Curran v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 23 May 1890 |
| Parties | CURRAN v. CITY OF BOSTON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
May 23 1890
HEADNOTES
E Greenhood, for plaintiff.
R.W Nason, for defendant.
The plaintiff was an inmate of the work-house, or house of industry, belonging to the city of Boston, situate on Deer island, having been convicted of a misdemeanor, and having been legally sentenced to confinement there. He was injured while engaged in unloading coal, and, it must be assumed, was prepared to prove that he himself was in the exercise of due care, and that the officers and servants employed in this institution were negligent. The single question presented is whether these officers and servants engaged in conducting the work incidental to the maintenance of the work-house of the city, and to the employment of the inmates thereof, from whose employment it derives a certain amount of revenue,--such officers and servants being also engaged in the management of the city's property employed in the business of the work-house,--are agents of the city, for whose negligence in the performance of their duties the city is responsible.
It is a general principle that municipal corporations are not liable to private actions for omissions or neglect in the performance of a corporate duty imposed upon them by law, or that of their servants engaged therein, where such city derives no benefit therefrom in its corporate capacity, unless such action is given by statute. Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, and cases cited. The contention of the plaintiff is that the case at bar is distinguishable because, as a mere volunteer, the city has devoted property intended mainly for corporate purposes to other purposes, for its own advantage, as in Oliver v. Worcester, ubi supra; that it has voluntarily undertaken a work, partially for the public good, with a view to its own advantage, and to relieve itself from burdens peculiar to itself; and that it has embarked in an enterprise, partly commercial, from which it receives a partial remuneration for its expenditures out of a special class in the community, so that the entire expense of conducting the work-house is not met by taxation. While the work-house was maintained primarily by the city at its own expense, it was not by law compelled to establish this institution. The plaintiff's argument concedes that, when established, its officers and servants were not selected by the city, but by the board of directors of public institutions; but it urges that they are still to be deemed the agents of the city, as the act of establishing such an institution is voluntary, and the imposition of the ministerial duties upon such officers is the act of the municipality, and that it is immaterial, therefore, whether the ministerial duties involved in the administration of such an institution are cast by statute upon a board over whose tenure of office the city has no control.
The authority to erect and maintain a work-house or almshouse, to relieve therein poor and indigent persons, is given by Pub.St. c. 33, § 1; Gen.St. c. 22, § 1. The same section provides that offenders of the class to which plaintiff belonged are to be there maintained, when sentenced thereto by proper authority. Pub.St. c. 207, § 29, provides that such offenders may be sentenced "for a term not exceeding six months to the house of correction, or to the house of industry or work-house, within the city or town where the conviction is had, or to the work-house, if any there is, in the city or town in which the offender has a legal settlement, if such town is within the county." There is no imperative direction that the city shall establish a work-house, but by law it is responsible for all county charges of the county of Suffolk; and, if the convict were sentenced to confinement therein, his expenses would necessarily be paid by it. Gen.St. c. 22, § 1. By the more general law, any city or town which has in the house of correction an inmate having his settlement in such town is liable for the cost of his support. Id. c. 220, § 61. By the statute authorizing the erection and maintenance of work-houses by a city, a mode of performing a strictly public duty is provided for which cannot be of any pecuniary advantage to the cities or towns instituting them. No such case is presented as exists where a city has undertaken to build particular works, as water-works, sewers, etc., and where a city acts as an agency to carry on an enterprise to some extent...
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