Currence v. Ralphsnyder.

Decision Date19 November 1929
Docket Number(No. 6388)
Citation108 W.Va. 194
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesLouise Jarvis Currence, ex'rix. v. Isaac C.Ralphsnyder et al.
1. Court of Equity Court of Equity is Proper Forum in

Which to Exact Settlement of Trusteeship.

A court of equity is a proper forum in which to exact settlement of a trusteeship, (p. 198.)

2. Laches Delay Alone Does Not Constitute Laches; It is

Delay Which Places Another at Disadvantage.

Delay alone does not constitute laches; it is delay which places another at a disadvantage. Camden V. Fink C. & C. Co., 106 W. Va. 312. (p. 199.)

3. Statute of Li imitations Statute of Limitations Does Not

Run Against Express Trust Until Beneficiary Has Notice, Trustee Has Repudiated Trust.

The statute of limitations does not run against an express trust until the beneficiary has notice that the trustee has repudiated the trust. Carter v. Carter, (107 W. Va. 394, 148, S. E. 378. (p. 202.)

4. Common Law Under Common Laic When Reason for Rule

Ceases, the Rule Itself Ceases.

Under the common law when the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself ceases, (p. 199.)

5. Same Champerty Under Common Law is Not Ordinarily

Consonant With Modern Statutes and Decisions in Case of Inequitable Conduct.

Champerty under the common law is not ordinarily consonant with modern statutes and decisions. It may be invoked now only in case of inequitable conduct, (p. 199.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Monongalia County.

Suit by Louise Jarvis Currence, Executrix, against Isaac C. Ralphsnyder and others. Judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Harvey W. Harmer and James B. Mor eland, for appellee. B. A. Blessing and George M. Balphsnyder, for appellants.

Hatcher, Judge:

Adolphus Armstrong, aged eighty years, died intestate and unmarried in 1907, leaving considerable property. The settlement of his estate has been attended with much litigation. See Butcher v. Kunst, 65 W. Va. 384; Butcher v. $ommerville, 67 W. Va 261; Woofter v. Matz, 71 W. Va. 63; Lynch v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 135, 90 W. Va. 98, 99 W. Va. 509, and Fisher v. Lynch, 107 W. Va. 384, 148 S. E. 484. This is another act in that drama. Claimants of the estate were legion. The most prominent one for a time was Louisa Ann Armstrong (or Butcher), who claimed to be a sister of Adolphus. She died before realizing on her claim and in order to expedite a settlement of the estate a compromise was made May 31, 1911, between a large number of claimants whereby it was agreed that Tena Smith of Ohio, the main devisee of Miss Armstrong, should have one-third of the estate and the other claimants, commonly referred to as the West Virginia claimants, should have the remaining two-thirds interest. On December 26, 1914, the West Virginia claimants agreed that George Woofter and those he represented should have approximately 63% and William M. Ralphsnyder, who had acquired some of the claims, approximately 37% of the twothirds interest. In the meantime, Dolly Armstrong and Edward Armstrong had asserted that they were half sister and half brother of Adolphus, had claimed the entire estate as his only heirs, and had conveyed their interests therein to Isaac C. Ralphsnyder. A third and final compromise was effected on March 27, 1915, wherein it was agreed that W. B. Lynch, as executor under the will of Louisa Ann Armstrong, should receive 20% of the estate of Adolphus (this included the share of Tena Smith); George Woofter and those he represented together with certain other claimants represented by Edward A. Brannon, attorney, should be accorded 27 7/9% of the estate (subject to certain interests), and to W. M. Ralphsnyder should be yielded 52 2/9% thereof. But it was specified that out of this percentage "W. M. was "to pay off and discharge any and all claims made to the estate of Adolphus Armstrong, deceased, by I. C. Ralphsnyder" as the purchaser of the claims of Dolly C. and Edward Armstrong. This agreement was signed by both Ralphsnyders. A suit entitled Lynch, executor et al., against Dolly C. Armstrong et al., was then brought in the circuit court of Harrison county by all the parties to the last compromise for the purpose of excluding certain claimants who were not parties thereto, and to have the estate distributed according to the provisions thereof. A decree was entered which recited the compromise and determined the interests of the parties accordingly. Under that decree, W. M. Ralphsnyder has already received from the estate of Adolphus Armstrong payments aggregating more than $75,000.00.

