Curley v. Curley

• Decision Date: 26 February 2015
• Citation: 4 N.Y.S.3d 676,125 A.D.3d 1227,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 01692
• Parties: Philomena CURLEY, Respondent, v. Charles M. CURLEY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

125 A.D.3d 1227

4 N.Y.S.3d 676

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 01692

Philomena CURLEY, Respondent

v.Charles M. CURLEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Feb. 26, 2015.

Tate Law Office, Liverpool (Jonathan O. Tate of counsel), for appellant.

Alderman & Alderman, Syracuse (Edward B. Alderman of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., McCARTHY, GARRY and ROSE, JJ.

Opinion

GARRY, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Rumsey, J.), entered June 13, 2013 in Cortland County, ordering, among other things, equitable distribution of the parties' marital property, upon a decision of the court.

The parties were married in 1979 and have no children together. On June 16, 2009, plaintiff (hereinafter the wife) commenced this action seeking a judgment of divorce and related relief, and defendant (hereinafter the husband) responded by serving an answer and cross claim seeking the same. The parties ultimately stipulated to grounds for divorce, and a trial of the remaining unresolved issues was held in November 2011. Supreme Court issued a decision in July 2012, which was subsequently merged into a judgment of divorce, ordering the equitable distribution of certain property and directing the husband to pay spousal maintenance and counsel fees. The husband appeals.

As to maintenance, Supreme Court ordered the husband to pay $900 per month starting upon the date of the wife's commencement of the action in June 2009 through December 2012, and $500 per month thereafter from January 2013 through December 2013, at which time the husband's maintenance obligation would end. In making an award of spousal maintenance, the court is required to consider the statutory factors set forth in the Domestic Relations Law and the marital standard of living (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6] ; Alecca v. Alecca, 111 A.D.3d 1127, 1129, 975 N.Y.S.2d 801 [2013] ; Roberto v. Roberto,

90 A.D.3d 1373, 1376, 936 N.Y.S.2d 337 [2011] ). The court must provide a reasoned analysis of the factors it ultimately relies upon in awarding maintenance, but it “is not required to analyze and apply every factor set forth in [the statute]” (McAteer v. McAteer, 294 A.D.2d 783, 784, 742 N.Y.S.2d 718 [2002] ; see Hartog v. Hartog, 85 N.Y.2d 36, 51, 623 N.Y.S.2d 537, 647 N.E.2d 749 [1995] ; Quarty v. Quarty, 96 A.D.3d 1274, 1277, 948 N.Y.S.2d 130 [2012] ; Freas v. Freas, 33 A.D.3d 1069, 1071, 822 N.Y.S.2d 798 [2006] ; Wojewodzic v. Wojewodzic, 300 A.D.2d 985, 986, 753 N.Y.S.2d 160 [2002] ). The issue is addressed to the court's sound discretion (see Settle v. McCoy, 108 A.D.3d 810, 811, 968 N.Y.S.2d 697 [2013] ; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 72 A.D.3d 1409, 1415, 900 N.Y.S.2d 476 [2010] ), and we have found maintenance to be appropriate when, among other things, the marriage was long-lasting and when one spouse made significant noneconomic contributions to the household or to the career of the other (see Williams v. Williams, 99 A.D.3d 1094, 1095, 952 N.Y.S.2d 662 [2012] ).

Here, contrary to the husband's contention upon appeal, we find that the decision reflects that Supreme Court properly considered the relevant statutory factors, and provided a reasoned analysis of those upon which it had based the award. The court noted that the parties had no children, were both in good health, and had been married for nearly 30 years. During most of that time, the wife worked full time and also contributed to the household by doing most of the cooking, cleaning, and laundering. The wife had a high school degree; during the marriage, the husband returned to school to obtain a Master's degree, while the wife continued to work. At the time of trial, the wife had retired, while the husband was still working as an engineer. The court noted the wife's testimony that she believed her position was in jeopardy when she accepted an early retirement incentive and, without expressly crediting this testimony, further noted that the position had not been filled in the two years between the retirement and the date of trial. However, in light of the wife's further testimony that she did not intend to seek alternate employment, and in accord with the purpose of maintenance to promote self-sufficiency (see Biagiotti v. Biagiotti, 97 A.D.3d 941, 942, 948 N.Y.S.2d 445 [2012] ), the court limited the duration of the husband's obligation and provided for the amount paid to substantially decrease over time. Upon review and considering all of the circumstances, and particularly in view of the durational limitation, we find that the court's award of maintenance was appropriate, and we decline to disturb it (see id. ).

The husband further argues that Supreme Court erred by not awarding him a distributive share of the wife's retirement incentive benefits. The record reveals that, in exchange for agreeing to retire from her position as a university administrator and surrender her accrued vacation and sick leave, the wife was paid a lump sum of money shortly after commencement of the divorce action. The husband asserts that the wife's eligibility for the retirement incentive benefits was derived from her employment during the marriage and, as such, the benefits should have been subject to equitable distribution. Benefits received in consideration for an early retirement will constitute marital property if the right to the payments arose during the marriage, or where the incentive is intended as compensation for past services rendered by the employee-spouse during the marriage (see Olivo v. Olivo, 82 N.Y.2d 202, 207–208, 604 N.Y.S.2d 23, 624 N.E.2d 151 [1993] ; compare Bink v. Bink, 55 A.D.3d 1244, 1245, 865 N.Y.S.2d 417 [2008] ). Here, the wife's inclusion in the retirement incentive program was based, at least in part, on the number of years of service to her employer (see Osorio v. Osorio, 84 A.D.3d 1333, 1335, 925 N.Y.S.2d 111 [2011] ). Additionally, the wife testified that she accepted inclusion in the early retirement program in April 2009. This evidence is reinforced by an email from the wife's employer indicating that the employer's decision regarding which employees would be accepted into the early retirement program would be made in April 2009. Thus, we find that the wife's entitlement to the early retirement benefits vested during the marriage. The mere fact that the incentive benefits were not paid until following the commencement of the proceedings did not alter their status as marital property subject to equitable distribution (see Hartog v. Hartog, 85 N.Y.2d at 49, 623 N.Y.S.2d 537, 647 N.E.2d 749 ; Howe v. Howe, 68 A.D.3d 38, 46, 886 N.Y.S.2d 722 [2009] ; Nielsen v. Nielsen, 256 A.D.2d 1173, 1173, 682 N.Y.S.2d 502 [1998] ).

Next, the husband argues that Supreme Court erred by selecting improper valuation dates when determining the value of the parties' investment and retirement accounts. In selecting a valuation date, a trial court has broad discretion and may select any appropriate date between the date of commencement and the date of trial (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b] ; Williams v. Williams, 99 A.D.3d at 1096, 952 N.Y.S.2d 662 ; Halse v. Halse, 93 A.D.3d 1003, 1004, 940 N.Y.S.2d 353 [2012] ). Upon review, we find no error in the court's selection of a valuation date for the husband's...