Curran v. Hastreiter
| Citation | 579 P.2d 524 |
| Decision Date | 19 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | 3071,Nos. 3026,s. 3026 |
| Parties | Thomas E. CURRAN, Jr. and Mary Jane Curran, Appellants, v. Hermann J. HASTREITER and Daniel T. Zantek, Individually and d/b/aHastreiter-Zantek and Company, Appellees. Hermann J. HASTREITER and Daniel T. Zantek, Individually and d/b/aHastreiter-Zantek and Company, Cross-Appellants, v. Thomas E. CURRAN, Jr. and Mary Jane Curran, Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alaska (US) |
Janalee R. Strandberg and John S. Hedland, Rice, Hoppner & Hedland, Anchorage, for appellants and cross-appellees.
James A. Parrish, Parrish Law Office, Fairbanks, for appellees and cross-appellants.
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., RABINOWITZ, J., and BUCKALEW, Superior Court Judge.
Appellant Mary Jane Curran brings this appeal from the superior court's judgment which granted the claim of Hastreiter and Zantek for specific performance compelling appellant to convey an individual 49 per cent interest in certain commercial real property located in close proximity to the Alyeska Ski Resort in Girdwood, Alaska. 1 The claim of Hastreiter and Zantek was based on an oral agreement. Appellees Hastreiter and Zantek have cross-appealed from the superior court's failure to award attorney's fees to them as the prevailing parties. 2
Hastreiter and Zantek, who are masonry workers and musical performers, and Mr. and Mrs. Curran, who were owners of the land in the Girdwood-Alyeska area, planned together to develop several of the Currans' properties. In the course of planning the details regarding these projects, the parties discovered that the Currans' sublease on one of the properties (hereinafter referred to as the "commercial property") was encumbered by covenants and restrictions which, unless removed, would preclude development of that property consonant with the parties' hopes. The issue on appeal is the correctness of the following findings and conclusions of the superior court: that Mr. Curran offered to convey to appellees a 49 per cent interest in the commercial property if Hastreiter and Zantek were able to secure the necessary signatures on a waiver of the restrictions; that the contract was formed when appellees obtained the waiver and is not rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds; and that Mrs. Curran, who is now Mr. Curran's widow, is bound by the agreement and must convey the interest.
It is established that a party seeking specific performance of an oral contract to convey an interest in real property must, in addition to adducing evidence taking the agreement out of the statute of frauds, prove a contract sufficiently definite and certain in its terms to warrant the grant of specific performance. 3 Where the existence of an oral contract and the terms thereof are contested and the evidence is conflicting, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the contract did in fact exist and, if so, the terms of such contract. 4 In addition, a party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's finding of fact must demonstrate that the questioned finding is "clearly erroneous." 5 Where, as in the case at bar, the superior court's decision depends largely on oral testimony and on inferences to be drawn from such testimony, this court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 6 In carrying out our appellate review functions, we are required to take the view of the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party at trial. 7
Application of these principles has led us to the conclusion that appellant Curran has demonstrated neither that the superior court's conclusions of law are erroneous, 8 nor that the underlying findings of fact relating to the issue of an oral contract to convey an undivided interest in the commercial property are clearly erroneous. 9 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties below, the record contains evidence more than ample to sustain the superior court's determination that an oral contract for the conveyance of an undivided 49 per cent interest in the commercial property was proven. Inherent in our determination that the superior court's findings relating to the issue are not clearly erroneous is our rejection of appellant's argument that there was no separate agreement to convey an interest in the commercial property to Hastreiter and Zantek. 10
Appellant next argues that the superior court erred in concluding that the statute of frauds was not a bar to the claim of Hastreiter and Zantek for specific performance of the oral contract to convey an interest in the commercial property. The superior court concluded that since Hastreiter and Zantek had
Since the case at bar concerns an oral contract to convey an interest in property, the statute of frauds is implicated. 11 Appellant Mary Jane Curran invokes the statute insofar as it requires written evidence of Thomas Curran's agency on her behalf. 12 The superior court determined that an exception to the statute of frauds applied in the instant case because appellees had "fully performed in accordance with the (Currans') offer." In this regard, AS 09.25.020 provides:
Exceptions of statute of frauds. A contract, promise, or agreement which is subject to § 10 of this chapter, which does not satisfy the requirements of that section, but which is otherwise valid is enforceable if
(1) there has been full performance on one side accepted by the other in accordance with the contract . . . .
