Cuny v. Annunzio
| Decision Date | 20 March 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 32060,32060 |
| Citation | 411 Ill. 613,104 N.E.2d 780 |
| Parties | CUNY et al. v. ANNUNZIO. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John C. Friese, of Chicago, for appellants.
Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
This is an appeal by Edward Cuny and Bernice Cuny, doing business as the Cuny Addressing Service, from a judgment of the superior court of Cook County, which confirmed a decision of the Board of Review of the Department of Labor.
The cause arose when one Cecelia Jaeger filed a claim for unemployment compensation. In processing the claim a deputy of the Division of Unemployment Compensation of the Department of Labor issued an administrative finding that appellants were, in 1946, employers within the purview of the Unemployment Compensation Act; (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 48, pars. 217-250,) that Cecelia Jaeger had performed services for appellants constituting employment under the act; that she had received wages and that she was entitled to unemployment compensation. Upon appeal by appellants to a referee, and upon further appeal from his decision to the Board of Review of the Department of Labor, the initial decision of the deputy was affirmed. Appellants then filed a complaint in the superior court seeking a review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 110, pars. 264-279.) The complaint named Frank Annunzio, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, as the only defendant, and sought 'review of a decision of the Board of Review and said Director of Labor.' The judgment of the superior court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review and appellants seek further review by appealing directly to this court.
In a motion, which has been taken with the case, the Director has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellants failed to join as parties defendant two necessary and indispensable parties, to wit, the Board of Review, whose decision is sought to be reviewed, and Cecelia Jaeger, who initiated the administrative proceeding by filing a claim for unemployment compensation, and whose interests will be materially affected by the outcome of the case. Appellants contend (1) that while the Board of Review is an administrative agency, it is not independent of the Department of Labor and its Director, but is in reality a division of the Department; (2) that the Attorney General by arguing the merits of the cause before the superior court on behalf of the Board of Review in effect entered the appearance of the Board of Review and acted as its counsel; and (3) that their failure to join the Board of Review has been waived by the failure of appellee to object. Insofar as the motion pertains to the claimant, Cecelia Jaeger, appellants contend: (1) that a decision in the cause will not materially affect her interests, and (2) that she abandoned her interest and claim by not filing appearance or otherwise appearing before the superior court, the said Cecelia Jaeger having been duly served with a summons.
Section 8 of the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 110, par. 271,) provides that 'In any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.' The Board of Review is an 'administrative agency' within the meaning of section 8 by virtue of the definition contained in section 1 of the Administrative Review Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 110, par. 264,) which states:
'For the purpose of this Act: 'Administrative Agency' means a person, body of persons, group, officer, board, bureau, commission or department (other than a court, judge, justice of the peace or magistrate) of the State, or of any political subdivision thereof or municipal...
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Ultsch v. Illinois Mun. Retirement Fund
...requirement that a complaint for administrative review name as a defendant the administrative agency. Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617, 104 N.E.2d 780 (1952); 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2004). The only exceptions the statutory language has carved out are those specified The plain meaning ......
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Nau, In re
...Whether or not respondent directed attention by objection to what is statutorily mandated is immaterial. See Cuny v. Annunzio (1952), 411 Ill. 613, 617, 104 N.E.2d 780 (holding that express statutory requirements rendered it immaterial that no objections were made regarding naming certain p......
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