Cunningham v. Castloo

• Citation: 983 F.3d 185
• Decision Date: 18 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20-40082,20-40082
• Parties: Brandie CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Thomas CASTLOO, Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

983 F.3d 185

Brandie CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.Thomas CASTLOO, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 20-40082

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED December 18, 2020

William Andrew Messer, Melissa H. Cranford, Timothy Allen Dunn, Messer Fort McDonald, P.L.L.C., Frisco, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David Ryan Herring Iglesias, James A. Evans, III, Attorney, Iglesias Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Jolly, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:

This interlocutory appeal presents the question whether Sheriff Thomas Castloo enjoys qualified immunity from Brandie Cunningham's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims premised on the denial of a name-clearing hearing in violation of procedural due process. The district court answered no. Citing factual disputes, and holding that Cunningham's right to a name-clearing hearing was clearly established, the district court denied qualified immunity on summary judgment. The district court's holding was error. Because "the violative nature" of Sheriff Castloo's "particular conduct" was not clearly established, Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam), Sheriff Castloo may claim qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE the denial of qualified immunity and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I

As laid out above, Sheriff Castloo appeals a summary judgment denying him qualified immunity from this lawsuit. In our review, then, we take Cunningham's version of the facts as true. See Kinney v. Weaver , 367 F.3d 337, 347–48 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Brandie Cunningham joined the Wood County Sheriff's Office as a deputy in April 2016. Before that, she worked at the Hopkins County Jail. And before that, she worked as a mental health specialist in the military. Her military duties included reviewing discharge forms, known as DD214s.¹

During Cunningham's stint at the Hopkins County Jail, one of her superiors had asked her to review the DD214 of a jailer named David McGee. Cunningham concluded, based on her military experience, that the DD214 was "altered."

Like Cunningham, McGee moved from Hopkins County to Wood County. By January 2017, he had become a supervisor at the Wood County Jail. His friend, Thomas Castloo, had taken office as Wood County Sheriff on January 1. The events that led to this litigation occurred over a one-week period, beginning on Wednesday, January 18.

On Wednesday the 18th, Cunningham approached Tony Crouse, a Wood County criminal investigator, and asked how she could "go about filing a federal crime." She believed that she had an obligation to report that, in her opinion, McGee's DD214 had been altered. Crouse told Cunningham to bring her concerns to Sheriff Castloo.

On Thursday the 19th, Cunningham and Crouse met with Sheriff Castloo. Cunningham told Sheriff Castloo that she suspected that McGee had altered his DD214. She did not think she was violating her chain of command by bringing her concerns to Crouse and Sheriff Castloo. She spoke to Crouse first because she knew him from Hopkins County. And she spoke to Sheriff Castloo next because Crouse "instructed" her to do so and because she thought that Sheriff Castloo was McGee's supervisor. After the meeting, Cunningham told her chain of command what she had reported. She also told at least one person outside her chain of command—Deputy Justin Bowring.

On Friday the 20th, Cunningham met with Sheriff Castloo and Chief Deputy Bobby Sanders. Sheriff Castloo called Cunningham a "liar" and said that "the only reason" she "was doing this to McGee was because [she] hated him." Sheriff Castloo asked her "numerous times" how many people she had told about her suspicion that McGee had altered his DD214. She gave Sheriff Castloo the names of everyone she told within her chain of command. Because Sheriff Castloo was yelling at her, however, she says that she forgot that she had told Deputy Bowring. Neither Sheriff Castloo nor Chief Deputy Sanders told Cunningham that she was under investigation for lying and violating the chain of command.

Later that day, Cunningham remembered that she had told Deputy Bowring of her suspicion that McGee had altered his DD214. So she sent a text message to Captain Robert Holland, "asking if [she] could meet with the [S]heriff because [she] needed to tell him more information." Captain Holland remained silent.

