Cureton v. Joma Plumbing & Heating Co.

• Decision Date: 09 October 1962
• Docket Number: No. A--7,A--7
• Citation: 38 N.J. 326,184 A.2d 644
• Parties: Vera CURETON, Administratrix of the Estate of John Robinson, deceased, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOMA PLUMBING & HEATING CO., Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 326

38 N.J. 326

184 A.2d 644

Vera CURETON, Administratrix of the Estate of John Robinson deceased, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOMA PLUMBING & HEATING CO., Respondent-Respondent.

No. A--7.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Sept. 11, 1962.

Decided Oct. 9, 1962.

Leonard J. Felzenberg, Newark, for petitioner-appellant (Roskein, Kronisch, Felzenberg & Mandell, Newark, attorneys, Leonard J. Felzenberg, Newark, on the brief).

Joseph T. Ryan, Jersey City, for respondent-respondent (Lamb, Langan & Blake, Jersey City, attorneys, Joseph T. Ryan, Jersey City, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.

This is a workmen's compensation case. John Robinson, the original petitioner, met with a compensable accident on May 30, 1959, while in the employ of the respondent. He received temporary disability payments from the respondent until June 29, 1959, when he returned to work. On July 28, 1959 Robinson filed a claim petition for permanent disability compensation. The respondent filed an answer and the matter was pretried in the Workmen's Compensation Division on November 23, 1959.

The pretrial memorandum admitted all jurisdictional elements and limited the issues to the nature and extent of the disability. The memorandum included the reports of both Robinson's and the respondent's medical examiners, who evaluated Robinson's partial permanent disability at 10% And 2 1/2% Respectively.

On January 4, 1960, before the matter was tried in the Workmen's Compensation Division, Robinson died intestate from a cause unrelated to his compensable injury. He left no statutory dependents (N.J.S.A. 34:15--13(g)) and had not received any payments on account of his permanent disability.

Robinson's only surviving next of kin were two sisters, one of whom, Vera Cureton, is the present petitioner. On June 24, 1960 she filed an 'Affidavit of Next of Kin in Lieu of Administration Where Real and Personal Estate Does Not Exceed $1,500' with the Surrogate of Essex County, pursuant to N.J.S. 3A:6--6, N.J.S.A. The affidavit stated that Robinson's estate consisted of the following asset: 'Claim for Workmen's Compensation in the sum of $400.' With the filing of the consent of the other sister, Vera Cureton became entitled to receive the personal assets of the decedent 'without administration or entering into a bond.' N.J.S. 3A:6--6, N.J.S.A. Thereafter, she was substituted in this action as the party petitioner.

The petitioner sought to recover those payments for permanent disability which had accrued, but had not been paid, to Robinson from the end of the period for temporary disability payments to the date of his death. In addition, she sought the statutory funeral allowance (N.J.S.A. 34:15--12(e)) of up to $400 from the remaining amount due after his death.

The Workmen's Compensation Division dismissed the petition on the ground that the cause of action abated upon the death of Robinson with no surviving dependents. The Essex County Court affirmed.

On petitioner's appeal to the Appellate Division, the court held that the claim for compensation payments abated upon the death of Robinson without statutory dependents, but that the petitioner was entitled to an allowance for funeral expenses pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15--12(e). Since the respondent conceded Robinson's permanent disability was 2 1/2% Of total, and therefore the full award for compensation would exceed the statutory maximum of $400 for funeral expenses, the matter was remanded to the Division for entry of judgment for the petitioner in that amount. 71 N.J.Super. 249, 176 A.2d 799 (1962). The petitioner sought certification, which we granted. 37 N.J. 89, 179 A.2d 417 (1962).

On this appeal, the petitioner urges that, as personal representative of the decedent Robinson, she is entitled to have the Workmen's Compensation Division enter an appropriate award for Robinson's permanent disability. She contends that, in addition to a funeral allowance, any part of such award which represents compensation payments for the period up to Robinson's death should survive to her as his personal representative. The respondent does not contest the allowance for funeral expenses, but argues that the claim for compensation payments abated at the death of Robinson without surviving dependents. Respondent contends that the Workmen's Compensation Act is intended for the benefit of employees and their dependents only, and payment of compensation to the personal representative of the deceased workman is beyond the scope of the act.

