Cure v. City of Jefferson, 50305
Decision Date | 13 July 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 50305,50305,1 |
Citation | 380 S.W.2d 305 |
Parties | William D. CURE and Ernest F. Linhardt, d/b/a Cure-Linhardt Construction Company, Appellants, v. CITY OF JEFFERSON, Respondent, Schwarz & Van Hoefen, Architects, Arthur F. Schwarz and Hari Van Hoefen, Defendants |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Tweedie Fisher, Jefferson City, for appellants.
Thomas P. Rose, Bond & Dominique, P. Pierre Dominique, John O. Bond, Jefferson City, for respondent.
WELBORN, Commissioner.
This is an action by the general contractors under a contract with the City of Jefferson for the contruction of a municipally owned parking facility. The petition sought recovery from the City of $62,898.94 for the removal of rock in the excavation for the project. The architects for the facility were originally named party defendants. The trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment made by each defendant. The contractors have appealed from the judgment in favor of the City. No appeal was taken from the judgment in favor of the architects. We have jurisdiction of the appeal because of the amount in controversy.
The petition alleged that the plaintiffs, a partnership, entered into a contract, in June, 1961, with the defendant City for the construction of a parking garage for a base contract amount of $301,730.64, plus a unit price for general rock excavation and hand excavated pier rock in excess of 300 cubic feet at $2.00 per cubic foot; that the plaintiffs excavated 31,449.47 cubic feet of rock and, on October 17, 1961, submitted to the City their statement for payment in the amount of $62,989.94, which the City refused to pay. A copy of the contract between the plaintiffs and the City was incorporated by reference in the plaintiffs' petition.
The defendant City by its answer admitted the execution of the contract, but denied generally the allegations of plaintiffs' petition. The City also denied liability on the grounds of failure of plaintiffs to comply with provisions of the contract relating to the procedure to be followed before making a claim for extra compensation over and above the base bid and general contract sum.
After the deposition of plaintiff Cure had been taken, the City filed its motion for summary judgment, based upon the provisions of the contract as set out in the plaintiffs' petition and statements of Cure on his deposition. The motion relied specifically upon the following provisions of the contract documents: (1) Article 3 of the basic agreement (AIA Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Owner for Construction of Buildings), which read as follows:
'Natkin & Co.--Combined bid on Heating, Ventilating & Snow Melting and Plumbing & Drainage
'Stokes Electric Co., Inc.--Electric Work.'
(2) Section 5 of the Specifications relating to excavation, backfilling and filling (incorporated by reference as a part of the contract), which provided as follows:
'6. ITEMS OF WORK
'a) Remove existing earth, existing footings and all other items required to be removed.
'b) Do all necessary rough grading for floors, walks, drives, etc 'c) Include removal of 300 cubic feet of rock as a part of the base bid for excavation, backfilling and filling.
(3) The following provision of the bid form submitted by plaintiffs, likewise incorporated by reference as part of the contract:
'UNIT PRICES
'1. Excavation. Backfilling. Filling & Grading--Section 5
'a) Unit price for excavation of:
'1. Common by machine $ 1.00 per cu. yd.
'2. Common by hand $10.00 per cu. yd.
'b) Unit Price for excavation of:
'1. Rock excavation of more than 300 cu. ft. $2,00 per cu. ft.
(4) Articles 15 and 16 of the General Conditions of the Contract (AIA Standard Form), which read as follows:
'In giving instructions, the architect shall have authority to make minor changes in the work, not involving extra cost, and not inconsistent with the purposes of the building, but otherwise, except in an emergency endangering life or property, no extra work or change shall be made unless in pursuance of a written order from the owner signed or countersigned by the architect, or a written order from the architect stating that the owner has authorized the extra work or change, no claim for an addition to the contract sum shall be valid unless so ordered.
'The value of any such extra work or change shall be determined in one or more of the following ways:
'a) By estimate and acceptance in a lump sum.
'b) By unit prices named in the contract or subsequently agreed upon.
'c) By cost and percentage or by cost and a fixed fee.
'Should conditions encountered below the surface of the ground be at variance with the conditions indicated by the drawings and specifications the contract sum shall be equitably adjusted upon claim by either party made within a reasonable time after the first observance of the conditions.
(5) Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Special Conditions of the Contract, which provide as follows:
'10. CHANGES IN THE WORK. Article 15 of the 'General Conditions' is hereby modified. The third paragraph shall read: 'The value of any such extra work or change shall be determined in one or the other of the following ways:
'11. CLAIMS FOR EXTRA COST. Article 16 of the 'general Conditions' is hereby amended as follows: 'A reasonable time is hereby defined as five days.''
The motion further relied upon the statements of plaintiff Cure in his deposition that, at the time the rock was encountered in the excavation work, he determined that in excess of 300 cubic feet of rock would be required to be removed and that he intended to charge for the rock so removed, but that he made no request for a changeorder; that the City was not informed that the alleged rock had been removed until sometime after it had been excavated; that the first written notice to the defendant City was in the form of a partial billing in the amount of $30,000; that Cure was aware of the provisions of the specifications with respect to change-orders and additions to the contract sum.
Based upon the deposition of Cure, the motion alleged that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the conditions of the contract necessary for the compensation for the removal of the alleged rock in the following respects: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Pagan v. City of Kennett
...and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Norman v. Willis, Mo.App., 402 S.W.2d 46, 47(1). See Cure v. City of Jefferson, Mo., 380 S.W.2d 305, 310(2). Our appellate courts have repeatedly characterized a summary judgment as an extreme and drastic remedy and have warned tha......
-
Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Investments
...in Corbin and the Restatement (Second), does not change former Missouri law, as stated by our Supreme Court in Cure v. City of Jefferson, 380 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo.1964), nor, the Court explained, do the changes in the Restatement (Second) change the principles of law stated in the Restatemen......
-
ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., MID-AMERICA
...a material issue of fact, because movant had not established a right to judgment as a matter of law). Accord Cure v. City of Jefferson, 380 S.W.2d 305, 309-310 (Mo.1964). At this stage of the analysis, the initial classification of movants is A movant's right to judgment as a matter of law ......
-
Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas City
...of the court of appeals is to determine the meaning to be enforced, not by what the parties now say was intended [Cure v. City of Jefferson, 380 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo.1964) ], but by what the words in context, the full circumstances at the contract formation event and the course of performanc......