reading
Request your trial