Currie v. Continental Casualty Co.
| Decision Date | 03 May 1910 |
| Citation | 126 N.W. 164,147 Iowa 281 |
| Parties | EUNACE CURRIE v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wapello District Court.--HON. D. M. ANDERSON, Judge.
SUIT on an accident insurance policy. There was a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Manton Maverick and McNett & McNett, for appellant.
Jaques & Jaques, for appellee.
In December, 1905, the defendant issued to Eben Currie, husband of the plaintiff, an indemnity policy in the sum of $ 1,000. At the time the policy issued the insured was a resident of Wapello County, Iowa, and the policy contained the following clause: "This policy covers only injuries received within the United States (not including its parts beyond the seas), Mexico and Canada." In June, 1906, Mr. Currie accepted a position as a locomotive engineer in the engineering department of the Isthmian Canal Commission, and soon thereafter went to the Isthmus of Panama and took charge of a railroad engine in the Panama Canal Zone, where he was killed in a collision in September, 1906. Mr. J. G. Sorenson was the defendant's agent who took the application for the policy, and after the deceased had gone to the Canal Zone he and the plaintiff herein had some talk with reference to the policy, the substance of which, it may fairly be inferred, was communicated to the deceased in a letter from the plaintiff. On the 27th of July, 1906, the insured wrote to the defendant as follows: On August 11, 1906, the defendant wrote the insured as follows Nothing more was done by either party before the death of Mr. Currie.
The appellant contends that the policy was not in force at the time of the death of the insured because he was then not "within the United States" within the meaning of the clause in the policy from which we have already quoted, and because he was then "beyond the seas" within the meaning of those words as used in the policy; and, further, for the reason that the insured had canceled the policy in his letter of July 27, 1906. On the other hand, the appellee insists that the deceased was not without the United States or beyond seas when he was killed, and that, if he was, the defendant waived that provision of its policy by its letter of August 11th and by its subsequent action. We think there can be no serious question as to the construction that should be given the clause of the policy limiting the territorial liability. It says in so many words that it covers only injuries received "within the United States not including its parts beyond the seas." If it be conceded that the Panama Canal Zone is in any sense a part of the United States, we think it must still be said that it is "beyond the seas," within the meaning of that term and within the meaning of the language of the policy. Had the limitations been to the United States alone, a more difficult question would have been presented. The additional statement that the policy did not cover any part of the United States beyond the seas, and did cover Mexico and Canada, clearly excludes the Canal Zone on the Isthmus of Panama. It excluded all parts of the United States beyond the seas as the term would be literally construed. The term "beyond the seas" has been construed to mean different things depending upon the evident intent of the users thereof. Thus in statutes of limitation containing an exception in favor of persons "beyond the seas" it has been held to mean "beyond or without the United States." Davie v. Briggs, 97 U.S. 628 (24 L.Ed. 1086). The term as used in a statute of wills was construed in like manner. Mason v. Johnson, 24 Ill. 159 (76 Am. Dec. 740). It has also been held to mean without the state. Whitney's...
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