Currey v. Currey
Decision Date | 07 August 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 22184.,22184. |
Citation | 650 N.W.2d 273,2002 SD 98 |
Parties | Constance R. CURREY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Shawn M. CURREY, Defendant and Appellant, Marvin Currey and Darlene Currey, Intervenors and Appellants. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Wilson Kleibacker of Lammers, Lammers & Kleibacker, L.L.P., Madison, for plaintiff and appellee.
Thomas J. Linngren of Green, Schulz, Roby, Oviatt, Cummings & Linngren, Watertown, for defendant and appellant and intervenors and appellants.
[¶ 1.] Marvin and Darlene Currey (Grandparents) sought a modification of visitation rights with their two grandchildren, the children of their son, Shawn Currey, and his ex-wife, Connie. Connie answered and countered to terminate the visitation rights of Grandparents. The trial court determined that (1) SDCL 25-4-52, which provides for grandparent visitation, was unconstitutional and (2) terminated Grandparents' visitation rights. Grandparents appeal. We reverse (1) and (2) and remand to determine whether grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the children.
[¶ 2.] Shawn and Connie were divorced on January 29, 2001, in Watertown, South Dakota. Because Shawn was incarcerated at the time of the divorce,1 Connie was given legal and physical custody of the parties' children, Ashley (DOB 3/12/94) and Tyler (DOB 8/24/95). The terms of the divorce decree and custody agreement provided for visitation in Grandparents.2 Connie required that Grandparents intervene as parties and agree to the terms of the custody agreement so that they would be subject to the contempt power of the trial court, if necessary.
[¶ 3.] In June 2001, Connie accepted a teaching position in Madison, South Dakota. She informed Grandparents that she would be moving in July and that they would need to come to Madison to exercise their visitation rights. In response, Grandparents petitioned the trial court for a modification of their visitation schedule. Connie asked the trial court to declare South Dakota's grandparent visitation statute, SDCL 25-4-52, unconstitutional under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), and terminate Grandparents' visitation with the children.
[¶ 4.] Following a hearing on July 18, 2001, the trial court modified Grandparents' visitation schedule to provide for visitation with the children in Madison. The trial court did not rule initially on the constitutionality of SDCL 25-4-52 and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issue. On September 17, 2001, the trial court issued a memorandum decision declaring SDCL 25-4-52 unconstitutional and the divorce decree and custody agreement illegal and unenforceable, thereby terminating Grandparents' visitation.
[¶ 5.] After the trial court rendered its decision, the attorneys for the parties learned that the constitutionality had been determined without reference to the 2001 legislative amendment of SDCL 25-4-52.3 The trial court reviewed the amended version of the statute and stated that the amendment did not cure the constitutional defect because the new version created a presumption against the parent, which the trial court stated was prohibited by Troxel.
[¶ 6.] Grandparents appeal, arguing that: 1) SDCL 25-4-52 is not unconstitutional, and 2) alternatively, even if it is, it is not determinative of the issue of Grandparents' visitation rights because those rights arose by agreement and were approved by the court in the divorce decree.
[¶ 7.] "Our review of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is de novo." Burlington N. Railroad Co. v. Green, 2001 SD 48, ¶ 6, 624 N.W.2d 826, 829 (citing Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, 1996 SD 146, ¶ 7, 557 N.W.2d 396, 398) (citation omitted).
[¶ 8.] Modifications of visitation rights are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard and the trial court's ruling will be reversed only on a clear showing of an abuse. Olson v. Olson, 438 N.W.2d 544, 546 (S.D.1989) (citing Mayer v. Mayer, 397 N.W.2d 638 (S.D.1986); Flint v. Flint, 334 N.W.2d 680 (S.D.1983); Kolb v. Kolb, 324 N.W.2d 279 (S.D.1982)).
[¶ 9.] 1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING SDCL 25-4-52 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
[¶ 10.] The trial court determined:
SDCL 25-4-52 is unconstitutional as it infringes upon the fundamental right of a custodial parent to determine whether visitation with a grandparent would be in his/her child's best interest. The provision in the parties' agreement regarding grandparent visitation was placed there after the [United States] Supreme Court had struck down a grandparent visitation statute. This provision was clearly contrary to a "policy of express law," [SDCL 53-9-1] and is thus unlawful.
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied heavily on the Troxel case. 530 U.S. 57,120 S.Ct. 2054,147 L.Ed.2d 49. In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court declared a Washington visitation statute, Wash.Rev.Code § 26.10.160(3), unconstitutional.4Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064, 147 L.Ed.2d 49. The Washington statute provided:
[¶ 11.] The United States Supreme Court determined that the statute was "breathtakingly broad" and "unconstitutionally infringe[d] on [the] ... fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. at 66, 120 S.Ct. at 2060-61, 147 L.Ed.2d 49. This statute would permit "any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review." Id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. at 2061, 147 L.Ed.2d 49. In effect, the statute allowed the trial court to place the burden on the custodial parent of "disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of [the children]" and "contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of the children." Id. at 69, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d 49.
[¶ 12.] SDCL 25-4-52 is not unconstitutional under Troxel. Mother has failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor of constitutionality. This Court has stated:
There is a strong presumption that the laws enacted by the [L]egislature are constitutional and the presumption is rebutted only when it clearly, palpably and plainly appears that the statute violates a provision of the constitution. Further, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a state or federal constitutional provision.
State v. Hauge, 1996 SD 48, ¶ 4, 547 N.W.2d 173, 175 (quoting Sedlacek v. Teener Baseball Program, 437 N.W.2d 866, 868 (S.D.1989)) (additional citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 13.] SDCL 25-4-52 provides for grandparent visitation "if the visitation is in the best interests of the grandchild and either the visitation would not significantly interfere with the parent-child relationship or the parent or custodian of the grandchild has denied or prevented a grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the grandchild." Unlike the Washington statute in Troxel, SDCL 25-4-52 is not overbroad. In fact, the statute takes effect if, and only if, "the visitation is in the best interests of the grandchild and either the visitation would not significantly interfere with the parent-child relationship or the parent or custodian of the grandchild has denied or prevented a grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the grandchild." It does not allow any individual to petition for visitation nor does it deprive the custodial parent of the fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of the children. This statute is limited to grandparents and does not unreasonably deprive the custodial parent of the fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of the children. The statute properly places the burden of proof upon the grandparents.
[¶ 14.] The last sentence of SDCL 25-4-52, which creates a presumption in favor of the grandparents, is unconstitutional under Troxel, but does not apply here and is clearly severable. See SD Educ. Assoc./NEA v. Barnett, 1998 SD 84, ¶ 33, 582 N.W.2d 386, 394 ( ); Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 768 (S.D.1985) ( ). The last sentence of this statute improperly provides that "[t]here is a presumption that visitation with the grandparents is in the best interests of the grandchild if a parent of that grandchild, who is also the child of that grandparent, has died." (emphasis added). This portion of the statute, however, is inapplicable to the facts of this case because Shawn is in prison and not dead.
[¶ 15.] Therefore, there is no showing that SDCL 25-4-52 is unconstitutional under these circumstances and we reverse the decision of the trial court.
[¶ 16.] 2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING GRANDPARENTS VISITATION AS A MATTER OF LAW WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.
[¶ 17.] Grandparents argue that the trial court erred in failing to consider the best interests of the children. Because the trial court declared SDCL 25-4-52 unconstitutional, it terminated Grandparents' visitation rights without considering the best interests of the children. It entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law when it summarily terminated Grandparents'...
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