Cummins v. Schweiker
| Decision Date | 02 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1731,81-1731 |
| Citation | 670 F.2d 81 |
| Parties | Duane E. CUMMINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Philip E. Burchett, Donat & Burchett, Lafayette, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Steven J. Plotkin, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, MARKEY, Chief Judge, * and POSNER, Circuit Judge.
Duane E. Cummins applied for social security disability benefits. An administrative law judge of the Department of Health and Human Services denied his application after a hearing in which Cummins was present and was represented by counsel. After exhausting his administrative remedies Cummins brought this suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the denial of his application. He consented to have his case heard before a federal magistrate who on cross-motions for summary judgment upheld the denial of benefits. His appeal from the magistrate's judgment challenges the validity and application of the standards by which the Department of Health and Human Services decides disability cases.
It will simplify this opinion first to assume that the facts were correctly found by the administrative law judge and then to consider whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ found as follows with regard to Cummins' alleged disability. Cummins, 49 years old, of limited education but literate, had been variously a lumberyard worker, log cutter, and farm laborer-all jobs involving heavy manual labor. He had long been blind in one eye but this had not interfered with his work. An automobile accident several years earlier had left him with a permanent but, according to the ALJ, mild weakness on the right side of his body. He also had arthritis in his knees and right shoulder but he could walk without the aid of a cane and was capable (though he had never done it) of "sedentary work," defined in the applicable regulations as 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). The ALJ found, however, that Cummins was physically incapable of performing the heavy work that he had done before his automobile accident. He had been unemployed since the accident.
Putting to one side for a moment the finding that Cummins was blind in one eye, the ALJ's findings compelled him, under the applicable regulations, to hold that Cummins was not disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), the statute under which Cummins was claiming. This statute defines disability as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment" lasting at least a year; and the impairment must be "of such severity that (the applicant) is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(2)(A). The Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated regulations, under the authority granted it in 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), to determine whether an impairment is of the requisite severity. The current regulations were adopted in 1979 and appear in 20 C.F.R., Appendix 2 (Medical-Vocational Guidelines). Appendix 2 is basically a matrix of the four factors that section 423 makes relevant to deciding whether an individual who is disabled from doing his previous work, such as Cummins, can find other substantial gainful work. The factors are: the heaviest type of substantial gainful work the applicant can do; his age; his education; and his previous work experience. Once the administrative law judge has determined each of these characteristics for the particular applicant he consults the relevant table in Appendix 2, here Table 1, and literally reads off from the pertinent row in the table the conclusion that the applicant is or is not disabled. He has no discretion: "Where the findings of fact made with respect to a particular individual's vocational factors and residual functional capacity coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule, the rule directs a conclusion as to whether the individual is or is not disabled." Appendix 2, § 200.00.
Cummins' characteristics, as found by the ALJ, put him in the row of Table 1 that is labeled Rule 201.18. This rule provides that if the applicant is 45-49 years of age, has limited or less education but is at least literate and able to communicate in English, has either no previous work experience or previous work experience limited to unskilled labor, and in his present condition is capable at most of sedentary labor as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), quoted above, then he is-not disabled. That is the end of the case.
This mechanical approach has troubled some courts. See, e.g., Santise v. Harris, 501 F.Supp. 274 (D.N.J.1980). Cummins argues that the approach violates the statute-which requires that the Secretary's denial of an application for disability benefits be supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)-because the "grid," as the approach in Appendix 2 is popularly and aptly called, is not a proper substitute for evidence. Congress, however, has given the Department of Health and Human Services very broad authority to promulgate regulations. "The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are...
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Moody v. Heckler, 84-2320.
...court can only determine whether the Administrative Law Judge's findings were supported by substantial evidence. See Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir.1982). The plaintiff is fifty-two years of age, and his formal education ended after the eighth grade. His employment history c......
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Heckler v. Campbell
...Torres v. Secretary of HHS, 677 F.2d 167, 169 (CA1 1982); Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 934-936 (CA3 1982); Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 82-83 (CA7 1982); Kirk v. Secretary of HHS, 667 F.2d 524, 529-535 (CA6 1981); Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 145 (CA4 1981). One Court of Appe......
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Santise v. Schweiker
...derived from identified and public documents, and "supplement(ed) and draw(n) upon ... in a rulemaking proceeding," Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1982). In sum, we believe that the degree of individualized consideration afforded to applicants for disability benefits is not......
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Stieberger v. Heckler, 84 CIV 1302 (LBS).
...Memo on ALJs, at 17-18. Also, plaintiffs observe that the Secretary has also adopted a Seventh Circuit decision, Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir.1982), which states that a treating physician who had greater knowledge of the claimant's medical condition and had examined him mo......
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Standards of Review and Federal Court Remedies
...U.S. 535, 546, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012, 79 S. Ct. 968 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cummins v. Schweiker , 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1982) (regulations promulgated by Secretary under his broad authority are “binding criteria”). Responsive Brief (SSA) In this ......
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Standards of Review and Federal Court Remedies
...U.S. 535, 546, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012, 79 S. Ct. 968 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cummins v. Schweiker , 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1982) (regulations promulgated by Secretary under his broad authority are “binding criteria”). Responsive Brief (SSA) In this ......