Currington v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 11 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 7387,7387 |
| Citation | 685 P.2d 73 |
| Parties | Richard CURRINGTON, Appellant, v. August A. and Miriam A. JOHNSON, Appellees. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Arthur Lyle Robson, Fairbanks, for appellant.
Andrew Kleinfeld, Fairbanks, and Ann M. Johnson, Johnson, Wechsler & Thompson, P.S., Seattle, Washington, for appellees.
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order granting specific performance of an option to purchase residential property in favor of the purchasers, August and Miriam Johnson. Richard Currington, the appellant, alleges that the trial court erred in ordering specific performance, in dismissing Currington's unlawful detainer action, and in awarding damages between the parties. We affirm the trial court's award of specific performance and its dismissal of Currington's unlawful detainer action. The superior court's award of damages is reversed in part as explained below, and the case is remanded for determination of damages consistent with this opinion.
On September 9, 1979, Richard Currington and August Johnson entered into a residential lease and option to purchase a residence and land that Currington owned outside of Fairbanks. Under the lease, the Johnsons were to occupy the residence for six months beginning September 9, 1979, for rent of $700 per month. Paragraph 15 of the lease provided that Currington would "pay all extended coverage fire insurance during the rental period." The option to purchase granted "August Johnson or/and Miriam A. Johnson" the option to buy the residence "at any time from 12/15/79 till 3/5/80." If the Johnsons exercised the option, they were to pay Currington $3000 for his equity in the property. The terms of payment stated:
This is to be a wrap around type of sale covering the $3,000 over 36 months with interest at 10- 1/2% an Alaska State Vet. loan of approx $68,000 and a Teamsters Credit Union loan of approx $16,000 (monthly @ $520 & $180) the latter two loans are to be refinanced by March 5, 1983.
Upon exercise of the option, Currington was to:
execute a proper deed of conveyance for [the] property and deliver the same to any title or escrow agency chosen by [Johnson] to be held by them in escrow and delivered to [Johnson] upon final payment.
The option agreement contained no integration clause.
August Johnson, who negotiated the lease and sale with Currington, kept handwritten notes of the transaction. According to these notes, the "[s]ix months rent will not apply to purchase." Additionally, the escrow was to "provide for payments to be made to existing mortgages to be made by Sellers." The Johnsons' payments were to "be sufficient" to cover the payments on Currington's equity, as well as his current two mortgage payments. Currington was "to pay at his own expense mortgage payments during the rental period," to "provide for fire insurance," and "[t]axes and insurance, plus or minus, [were to] be prorated at the time option is exercised."
On about February 26, 1980, the Johnsons exercised their option to purchase the residence by mailing a document in which this election was declared to Currington's attorney. They recorded the document on March 4, 1980. However, Currington refused to execute and tender into escrow a deed to the property. He took the position that he would not execute a deed until the Johnsons paid off his veterans' loan in full. Currington desired to obtain another veterans' loan to finance a house in Juneau, but could not do so while the present loan was outstanding.
After they notified Currington of their exercise of the option to purchase the property, the Johnsons continued to send him $700 per month. Currington accepted these checks through December 1980, but returned checks for January, February, and March 1981.
On May 21, 1981, the Johnsons sued for specific performance, alleging that they had fully complied with the terms of the option to purchase, but that Currington had refused to go through with the transaction. On May 26, 1981, Currington filed a complaint for "forcible detainer." The Johnsons answered this complaint incorporating by reference their complaint for specific performance as a counterclaim. The actions for specific performance and unlawful detainer were consolidated.
Currington moved for summary judgment on the issue of possession and the Johnsons moved for summary judgment on the issue of specific performance, while seeking to reserve for trial the issue of damages, and for dismissal of Currington's unlawful detainer action. In their memorandum supporting these motions, the Johnsons alleged that unlawful detainer would not lie because title to the property was in dispute. In his memorandum in opposition to the Johnsons' motion, Currington questioned whether the option to purchase had been voided by the veterans' loan statutes or was illegal pursuant to those statutes, whether the option was void as against the public policy supporting the veterans' loan statutes, and whether the option was discharged by frustration of purpose since his veterans' loan might be accelerated if he conveyed the property to the Johnsons.
Judge Warren W. Taylor ruled in favor of the Johnsons, ordering the dismissal of the unlawful detainer action and granting specific performance of the option contract. Damage questions were reserved for trial.
Judge Taylor conducted the trial after which he issued an order detailing each party's monetary liability. 1 Setting off the liability, the court ordered that the Johnsons have judgment against Currington for $3643.66. However, the Johnsons requested an adjustment in this order, noting that they had already submitted to escrow the amount due Currington. Accordingly, an amended order was issued awarding the Johnsons damages of $20,403.44.
Currington appealed. We remanded the case to the superior court with direction to enter detailed findings of fact concerning the award of interest differential damages. These findings have been entered.
In their jurisdictional statement, the Johnsons assert that Currington's appeal from the partial summary judgment was not timely because it was taken more than thirty days after the partial summary judgment was entered.
Appellate Rule 202(a) states that an "appeal may be taken to the supreme court from a final judgment entered by the superior court...." This court has held that "[a]s a general rule, a partial summary judgment order is considered 'interlocutory' and non-appealable unless there is a specific statutory provision providing for appeal." Williams v. City of Valdez, 603 P.2d 483, 487 (Alaska 1979) (footnote omitted). In Williams, we stated that a partial summary judgment that disposed of the legal issue of inverse condemnation but left the issue of damages for trial was not a final judgment. Id. at 488. Similarly, in the present case, the issue of specific performance was resolved summarily, leaving the issue of damages for trial. Therefore the partial summary judgment did not constitute a final judgment, and since Currington appealed within 30 days of the entry of the amended order which determined the damage issues, we conclude that his appeal as to the order of specific performance was timely.
The question of whether Currington's appeal was timely as to his wrongful detainer action presents a slightly different issue. This action originally was filed as a separate suit and the partial summary judgment order dismissed the action, leaving no question of damages. The issue is then whether Civil Rule 54(b), which provides that judgment on one issue in a multi-issue case is not a final judgment unless expressly designated as such by the trial court, 2 applies to cases which contain multiple issues only through consolidation pursuant to Civil Rule 42(a). We conclude that the requirements of Rule 54(b) do apply to consolidated cases. When faced with this issue the Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned:
If this were not so, an appellate court might be called upon to review piecemeal numerous cases which were in the principal aspects identical and during such period the various parties interested in the litigation would be subject to much confusion in attempting to comply with the requisite steps in appeal. It is, of course, conceivable that there would be exceptional circumstances which might influence the trial court to certify that there was no cause for delay in entering the final judgment and thus permit an appeal, but the propriety of such an arrangement can best be determined by the court which tried the case.
State ex rel. Pacific Intermountain Express, Inc. v. District Court of Second Judicial District, 387 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyoming 1963). See also 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2386 (1971); 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 54.22 (2d ed. 1971); cf. Jones v. Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 451 F.2d 985, 986-87 (3d Cir.1971) (). In conclusion, we find Currington's appeal timely as to all issues.
Currington raises four grounds in opposition to the grant of specific performance of the option contract. He asserts that the contract is void as prohibited by the Alaska Veterans' Act; is illegal pursuant to the same Act; is against public policy as expressed by the Act; and is void under the doctrine of frustration of purpose.
A contract is void and hence not subject to specific performance if it is
directly and explicitly prohibited by a constitutional statute in unmistakable language.... However, it is not necessary that there should be an express prohibition in a statute to render void a contract made in violation of it.
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