A major objective of our Workmen's Compensation Act is to provide an employee, when he suffers a work-connected injury, with a speedy and efficient remedy for loss of wages and the permanent impairment of his physical capabilities. It recognizes that many employees are without sufficient means to sustain themselves either during the period of temporary disability or thereafter if the injury results in a permanent lessening of physical capacity. Clearly, the legislative purpose is to create benefits which will issue promptly according to the schedules in the statute. After the seven-day waiting period, N.J.S.A. 34:15--14, payments are to be made for the duration of temporary disability and, immediately thereafter, N.J.S.A. 34:15--16, for any permanent disability. Moore v. Magor Car Corp., 27 N.J. 82, 141 A.2d 536 (1958). As we said in that case:

'The basic idea was to avoid the disaster that delay might bring to the workman and his family, or the loss of self-respect that the necessity of appeal for public relief might visit upon them. Compensation was to be a benefit earned. It was to be a matter of right and not of grace or related in any way to the dole.' At page 85, 141 A.2d at page 537. (Emphasis added)

The workman's right to the compensation benefits which he has 'earned' comes from his employment contract, whose terms include the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218, 226, 113 A.2d 666 (1955). When he has sustained a work-connected injury within the terms of that contract and the waiting period has passed, he immediately becomes entitled to compensation, subject only to determination as to amount and duration. This may be accomplished either through direct agreement with the employer, R.S. 34:15--50, N.J.S.A., or by a determination of the Workmen's Compensation Division. R.S. 34:15--20, N.J.S.A.

The workman's right to receive weekly compensation payments extends for the full scheduled period (subject to increase or decrease in extent of incapacity, N.J.S.A. 34:15--27) unless, of course, the workman's death ends the need for continued financial aid to him. In such a case, the right to the payments which would have accrued after the workman's death dies with him in the absence of a specific statute preserving such a right. Erie Railroad Co. v. Callaway, 91 N.J.L. 32, 102 A. 6 (Sup.Ct.1917). However, a claim for compensation payments which accrued but were not paid at the time of the workman's death is a vested right which he has earned, and therefore it becomes an asset of his estate. In Roney v. Griffith Piano Co., 4 N.J.Misc. 31, 131 A. 686 (Essex C.P.1925), affirmed sub nom. Griffith Piano Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 4 N.J.Misc. 837, 134 A. 922 (Sup.Ct.1926), the employer appealed from an award for compensation to the workman Roney. During the pendency of the appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, Roney died and the employer thereafter urged that there was no person to whom any compensation could be properly paid. Roney's widow was not a party to this proceeding. In rejecting the employer's contention, Judge (later Justice) Porter said:

'The authorities cited in support of this view do not sustain that contention. On the contrary, the law is settled that the personal representative of the deceased is entitled to the compensation which had accrued up to the date of death of the petitioner.' 4 N.J.Misc., at p. 33, 131 A. at p. 687.

The above holding is in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority. Inman v. Meares, 247 N.C. 661, 101 S.E.2d 692 (Sup.Ct.1958), and cases cited therein; see also 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 578; Annotations: 15 A.L.R. 821; 24 A.L.R. 441; 29 A.L.R. 1426; 51 A.L.R. 1446; 87 A.L.R. 864; 95 A.L.R. 254. As Dean Larson puts it in his authoritative treatise 'Accrued but unpaid installments are, of course, an asset of the estate (of the workman), like any other debt.' (Citing cases.) 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 58.40, n. 64.

The Appellate Division said:

'Next of kin, who are not dependents as defined in the statute, and creditors of the decedent are not the intended beneficiaries of workmen's compensation payments which an employer must make without regard to fault.' 71 N.J.Super., at p. 254, 176 A.2d at p. 801.

But, if the payments which accrued during Robinson's lifetime had been paid to him before his death, there is nothing in the act which would have prevented him from disposing of them to any persons he wished, including his creditors or his next of kin who were not dependents. There is no reason, therefore, why these payments should not be part of his estate after his death. See Parker v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (Sup.Ct.1935); Greenwood v. Luby, 105 Conn. 398, 135 A. 578, 51 A.L.R. 1443 (Sup.Ct.Err.1926).

Respondent argues that because R.S. 34:15--29, N.J.S.A. makes a compensation claim nonassignable, it therefore does not survive the death of the claimant. However, the statutory prohibition against assignments was intended solely for the protection of beneficiaries under the act. Renshaw v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 30 N.J. 458, 465, 153 A.2d 673 (1959). Where, as here, compensation claims are made nonassignable in order to protect the beneficiaries, the test of assignability cannot be invoked to determine whether such claims survive the death of the original claimant. Heuchert v....