Farrar v. Hobby

Decision Date14 December 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-990,91-990
Citation113 S.Ct. 566,506 U.S. 103,121 L.Ed.2d 494
PartiesDale FARRAR and Pat Smith, Co-Administrators of Estate of Joseph D. Farrar, Deceased, Petitioners, v. William P. HOBBY, Jr
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus *

Petitioners, coadministrators of decedent Farrar's estate, sought $17 million in compensatory damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, from respondent Hobby and other Texas public officials for the alleged illegal closure of the school that Farrar and his son operated. However, the Federal District Court awarded them only nominal damages and, subsequently, awarded them $280,000 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court of Appeals reversed the fee award on the ground that petitioners were not prevailing parties eligible for fees under § 1988.

Held:

1. A plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under § 1988. A plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654; Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1; Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866. Here, petitioners were entitled to nominal damages under Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, because they were able to establish Hobby's liability for denial of procedural due process, but could not prove the actual injury necessary for a compensatory damages award. Judgment for nominal damages entitled petitioners to demand payment and modified Hobby's behavior for petitioners' benefit by forcing him to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not have paid. The prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained, and whether a nominal damages award is a "technical," "insignificant" victory does not affect the plaintiff's prevailing party status. Cf. Garland, supra, 489 U.S., at 792, 109 S.Ct. at 1493. Pp. ____.

2. Petitioners are not entitled to a fee award. While the "technical" nature of a nominal damages award does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988. The most critical factor in determining a fee award's reasonableness is the degree of success obtained, since a fee based on the hours expended on the litigation as a whole may be excessive if a plaintiff achieves only partial or limited success. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40. When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. In light of "the relationship between" the extent of petitioners' success on the merits and the award's amount, id., at 438, 103 S.Ct., at 1942, the reasonable fee was not the District Court's $280,000 award but no fee at all. Pp. ____.

941 F.2d 1311 (CA5 1991), affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.

Gerald M. Birnberg, Houston, Tex., for petitioners.

Finis E. Cowan, Houston, Tex., for respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide today whether a civil rights plaintiff who receives a nominal damages award is a "prevailing party" eligible to receive attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an award of attorney's fees on the ground that a plaintiff receiving only nominal damages is not a prevailing party. Although we hold that such a plaintiff is a prevailing party, we affirm the denial of fees in this case.

I

Joseph Davis Farrar and Dale Lawson Farrar owned and operated Artesia Hall, a school in Liberty County, Texas, for delinquent, disabled, and disturbed teens. After an Artesia Hall student died in 1973, a Liberty County grand jury returned a murder indictment charging Joseph Farrar with willful failure to administer proper medical treatment and failure to provide timely hospitalization. The State of Texas also obtained a temporary injunction that closed Artesia Hall.

Respondent William P. Hobby, Jr., then Lieutenant Governor of Texas, participated in the events leading to the closing of Artesia Hall. After Joseph Farrar was indicted, Hobby issued a press release criticizing the Texas Department of Public Welfare and its licensing procedures. He urged the department's director to investigate Artesia Hall and accompanied Governor Dolph Briscoe on an inspection of the school. Finally, he attended the temporary injunction hearing with Briscoe and spoke to reporters after the hearing.

Joseph Farrar sued Hobby, Judge Clarence D. Cain, County Attorney Arthur J. Hartell III, and the director and two employees of the Department of Public Welfare for monetary and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The complaint alleged deprivation of liberty and property without due process by means of conspiracy and malicious prosecution aimed at closing Artesia Hall. Later amendments to the complaint added Dale Farrar as a plaintiff, dropped the claim for injunctive relief, and increased the request for damages to $17 million. After Joseph Farrar died on February 20, 1983, petitioners Dale Farrar and Pat Smith, coadministrators of his estate, were substituted as plaintiffs.

The case was tried before a jury in the Southern District of Texas on August 15, 1983. Through special interrogatories, the jury found that all of the defendants except Hobby had conspired against the plaintiffs but that this conspiracy was not a proximate cause of any injury suffered by the plaintiffs. The jury also found that Hobby had "committed an act or acts under color of state law that deprived Plaintiff Joseph Davis Farrar of a civil right," but it found that Hobby's conduct was not "a proximate cause of any damages" suffered by Joseph Farrar. App. to Brief in Opposition A-3. The jury made no findings in favor of Dale Farrar. In accordance with the jury's answers to the special interrogatories, the District Court ordered that "Plaintiffs take nothing, that the action be dismissed on the merits, and that the parties bear their own costs." Id., at A-6.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148 (1985). The court affirmed the failure to award compensatory or nominal damages against the conspirators because the plaintiffs had not proved an actual deprivation of a constitutional right. Id., at 1151-1152. Because the jury found that Hobby had deprived Joseph Farrar of a civil right, however, the Fifth Circuit remanded for entry of judgment against Hobby for nominal damages. Id., at 1152.

The plaintiffs then sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On January 30, 1987, the District Court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $280,000 in fees, $27,932 in expenses, and $9,730 in prejudgment interest against Hobby. The court denied Hobby's motion to reconsider the fee award on August 31, 1990.

A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed the fee award. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (1991). After reviewing our decisions in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (per curiam ), and Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), the majority held that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and were therefore ineligible for fees under § 1988:

"The Farrars sued for $17 million in money damages; the jury gave them nothing. No money damages. No declaratory relief. No injunctive relief. Nothing. . . . [T]he Farrars did succeed in securing a jury-finding that Hobby violated their civil rights and a nominal award of one dollar. However, this finding did not in any meaningful sense 'change the legal relationship' between the Farrars and Hobby. Nor was the result a success for the Farrars on a 'significant issue that achieve[d] some of the benefit the [Farrars] sought in bringing suit.' When the sole relief sought is money damages, we fail to see how a party 'prevails' by winning one dollar out of the $17 million requested." 941 F.2d, at 1315 (citations omitted) (quoting Garland, supra, 489 U.S., at 791-792, 109 S.Ct., at 1493).1

The majority reasoned that even if an award of nominal damages represented some sort of victory, "surely [the Farrars'] was 'a technical victory . . . so insignificant and . . . so near the situations addressed in Hewitt and Rhodes, as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status.' " 941 F.2d, at 1315 (quoting Garland, supra, 489 U.S., at 792, 109 S.Ct., at 1493).2

The dissent argued that "Hewitt, Rhodes and Garland [do not] go so far" as to hold that "where plaintiff obtains only nominal damages for his constitutional deprivation, he cannot be considered the prevailing party." 941 F.2d at 1317 (Reavley, J., dissenting).

We granted certiorari. 502 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1159, 117 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).

II

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides in relevant part:

"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 . . ., or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . ., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."

"Congress intended to permit the . . . award of counsel fees only when a...

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