Cunliff v. Hausman

• Decision Date: 23 December 1902
• Citation: 71 S.W. 368,97 Mo. App. 467
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: CUNLIFF v. HAUSMAN.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>

71 S.W. 368

97 Mo. App. 467.

CUNLIFF v. HAUSMAN.^*

Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Missouri.

December 23, 1902.

BROKERS — REAL ESTATE SALE — SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICES — BRINGING PARTIES TOGETHER.

1. A real estate dealer put in communication with the owner of a lot a prospective purchaser, and was authorized to sell at a certain price. The purchaser postponed the proposition for the time being, and afterward went to another real estate agent of the owner, who was known to him to have authority to sell the lot, and made the purchase from him at a slightly reduced price, which sale was approved by the owner. Held, that the first agent was entitled to a commission for the sale.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; Wm. Zachritz, Judge.

Action by Benjamin Cunliff against Albert C. Hausman for a real estate commission. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The cause was first heard in the justice's court, where it originated, on the following statement: "St. Louis, Mo., May 24th, 1901. Albert C. Hausman to Benjamin Cunliff, Dr.: To services rendered as real estate agent, procuring purchaser for sale of lots seven and eight of city block 3,861, 100 feet on south side of Cabanne avenue; commission, 2½ per cent. on selling price,-$9,000,-$225.00. Received payment." On a trial anew in the circuit court, where the cause was taken by appeal, to the court sitting as a jury, plaintiff recovered judgment, from which defendant appealed.

Briefly stated, the facts are that defendant owned a vacant lot on Cabanne avenue, in the city of St. Louis, which was for sale, and was in the hands of J. I. Epstein, a real estate broker, and on which for over two years he had posted a sign, "For Sale;" that W. F. Little had seen the lot, with the sign "For Sale" posted on it, and was desirous of buying it, but did not know to whom it belonged, or the price of it. D. W. Hewitt, a real estate broker, was in the office of Little in February, 1900, when Little asked him to find out who owned the lot, and the price of it. Hewitt agreed to do this, and went to plaintiff, also a real estate broker, for information, on account of his superior knowledge in respect to property in that part of the city. Plaintiff showed Hewitt a plat of the lot, told him that defendant owned it, and called up defendant by telephone, and asked him the price of the lot, and said to him that he had a prospective purchaser, in the person of Little. Defendant told plaintiff that the price was $90 per foot, and to go ahead and sell it. Hewitt was present during this telephonic conversation, and went back to Little's office, and told him that defendant owned the lot, and the price. Thus far Hewitt and Little agree in their testimony, but give a different account of what took place afterwards. Hewitt testified that, when he reported the price, Little said that it was cheap enough, and asked if he could trade in a lot that he owned on Von Verson avenue; that he (Hewitt) told Little it was not a trading proposition, and Little replied: "We will take the matter up later on. I am busy now with some other matters." Hewitt further testified that he went back to Little's office two or three times after this on other business, and mentioned the Cabanne lot to him, and Little said: "Let it drop now. We will take it up later." Little testified that Hewitt knew he was in the market for a lot, and mentioned several other lots to him when he (Little) suggested this lot, and that when he reported the price of the lot to him he told him he would not pay that price for it, and considered the matter ended at that time, and had nothing more to do with Hewitt about the lot; that about May 10, 1900, Little went into Epstein's office and bargained for the lot for about $88.50 per front foot, and a few days afterwards the deal was closed by defendant conveying the lot to Little. At the time the contract of sale was made, defendant did not know the name of the purchaser, nor did he learn it until he came to Epstein's office to sign the deed, and he testified that at that time it did not occur to him that Little was the name communicated to him by plaintiff as a prospective purchaser; that, if it had occurred to him, he would not have made the deed because, to use his own...