The consideration of the deed from Dolly C. and Edward Armstrong to Isaac Ralphsnyder was $5.00 and the promises of Isaac in a separate written contract to pay to them one-half of whatever amount he should receive from the estate of Adolphus Armstrong by reason of their deed to him, and if it became necessary to prosecute suits to enforce their claims, to litigate same in his own name and at his own expense and to make no final compromise without their consent.

This suit was brought to secure a settlement from the Ralphsnyders under that contract. The court found that of the 52 2/9 % of the Armstrong estate accorded William Ralphsnyder by the other claimants, 27 5/9% was included as the consideration for Isaac Ralphsnyder signing the third compromise agreement; that one-half of the 27 5/9% so decreed to William amounted to 62/235ths of the amount he had received from the estate and ordered that the plaintiff recover from William and Isaac 62/235ths of the amount William had so received. A recovery was also ordered against the two for $1,567.13 legal costs paid by Dolly Armstrong in litigation of the claim of herself and Edward which was conducted by Isaac after the contract with him.

On behalf of plaintiff the following facts appear. Isaac Ralphsnyder is a lawyer. After he secured the contract with Dolly and Edward Armstrong, he instigated and conducted litigation of their claims in their names. The hill prepared under his direction alleged (among other things) that the father of Adolphus was Maxwell Armstrong, Jr.; that he was also the father of Dolly and Edward by a subsequent marriage and that Louisa Ann Armstrong was not the sister of Adolphus. The claims of Dolly and Edward thus advanced lead to the final compromise. Isaac secured the assent of the Ohio and most of the West Virginia claimants, except William Ralphsnyder, to a compromise with Dolly and Edward. He then produced his deed from Dolly and Edward and concluded the negotiations in his own behalf. The leading claimants (except William) were "anxious to compromise" with Isaac; and without any consideration whatever from William but solely to secure the assent of Isaac (as the assignee of Dolly and Edward) to a compromise, the Ohio and West Virginia claimants surrendered to William 27 5/9% of the estate accorded them by the previous compromise, with the understanding that he was to settle with Isaac. The arrangement was made in this form at the suggestion of William's attorney for the purpose, he said, of avoiding encumbering the contract with such fractions as would express the several interests of William and Isaac who could adjust the matter between themselves.

William testified that within a few months after the death of Adolphus Armstrong he had engaged Isaac to ascertain who were the heirs of Adolphus and to purchase the rights of claimants to the estate; that Isaac had made such purchases at a total expense of about $6,500.00; that there was a collateral oral understanding between him and Isaac at the time of signing the third compromise agreement that Isaac would guarantee him (William) 37 1/2% out of the 52 2/9% he was to receive by the compromise; that he knew nothing of the contract between Isaac and Dolly and Edward at the time of signing the third compromise agreement; that after be commenced to receive payments from the estate Isaac had demanded of him the difference between the percentage guaranteed in their collateral agreement and the percentage he had received under the compromise; but that he had refused to pay Isaac any of this money because his attorney had advised him that the claims of Dolly and Edward were wholly unfounded and could not be enforced; that he had never paid Isaac directly or indirectly any part of the money received from the estate because of Isaac's ownership of the Dolly and Edward Armstrong interests, but refused to say whether he had paid Isaac any part of the money so received for other reasons; that he and Isaac are both bachelors; that he is sixty-three years old and Isaac is somewhat older; that he has resided at the old home place all his life, and Isaac has resided there a large part of his life, and does so now; that his relations with Isaac have continued friendly all the time; that Isaac had usually accompanied him when looking after the business of, or attending conferences in connection with, the Armstrong estate; that he had required the administrator of the estate to pay him his part in cash until the administrator complained, after which he accepted checks which he cashed; and that he did not deposit any of the money received from the estate in banks but used it generally in his business, refusing to specify how he had disposed of the money. Isaac did not testify.

The defendants assert that plaintiff has a complete remedy at law. As Dolly and Edward had no contractual relations whatsoever with William, we find no merit in that contention. The arrangement between Dolly and Edward and Isaac constituted him their trustee. The terms of the final compromise made William the trustee of Isaac. It is unquestioned that equity is a proper forum in which to demand settlement of a trusteeship. Wilson v. Kennedy, 63 W. Ya. 1.

The defendants contend that the contract sued upon is champertous and void, citing Boiler v. Murray, 107 Ya. 527, and kindred decisions. That line of cases follows the common law, and is not...

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