This proviso, by referring to AS 09.25.010, 13 applies equally to the requirement of written evidence of agency and to the general requirement of written evidence of a contract for the transfer of an interest in real property. 14 Having reviewed the conflicting evidence and evaluated the parties' demeanor and credibility, the superior court concluded that an offer to convey an undivided one-half interest in the Currans' commercial property was made; and that upon securing the required waiver agreement, appellees accepted that offer and fully performed their obligations under the offer. The superior court's findings of fact do not explicitly cover the question of whether Mary Jane Curran accepted Hastreiter and Zantek's performance for purposes of determining whether the exception to the Statutes of Frauds contained in AS 09.25.020(1) is applicable.
The requirement of a writing contained in AS 09.25.010(a)(7) 15 is found in the statutes and case law of numerous other jurisdictions. 16 In California, this requirement of written agency has been specifically applied to husband and wife situations. In O'Banion v. Paradiso, 61 Cal.2d 559, 39 Cal.Rptr. 370, 373, 393 P.2d 682, 685 (Cal.1964), the court stated, in part:
Was Mrs. Orduno's oral assent to her husband's written memorandum sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds although she never signed the memorandum or any document authorizing her husband to act on her behalf?
No. An agreement for the sale of real property is invalid unless it is in writing. (Civ.Code, § 1624, subd. 4.) Since authority to enter into a contract which is required to be in writing can be given only by an instrument in writing (Civ.Code, § 2309), any contract by a husband affecting the wife's interest in land is unenforceable against her in the absence of a written authorization signed by the wife, there being no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. (Cf. Henry v. Nelms, 113 Cal.App. 587, 591, 298 P. 822; Glazer v. Hanson, 98 Cal.App. 53, 59(2), 276 P. 607. (emphasis deleted) 17
Although the language of AS 09.25.020(1), "there has been full performance on one side accepted by the other in accordance with the contract," is sufficiently broad to suggest that acceptance by the agent is sufficient, we think the proper construction requires that the acceptance must be by the principal before the exception provided for in AS 09.25.020(1) is applicable to AS 09.25.010(b) (). We therefore conclude that this aspect of the case must be remanded to the superior court for the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the question of whether Mary Jane Curran accepted the performance of Hastreiter and Zantek.
Appellant further argues that the superior court erred in finding that appellant Mary Jane Curran participated in the offer allegedly made by Mr. Curran to appellees concerning the Currans' commercial party. 18 We have concluded that this contention of appellant must be rejected. Review of the record establishes the presence of abundant evidence to support the trial court's finding that "Mrs. Curran did in fact consent to and join in the offer made by Mr. Curran, whereby he agreed to convey a 49% interest in the 'commercial' property to the plaintiffs in the event that they were able to obtain the required signatures on the waiver agreement." Thus, we hold that this finding of the superior court was not clearly erroneous.
Appellant's final contention is that the superior court's findings with respect to the agency question do not comport with Civil Rule 52(a) and the concomitant duty of the trial court to make sufficiently detailed and explicit findings in order to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court's decision and to enable it to determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision. 19 In our view, this contention must be rejected because the superior court's findings of fact clearly indicate the evidence upon which it relied in reaching a decision.
In their cross-appeal, appellees contend that the superior court erred in failing to award attorney's fees to them as...
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...at 799-800. We hold that the same general principles apply to a court's interpretation of an oral contract. See, e. g., Curran v. Hastreiter, 579 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1978); Jackson v. White, 556 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976); B. B. & S. Construction Co., Inc. v. Stone, 535 P.2d 271 (Alaska 1975); Nor......
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