Curran v. State of Delaware
Decision Date | 29 September 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 12397.,12397. |
Parties | Francis J. CURRAN, Francis J. Maguire and Ira F. Jones, Jr. v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Frank O'Donnell, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., of Delaware (Joseph Donald Craven, Atty. Gen. of Delaware, on the brief), for appellant.
Irving Morris, Wilmington, Del., for appellees.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.
The following pertinent facts, succinctly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Southerland land writing for the Supreme Court of Delaware, give much of the background necessary to understand the case at bar:
The investigation of the crime — at least in its early stages — was conducted by Detective John A. Rodenheiser, Detective Charles F. McCool, Sergeant John Emering, assisted by Officers Nagle, Mazewski, Delloso, and other members of the Wilmington Bureau of Police. The statements, referred to in Mr. Chief Justice Southerland's opinion quoted above, signed by the three defendants, Curran, Jones and Maguire, were admitted in evidence at their trial in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, respectively as State's Exhibits, Nos. 10, 11 and 12. Curran's statement and that of Maguire were admitted without objection. Jones' counsel objected to the admission of his client's statement and examined Rodenheiser on voir dire, attempting to show that it had been procured by coercion. During the course of the voir dire examination2 Rodenheiser was asked whether State's Exhibit No. 11 was the only signed statement procured from Jones. Rodenheiser replied that it was the only one.3
Curran's statement, State's Exhibit No. 10, admitted that he had twice attempted to have intercourse with the girl but that his attempts were unsuccessful. The statement contained the sentence: "This girl was moaning. * * *" Jones' statement, State's Exhibit No. 11, admitted unsuccessful attempts to have sexual intercourse with the complaining witness. It contained the sentence: "The woman was moaning. * * *" Maguire's statement, State's Exhibit No. 12, did not admit any attempt at intercourse by him. The statement contained the two following sentences:
The three defendants testified on their own behalf. Curran swore that he did not read his statement, State's Exhibit No. 10, before he signed it. Maguire testified that he "scanned" a statement which he signed. It does not appear whether or not the document which he scanned and signed was State's Exhibit No. 12. Maguire testified that he did not even scan a statement which he claimed to have signed in the afternoon and which may or may not have been State's Exhibit No. 12. Jones gave no evidence as to reading or scanning State's Exhibit No. 11, or any other statement. Each of the defendants denied that they had ever said that the complaining witness was "moaning".
All three defendants denied the accuracy of the statements in evidence. They also insisted that there were other statements signed by them and given to the police. But Detective Rodenheiser, called as the last witness at the very end of the State's case, in rebuttal, swore that Maguire's statement, State's Exhibit No. 12, was the only signed statement given by Maguire to the police. Rodenheiser testified on rebuttal that Jones' statement, State's Exhibit No. 11, was the only signed statement4 given by Jones to the police. To repeat for the sake of both clarity and emphasis, Rodenheiser swore plainly, positively and unequivocally that the statements of Jones and Maguire, State's Exhibits Nos. 11 and 12, were the only signed statements given by them to the police. The issue of the credibility of the defendants and that of the police was thus sharply before the jury.
It is now clear5 that a statement other than State's Exhibit No. 11 had been signed by Jones and given to the police. This other statement had been destroyed by the police. It is clear also that the police had taken another statement from Curran before State's Exhibit No. 10 had been signed. According to Officer Nagle, Curran had refused to sign the earlier statement because his name had been spelled "Kern" in it. Nagle testified that a new statement was typed with Curran's name spelled correctly in it and that Curran signed this statement. The original statement testified to by Nagle at no time was produced in evidence. It also appears that Maguire gave the police two statements but it is not clear that both statements were signed. One statement was destroyed by the police. The other statement was signed and is State's Exhibit No. 12.6
As to Rodenheiser's veracity, Mr. Chief Justice Southerland said: 7
The Supreme Court of Delaware did not characterize Rodenheiser's testimony as perjurious but there can be no doubt that its conclusion was to that effect. We agree also with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the phrases in the three statements introduced in evidence that the complaining witness was "moaning" do not possess substantial probative effect on the issue of consent.8 The two questions on which our decision must turn are, first, whether Rodenheiser's knowingly false evidence kept from the defendants facts which they were entitled to use as they saw fit, and second, whether it so damaged the defendants' credibility on the fundamental issue of consent as to render their trial fundamentally unfair and therefore constitute a denial of due process of law. Bute v. People of State of Illinois, 1948, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986.
In respect to the first question, we state that the trial of a capital case, or indeed any other trial, no longer can be considered properly a game of wits and skill. It is clear that men on trial for their lives are entitled to all pertinent facts relating to their defense and that no witness is entitled to constitute himself the judge of what the court shall hear. As Mr. Chief Justice Southerland stated, counsel for defendants were entitled to the facts and to make such use of the facts as they saw fit. Had Jones' counsel on his examination of Rodenheiser on voir dire been told that Jones' statement, then marked for identification and later State's Exhibit No. 11, was not the only signed statement given by Jones and that another signed statement previously in the possession of the police had been destroyed by them, we cannot doubt but that Jones' counsel would have questioned Rodenheiser as to why the statement had been destroyed. Jones' attorney could, and it must be assumed, would have asked questions to bring out facts relating to the destruction of the statement. Jones' counsel undoubtedly would have inquired whether, for example, the destroyed statement...
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