Curran v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 1928
• Citation: 4 S.W.2d 957,157 Tenn. 7
• Parties: CURRAN v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

4 S.W.2d 957

157 Tenn. 7

CURRAN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April 14, 1928

Error to Criminal Court, Davidson County; Frank M. Garard, Judge.

Richard Curran was convicted of rape, and he brings error. Reversed and remanded.

J. D De Bow and Jack Norman, both of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

The Attorney General, for the State.

SWIGGART J.

The plaintiff in error, Richard Curran, was found guilty in the criminal court of Davidson county of the crime of rape, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of 25 years. He has appealed to this court, and, in addition to his assignments of error that the evidence preponderates against the verdict and in favor of his innocence, he assigns as error that the learned trial judge should have set aside the verdict and should have granted a new trial because he himself was not satisfied with the verdict, as shown by the language employed in overruling the motion for a new trial as follows:

"Now the defendant in this case said he didn't do anything wrong that night and the girl said he did. That was a question for the jury to decide; at least, I feel that way about it. There were only two parties there and it comes down to one on each side. As to whether that was done or whether it was not done, I am not saying it was and I am not saying it was not. The jury had this before them as to the veracity of the defendant on one side and the prosecutor on the other, and, of course, before they could have reached their conclusion as to guilt on this they would have had to have accepted one and rejected the other. It is the opinion of the court they must have looked at it from that standpoint, otherwise they couldn't have reached their conclusion and verdict. * * *

I feel there is no error in the record sufficiently to sustain it and I will have to overrule the motion."

As indicated by the trial judge in the foregoing quotation, the issue of fact submitted to the jury depended upon the credibility of the prosecuting witness and of the plaintiff in error.

The plaintiff in error testified that the prosecuting witness, who was an employee of a Nashville Hosiery Mill, flirted with him and accepted his invitation to drive with him on the evening of the same day; that she voluntarily accompanied him on the ride, and that no act of intercourse occurred between them; that he frequently saw and talked to the prosecuting witness thereafter; that about three weeks later she informed him that she was pregnant and demanded that he marry her; that the prosecution followed his refusal to accede to this demand.

A large volume of evidence was offered by the plaintiff in error, tending to impeach both the credibility and the moral character of the prosecuting witness, and to corroborate his testimony as to her friendly attitude toward him after the date of the alleged rape and before his refusal to marry her.

On the other hand, the prosecuting witness testified that the plaintiff in error had paid her attention for some time before the date of the alleged rape, and had given her to understand that he was interested in her and held matrimony in prospect; that she went with him on the night in question, intending to go to church, but that, over her protest, the plaintiff in error drove to a secluded lane and raped her, under circumstances described by her as extremely brutal and revolting. She testified that she notified her sister of the occurrence on the following morning, and that the facts were communicated to her parents, at White Bluff, Tenn., as soon as possible, and that the institution of the prosecution was begun as soon as the condition of health of her father permitted. She denied that she had any communication with the plaintiff in error between the date of the alleged crime and the institution of the prosecution, and denied that she endeavored or desired to have the plaintiff in error marry her. Many corroborating witnesses were introduced.

The record is such that it is impossible for a reviewing court, by analysis and examination of the large volume of testimony on the primary and collateral issues, to arrive at a conclusion with any degree of certainty or conviction. In a case of this character, even more than in the ordinary case, the appearance and demeanor of the principal witnesses will necessarily have much influence in the weight and credit to be accorded their testimony. This greatly increases the responsibility of the trial judge.

From the earliest history of this state, the Supreme Court has reviewed the action of the trial judge in refusing to set aside a verdict of conviction in a criminal case, on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the guilt of the...