Cunningham v. Waford
| Decision Date | 07 August 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 25,No. 23390,25,23390 |
| Citation | 131 Idaho 841,965 P.2d 201 |
| Parties | , 129 Ed. Law Rep. 1151 Shawna CUNNINGHAM, Rae Del Jensen, Darrell Jensen, Marcia Roberts and Jacki Sorenson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gordon WAFORD, Director of Personnel, and L. Jerry Skaggs, Department of Transportation, in their individual and official capacities; and Board of Trustees, Pocatello School District, and Joseph Willes, Jr.; Dr. R. Glenn McMinn; Maxine Crow-Shaw; Dr. Kay Merriam, and Dr. Robert Weppner, members of the Board, in their official capacities, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
John E. Rumel, Boise, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Pocatello, for Defendants-Respondents. Douglas J. Balfour argued.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the plaintiffs in a civil rights action that was resolved by a settlement are entitled to recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). The district court held that the plaintiffs had not achieved a degree of success that would merit an award of attorney fees or costs. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's decision.
In July 1994, the appellants, Shawna Cunningham, Rae Del Jensen, Darrell Jensen, Marcia Roberts and Jacki Sorenson (the bus drivers), instituted an action against the Pocatello School District Board of Trustees and certain employees of the school district (collectively referred to herein as the school district). In their complaint, the bus drivers alleged they were all employed by the school district as school bus drivers and that the school district had violated their right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, their rights under ARTICLE 1, § 10 OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION1, and their rights under Idaho Code § 33-517. 2 Each of the claims was based on the assertion that the school district had discriminated against and harassed the bus drivers because of their membership in a labor union, the Pocatello Education Association. The bus drivers sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages on each cause of action.
The school district filed a motion to dismiss the bus drivers' suit and a motion for a partial summary judgment. Both motions were denied. One year later, the school district filed a second summary judgment motion which was also denied. Shortly thereafter the bus drivers and the school district entered into a stipulation for judgment that settled the lawsuit. Under the terms of the stipulation, the drivers agreed to drop their damage claims and the school district, without admitting liability, agreed to entry of an injunction that would prohibit the school district from discriminating against employees because of their union membership or their exercise of rights under state and federal law, including the right to freedom of association and freedom of speech. The school district also agreed that the judgment would require the district: to follow certain procedures when considering or taking disciplinary action against employees or placing adverse information in personnel files, to hold confidential any adverse information placed in the bus drivers' personnel files between December 1992 and the date of judgment and to not use such information in future evaluations of the bus drivers, and to give transportation department employees a meaningful opportunity for input regarding revisions of the School District's transportation department manual. The stipulation also left the question of either party's entitlement Following entry of a judgment on the stipulation, the bus drivers filed a motion seeking attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d). Although the district court ruled that the bus drivers were the prevailing party with regard to their federal law claims, it nevertheless denied their motion for attorney fees because it concluded that the bus drivers had obtained only a nominal victory which did not warrant the award of fees. With regard to the claim for costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d), the district court concluded that neither party had prevailed and therefore denied an award of costs. On appeal, the bus drivers contend that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and in not granting costs under state law.
to attorney fees for resolution by the court.
The bus drivers' federal cause of action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows an individual to bring a lawsuit against anyone who, under color of law, deprives the individual of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." The bus drivers claim entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That statute provides in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." By terms of this statute, in order to be entitled to an attorney fee award, the bus drivers must demonstrate that they are the "prevailing party."
The question of when a party may be deemed to have prevailed within the meaning of § 1988 has generated considerable litigation in the federal courts, including several United States Supreme Court decisions. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the United States Supreme Court stated, "Plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (1st Cir.1978)). This test was later refined in Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), where the Court held that the entry of a declaratory judgment in a party's favor did not automatically render that party prevailing under § 1988. Id. at 3, 109 S.Ct. 202. Rather, the Court stated that a judgment "will constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff." Id. at 4, 109 S.Ct. 202. Most recently, in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), the Court held that "a plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Id. at 111-112, 113 S.Ct. 566. Hence, a plaintiff seeking characterization as the prevailing party must, at a minimum, identify some favorable change in the defendant's behavior that was prompted by the litigation.
Achieving prevailing party status does not, however, automatically entitle a litigant to an award of attorney fees. Rather, "the degree of the plaintiff's overall success" affects the reasonableness of an attorney fee award. Id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566. In Farrar, the Supreme Court held that in some circumstances, even a plaintiff who has technically prevailed should be granted no attorney fees at all. In that case, the plaintiff, who had sought seventeen million dollars in damages but was awarded only nominal damages following a jury trial, was found to be such a prevailing party. The Court commented, "When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566.
Here, the district court concluded that by obtaining the stipulated judgment requiring certain acts on the part of the The bus drivers initially sought both damages and equitable relief, but abandoned the damages claim as a part of the settlement. This relinquishment of their request for damages does not, of itself, militate against an attorney fee award. Equitable relief alone may warrant fees. Indeed, in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had prevailed and were entitled to attorney fees under § 1988 where their lawsuit had materially altered the defendant school district's policy limiting teachers' rights to communicate with each other concerning employee organizations and union activities. Similarly, in Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 751-52 (9th Cir.1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who sued for damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief but received no damage award was, nevertheless, entitled to attorney fees because the lawsuit was the catalyst that induced the defendants to grant the plaintiff licenses that had previously been denied. Also, in Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550 (9th Cir.1994), the Court held that a district court could properly award attorney fees to a plaintiff who had received a nominal damage award if it could "point to some way in which the litigation succeeded, in addition to obtaining a judgment." The Court stated, "If the lawsuit achieved other tangible results--such as sparking a change in policy or establishing a finding of fact with potential collateral estoppel effects--such results will, in combination with an enforceable judgment for a nominal sum, support an award of fees." Id. at 555.
school district, the bus drivers had become the prevailing party. Relying upon Farrar, however, the court declined to award attorney fees because the bus drivers had recovered no damages and, in the court's view, had prevailed only nominally on their claims for equitable relief. We review this decision for an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bouten Constr. Co. v. HF Magnuson Co.
...absent abuse of discretion. Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 559, 961 P.2d 647, 650 (1998); see also Cunningham v. Waford, 131 Idaho 841, 843-44, 965 P.2d 201, 203-04 (Ct.App.1998). In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test fa......
-
Ass'n of APARTMENT OWNERS of KEAUHOU v. BOWERS, 29218
...a court could determine that a claim for enforcement was neither "substantiated" nor "not substantiated." See Cunningham v. Waford, 965 P.2d 201, 205-06 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that there was no prevailing party when litigation was resolved through a settlement agreement); Boxer M......