Curry v. City of Syracuse

• Decision Date: 15 January 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 01-9211.
• Citation: 316 F.3d 324
• Parties: Benny CURRY, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SYRACUSE, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, Chad Lynch, Individually and as a Police Officer for the City of Syracuse, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, John Doe or Does, Fictitious names and the real identities of these individuals who, upon information and belief, are Police Officers employed by the city of Syracuse whose real identities are not known as Police Officers and/or employees of the Syracuse Police Department, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

316 F.3d 324

Benny CURRY, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SYRACUSE, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, Chad Lynch, Individually and as a Police Officer for the City of Syracuse, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, John Doe or Does, Fictitious names and the real identities of these individuals who, upon information and belief, are Police Officers employed by the city of Syracuse whose real identities are not known as Police Officers and/or employees of the Syracuse Police Department, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.

Docket No. 01-9211.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued September 26, 2002.

Decided January 15, 2003.

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Elmer Robert Keach, III, Albany, NY (Kenneth P. Ray, Utica, NY, of counsel), for Appellant.

Karen M. Richards, Office of the Corporation Counsel, City of Syracuse, Syracuse, NY (Terri Bright, Corporation Counsel, Syracuse, NY, Sheila M. Finn, Office of the Corporation Counsel, City of Syracuse, Syracuse, NY, of counsel), for Appellees.

Before: MESKILL, SACK and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

MESKILL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Benny Curry (Curry) appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Scullin, J., granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Chad Lynch (Lynch) and the City of Syracuse (Syracuse) on Curry's federal claims alleging unlawful use of excessive force and false arrest, and dismissing Curry's state law claims without prejudice. Federal question jurisdiction is proper because Curry has brought claims pursuant to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as this is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

At all times relevant to this case, Lynch was a police officer for the city of Syracuse. On September 10, 1997 at approximately 10:15 p.m., Lynch responded to a radio call from Officer Anthony Rossillo reporting shots fired in the area of Shonnard and Oswego Streets, which was known to Lynch as a high crime area. When Lynch arrived at the scene, Officer Rossillo indicated that the shots had come from the 300 block of Shonnard Street. Lynch proceeded to the 300 block of Shonnard Street, where he saw a black male coming out of a yard in the area where the shots had been fired. The male, later identified as Curry, ran down Shonnard Street. Lynch followed in his police car, shouting out the window to Curry to stop. Lynch got out of his car and began to chase Curry on foot, continually ordering Curry to stop.

As Curry was attempting to climb over a fence, his shirt got caught. While Curry was stuck on the fence, Lynch's police flashlight hit Curry in the back of the knee. Curry testified at his deposition that he believed Lynch threw the flashlight at him, but that he did not actually see it happen. Lynch testified that he slipped on the wet ground and his flashlight slipped out of his hand and hit Curry.

Lynch pushed the fence over on top of Curry and tackled him, attempting to handcuff him. Lynch called for help. Lynch and Officer Michael Yarema each testified at depositions conducted in this case that Lynch used his radio to call for help. However, at Curry's parole revocation hearing, Lynch testified that he did not use his radio to call for help, but simply shouted instead, because he was using his radio to hit Curry.

When Officer Yarema responded to Lynch's call for help, he observed Lynch and Curry struggling on the ground and assisted Lynch in subduing Curry. Lynch testified at his deposition that Curry began hitting him while the two were on the ground. Lynch also testified that Curry reached for his sock, pulled something out of his sock and threw it away. Lynch testified that when Curry reached for his sock, he believed Curry might be reaching for a gun. Curry testified that he never reached for or removed anything from his sock, and that he never hit Lynch. Lynch ordered Curry to place his hands behind his back; Curry was attempting to crawl away from Lynch and did not comply. Lynch hit Curry repeatedly in the head and elsewhere on his upper body with his police radio, possibly as many as ten times. Yarema also hit Curry. Finally, Curry was handcuffed and arrested.

Lynch testified that he returned to the scene of the struggle after Curry was under arrest and found a plastic bag containing crack cocaine. Lynch believed that this plastic bag was the object Curry had removed from his sock and thrown away during the struggle. Curry testified that he did not possess any illegal drugs on that night, that he did not remove anything from his sock, and that he did not throw anything away. Curry contends that the crack was planted at the scene after the fact to incriminate him.

Lynch did not suffer any injuries from the incident that required medical treatment. At his deposition, Lynch testified that he suffered bruising as a result of the incident. However, at Curry's parole revocation hearing, Lynch testified that he did not sustain any marks or injuries in the struggle. Curry was hospitalized with lacerations to his head and face and a ruptured patellar tendon in his left leg which required major surgery and several days in the hospital.

At the time of his arrest, Curry was on parole, and was subject to a curfew. When he arrived at Shonnard Street, Curry knew that it was past his curfew. Curry testified at his deposition that he ran from the police only because he did not want to be caught violating his curfew.

Curry was charged in New York state court with resisting arrest and possession of a controlled substance. A Violation of Release Report was also filed, charging Curry with (1) possession of a controlled substance, (2) violating his curfew, (3) threatening the safety and well-being of a police officer by resisting arrest, and (4) threatening the safety and well-being of a police officer by striking Lynch, all in violation of the conditions of Curry's parole.

The criminal charges against Curry were dismissed by a New York court, which found that Lynch's pursuit and "tackling" of Curry was unlawful. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding over Curry's parole revocation hearing found that the first and third violations, i.e., possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest, had not been established by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Curry was found to have violated his parole by being out past his curfew and by striking Lynch.

Curry filed a complaint in district court setting forth the following claims: Counts One and Two, that the defendants had violated his constitutional right to be free from the use of excessive force; Counts Three and Four, that the defendants had violated his constitutional right to be free from false arrest; Count Five, that the defendants had failed to protect him from the use of excessive force and false arrest by Lynch; Count Six, that Syracuse had failed to adequately screen and supervise its employees; and five supplemental claims brought pursuant to state law for battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.¹ Syracuse and Lynch moved for summary judgment. Curry conceded at oral argument before the district court that Count One was duplicative of Count Two, and Count Three was duplicative of Count Four; Counts One and Three were therefore dismissed. Count Five was dismissed, for reasons set forth by the district court at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment.² Curry withdrew Count Six, the claim against Syracuse. The district court thus considered only two claims on summary judgment: excessive force and false arrest. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on these claims and dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice. This appeal followed. On appeal, Curry challenges only the district court's grant of summary judgment on the false arrest and excessive force claims and does not challenge the dismissal of his other federal law claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

"As the analysis required for summary judgment is a legal one, we review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that

the issue of material fact required by Rule 56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.

First Nat'l. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). Further, "in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "If, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper." Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.1996).

II. Claims Against the City of Syracuse

In the motion for summary judgment, the City of Syracuse argued that all claims against it should be dismissed because the complaint failed to set forth allegations which...