That night, Cunningham received a call from Lieutenant William Burge. Lieutenant Burge told her to report to Sheriff Castloo's office on Monday morning. She asked Lieutenant Burge if she "was going to be able to speak with" Sheriff Castloo. Lieutenant Burge responded that she "was not allowed to speak with the [S]heriff that day," but she could speak to him on Monday morning.

On the morning of Monday the 23rd, Cunningham met with Chief Deputy Sanders, Lieutenant Burge, and Captain Holland. Thereupon, she was fired for "improper use of chain of command and lying." She was not told how she had lied or how her "use" of the chain of command was "improper." She "ask[ed] to speak with the [S]heriff at that time," but "they would not allow [her] to talk to him." She did not receive a written notice describing the charges against her, nor was she "allowed" to respond to the oral charges made against her. When she tried to speak, Chief Deputy Sanders cut her off, saying, "I don't need to hear anything further from you ...."²

The next day, Sheriff Castloo signed Cunningham's F-5. The F-5 is filed with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement and indicates the nature of an officer's discharge: honorable, dishonorable, or general. Sheriff Castloo designated the discharge as "dishonorable," which is the "only option" when the employee is "found guilty of either lying or lack of clarity." Since Cunningham was dishonorably discharged, she has not found further work.

Cunningham sued Wood County and Sheriff Castloo—in his individual and official capacities—in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that Sheriff Castloo violated, among other rights, her Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by denying her request for a name-clearing hearing. Sheriff Castloo claimed qualified immunity.

After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Cunningham's motion in full and granted Wood County and Sheriff Castloo's motion in part, dismissing all but the procedural-due-process claims against Sheriff Castloo and Wood County. Although Sheriff Castloo raised a qualified-immunity defense to that claim, the district court held that Cunningham had "successfully rebutted" it. The district court said that factual disputes, when resolved in Cunningham's favor, established a procedural-due-process violation and satisfied qualified-immunity's constitutional-violation prong. Qualified immunity's clearly established prong was met, the district court reasoned, because Wisconsin v. Constantineau , 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), and Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake , 449 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2006), had "placed beyond debate" Cunningham's "liberty interest in the opportunity to clear her name of stigmatizing charges."

Sheriff Castloo timely filed this interlocutory appeal.³

II

We begin with our jurisdiction and the standard of review. Sheriff Castloo challenges the denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment. That denial is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine to the extent that it turned on an issue of law. Melton v. Phillips , 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We lack jurisdiction to review the genuineness of the factual disputes the district court identified, but we have jurisdiction to review their materiality . Id. That means "our review is limited to determining whether the factual disputes that the district court identified are material to the application of qualified immunity." Samples v. Vadzemnieks , 900 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty. , 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) ). We review legal conclusions, materiality determinations, and the scope of clearly established law de novo. Amador v. Vasquez , 961 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

In determining materiality, we take Cunningham's version of the facts as true and view those facts through the lens of qualified immunity. See Samples , 900 F.3d at 660. If Sheriff Castloo would still be entitled to qualified immunity under this view of the facts, then any disputed facts are not material, the district court's denial of summary judgment was improper, and we must reverse. See Lytle v. Bexar Cnty. , 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009).

These precepts are clear, though perhaps less so to Cunningham. She contends that we lack jurisdiction because the district court said that it found genuine disputes of material fact. Not so. The mere fact that the district court said that, in its view, material factual disputes preclude summary judgment does not deprive us of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Shaboon v. Duncan , 252 F.3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Although the district court explicitly stated that material fact issues remain ... this in itself does not preclude appellate review."). We may of course decide whether the factual disputes the district court said were material are in fact material. See Melton , 875 F.3d at 261.

Assured of our jurisdiction, we turn to the merits.

III

Sheriff Castloo contends the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity on summary judgment. We begin with the doctrine of qualified immunity. We next lay out the underlying substantive law that dictates whether Sheriff Castloo is entitled to the defense. We last apply the substantive law and doctrine to the facts of this case.

A

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability in their individual capacity so long as their conduct " ‘does not violate clearly...