Curl v. Pacific Home
| Decision Date | 15 January 1952 |
| Citation | 108 Cal.App.2d 655,239 P.2d 481 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CURL v. PACIFIC HOME. Civ. 18416. |
Newby, Holder & Newby, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Edward L. Butterworth, Bruce H. Thomas, Los Angeles, for respondent.
The defendant corporation maintains the Pacific Home as a home for elderly people. In 1941 the parties hereto entered into a written contract whereby plaintiff paid defendant $6,050 and defendant accepted her as a life member of the Home and agreed to provide her with 'room 201 over the dining hall' and with board, laundry and medical care. Plaintiff, who at the time was 65 years of age, thereupon entered the home and continued to reside therein and receive the specified benefits until June 7, 1950. On that day she was informed by the superintendent that her life membership and the benefits thereof to her had been cancelled by the board of directors and that she must leave the Home immediately. Plaintiff refused to recognize the attempted cancellation and defendant filed an action in unlawful detainer in the municipal court. Prior to service of process in that action plaintiff filed this action and secured a temporary order restraining the defendant, pending the hearing of an order to show cause, from prosecuting that action. The order required the defendant to show cause why it should not be enjoined, pending the action, from interfering with defendant in the enjoyment of her room and the board, laundry and other services to which she was entitled under the contract and from proceeding further with the unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff filed supporting affidavits and defendant filed a demurrer and counter affidavits. After a hearing the court overruled the demurrer and ordered a preliminary injunction issued in the language of the order to show cause.
Appellant attacks the order on various grounds. Its principal contentions are that the complaint falls to state a cause of action for declaratory relief and that neither if nor the supporting affidavits state facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. By her complaint, in addition to the facts set forth above, plaintiff made the following allegations: That during the early part of 1950 many of the members of the conference of the Methodist Church, who were members of defendant corporation, became dissatisfied with the administration of the Home by the superintendent and instituted an investigation; that during the course thereof plaintiff, at the request of such members, advised them of facts that were unfavorable to the superintendent; that he became cognizant thereof and adopted a malicious and fraudulent scheme to have plaintiff and others who had given similar information expelled from the institution; that in pursuance of such scheme the superintendent caused certain false charges to be lodged against her with the board of directors and on May 24, 1950, without any notice to her, caused her to be called from her lunch, brought before himself and two others, where for the first and only time she was informed of the charges against her, and asked to immediately state her case; that the superintendent caused this to be done so that she would be taken by surprise and be so confused and shocked that she would not be able to defend herself; that no witnesses against her were called and she had no opportunity to prepare her case or to call her witnesses; that she was wholly unprepared and was surprised and shocked by the proceeding and could not properly defend herself; that she denied the charges and was dismissed and that the superintendent in pursuance of his fraudulent scheme told her that if she spoke to anyone regarding the incidents she would jeopardize her position; that on June 7, 1950, she received a letter, signed by the superintendent, stating that the board of directors at a meeting held June 6, 1950, had purported to cancel her life membership in the Home; that the superintendent told her she must leave at once and that no part of the $6,050 paid by her would be refunded; that she has faithfully abided by the rules, regulations and bylaws of the Home, that no just cause for dismissal has arisen, and that the attempt by defendant to oust her and to terminate her membership was and is unlawful and void; that under the contract she could not be dismissed unless she was given sufficient notice to enable her to prepare for a hearing before the board of directors, and an opportunity to there present her witnesses and her defense to the charges; that plaintiff is without funds to maintain herself away from the Home and that if the attempt to dismiss her is successful she will be irreparably injured and become partially destitute and a possible charge upon the public.
Plaintiff prayed for a declaration of the rights, duties and obligations of the parties under the contract and for a preliminary injunction, pending final judgment, preventing defendant from evicting her from the Home, from attempting to terminate the contract and upon proceeding with the unlawful detainer action. She also prayed for a permanent injunction to the same effect.
The portion of the contract upon which the respondent relies provides that she agrees to the rules and regulations of the Home and that 'the Board of Directors of the Home reserves the right to dismiss any member of the Home for any just cause and that * * * [such action] shall be final and conclusive.' The contract also provides that the board of directors shall have the right to retain from the money theretofore paid by a dismissed member, a sum not to exceed $100 per month while the member enjoyed the benefits of the home.
It appears to us that plaintiff has clearly stated a cause of action for declaratory relief and that an action for damages, as appellant suggests, would not lie under the allegations of the complaint and that such relief would not be adequate. Appellant misconceives respondent's action as one resulting from the termination of the contract. On the contrary the action is on a contract that is still in full force and effect because it was not terminated for 'just cause' as provided therein and the purported termination was done in a manner contrary to the law of this State. There being a controversy as to the meaning of the terms of an existing contract respondent is entitled to a...
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