Cunningham v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 15 September 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-01659
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: RONNIE JAMES CUNNINGHAM, JR., Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

RONNIE JAMES CUNNINGHAM, JR., Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-01659

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 15, 2014

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action brought under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying the Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17). For the reasons expressed herein, the Commissioner's decision shall be REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 19, 2010, Plaintiff Ronnie James Cunningham, Jr., filed an application for disability insurance benefits alleging that he became disabled on October 23, 2010, due to lumbar degenerative disc disease. Mr. Cunningham's initial application was denied on January 19, 2011, and he timely requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). On April 11, 2012, Mr. Cunningham appeared with his attorney for anadministrative hearing before ALJ Patrick S. Cutter. On May 23, 2012, the ALJ denied Mr. Cunningham's application for disability insurance benefits, finding that he was capable of performing a limited range of light work and making an adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Mr. Cunningham requested administrative review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, submitting an additional two-page medical opinion from Mr. Cunningham's treating orthopedist to rebut certain of the ALJ's findings. The Appeals Council denied his request for review on May 7, 2013. This makes the ALJ's May 23, 2012, decision the "final decision" of the Commissioner subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

Mr. Cunningham appealed the Commissioner's final decision by filing the complaint in this action on June 19, 2013. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner filed her answer to the complaint on September 5, 2013. (Doc. 7). Together with her answer, the Commissioner filed a transcript of the administrative record in Mr. Cunningham's case. (Doc. 8). The matter is now fully briefed by the parties and ripe for decision. (Doc. 9; Doc. 12; Doc. 13).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, the Court's review is limited to determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence five); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marksomitted). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Mr. Cunningham is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that he is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) ("[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.") (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("The [Commissioner]'s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts."); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 ("[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .").

To receive disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expectedto last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment¹ that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity² that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the Commissioner must determine, in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;³ (4) whether the claimant is able to do past relevant work, considering his or her residual functional capacity ("RFC");⁴ and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating a medically determinableimpairment that prevents him or her from doing past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). Once the claimant has established at step four that he or she cannot do past relevant work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her RFC, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

III. THE ALJ'S DECISION

In his May 23, 2012, decision, the ALJ determined that Mr. Cunningham met the insured status requirement⁵ of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2015. (Admin. Tr. 16, Doc. 8-2, at 17). At step one of the five-step process, the ALJ determined that Mr. Cunningham did not engage in any substantial gainful activity between his alleged onset date of October 23, 2010, and the date of the ALJ's decision. (Admin. Tr. 16, Doc. 8-2, at 17). At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Cunningham had the following severe impairment: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. (Admin. Tr. 16, Doc. 8-2, at 17). The ALJ also considered several other medically determinable health conditions found in the claimant's medical history, finding each to be non-severe. (Admin. Tr. 16-18, Doc. 8-2, at 17-19). At step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Cunningham did not have an impairment, or combination of impairments, that met or medically equaled the severity of any one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Admin. Tr. 18, Doc. 8-2, at 19).

Prior to step four, the ALJ determined Mr. Cunningham's RFC based on the evidence of record, including the claimant's testimony, the findings and opinions of treating and examining medical sources, and the testimony of the claimant's girlfriend. The ALJ determined that Mr. Cunningham retained the RFC to perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567, including certain non-exertional limitations. (Admin. Tr. 18-20, Doc. 8-2, at 19-21). Specifically, the ALJ found that:

[T]he claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). The claimant is capable of occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. The claimant's work must be able to be done while sitting or standing and must allow for access to a restroom. The claimant is limited to unskilled (defined as "work that requires little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in thirty days or less with little vocational preparation). The claimant has a moderate (defined as "more than a slight limitation but the function can still be performed on a consistent enough basis to be satisfactory to employers) limitation in the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods.

(Admin. Tr. 18, Doc. 8-2, at 19).

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) and Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, the ALJ considered Mr. Cunningham's testimony and found that "the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment." (Admin. Tr. 19, Doc. 8-2, at 20; see also Admin. Tr. 30-47, Doc. 8-2, at...