Dzwonczyk v. Syracuse City Police Dep't

• Citation: 710 F.Supp.2d 248
• Decision Date: 22 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 5:08-CV-00557 (NPM/DEP),5:08-CV-00557 (NPM/DEP)
• Parties: Wlodzimierz J. DZWONCZYK, Plaintiff, v. SYRACUSE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; Syracuse Housing Authority Security; John Doe, Syracuse Housing Authority Detective; Gary Miguel, Chief of Police, Syracuse City Police Department; Onondaga County Sheriff's Office; Onondaga County Justice Center; John Does, in Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York

710 F.Supp.2d 248

Wlodzimierz J. DZWONCZYK, Plaintiff,

v.SYRACUSE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; Syracuse Housing Authority Security; John Doe, Syracuse Housing Authority Detective; Gary Miguel, Chief of Police, Syracuse City Police Department; Onondaga County Sheriff's Office; Onondaga County Justice Center; John Does, in Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants.

No. 5:08-CV-00557 (NPM/DEP).

United States District Court,

N.D. New York.

Dec. 22, 2008.

Wlodzimierz J. Dzwonczyk, pro se.

Rory A. McMahon, City of Syracuse Corporation Counsel, Syracuse, NY, for the Defendants, Syracuse City Police Department; Gary Miguel, Chief of Police, Syracuse City Police Department; and John Does, in their official and individual capacities.

Paul F. Murak, Sliwa & Lane, Buffalo, NY, for the Defendants, Syracuse Housing Authority Security; and John Doe, Syracuse Housing Authority Detective.

Karen A. Bleskoski, Gordon J. Cuffy, Onondaga County Attorney, Syracuse, NY, for the Defendants, Onondaga County Sheriff's Office; Onondaga County Justice Center; and John Does.

Amended Memorandum, Decision and Order

NEAL P. McCURN, Senior District Judge.

I. Introduction

Presently before the court in this civil rights action are two dispositive motions.Defendants Onondaga County Sheriff's Office, Onondaga County Justice Center and John Does (collectively, "the County Defendants") move to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff, Wlodzimierz J. Dzwonczyk ("Plaintiff") for failure to state claims against them upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 16. Defendants Syracuse City Police Department ("SPD"); Gary Miguel, Chief of Police, Syracuse City Police Department ("Miguel"); and John Does (collectively, "the City Defendants") move for judgment on the pleadings in their favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). See Dkt. No. 37. Plaintiff opposes both motions. No reply having been filed by the County Defendants, and the City Defendants having informed the court of their intent not to reply, both motions are fully briefed. Decision regarding the motions is on the papers submitted, without oral argument.

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a complaint against the County Defendants and City Defendants as well as defendants, Syracuse Housing Authority Security and John Doe, Syracuse Housing Authority Detective (collectively, "SHA Defendants"), alleging the violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as predicates for civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as several New York common law tort claims, stemming from events surrounding Plaintiff's arrest and detention for aggravated harassment on or about May 23, 2008. The City Defendants and SHA Defendants thereafter answered the complaint, while the County Defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The City Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings followed.

III. Legal Standard

The standard to be applied when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) is identical to that of a motion to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994). When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations of fact in the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See World Religious Relief, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 05-CV-8257, 2007 WL 2261549, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2007) ( quoting Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.1994)). Additionally, when deciding such a motion, the court may only consider "the factual allegations in the complaint, [...] documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, [... matters of which judicial notice might be taken, and [...] documents either in plaintiff's] possession or of which [the] plaintiff [ ] had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Muller-Paisner v. TIAA, 446 F.Supp.2d 221, 226-227 (S.D.N.Y.2006) ( citing Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted)) ( rev'd in part on other grounds, 289 Fed.Appx. 461 (2d Cir.2008)). Particularly relevant here, an arrest report is a matter of public record that may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See McCloud v. Cutler, No. 06-CV-5443, 2008 WL 906701, at *1 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2008) ( citing Vasquez v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 4606(DC), 2000 WL 869492, at *1 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2000)).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may not be granted so long as the complaint includes "enough facts tostate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).¹ The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted the foregoing language to require that lower courts apply "a flexible 'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible [,]" but does not require a heightened pleading standard for civil rights claims. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis in original).

Finally, the court is mindful of the well-established principle that a pro se litigant's papers are to be construed liberally, especially when civil rights violations are alleged. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). Thus, "a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir.2008) ( quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ( per curiam )). Accordingly, the court must interpret Plaintiff's "submissions to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Diaz v. United States, 517 F.3d 608, 613 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Further, "when reviewing pro se submissions, a district court should look at them 'with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.' " Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 127-128 (2d Cir.2005) ( quoting Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir.1998)) ( per curiam ). Thus, courts have held it appropriate to consider assertions in a pro se plaintiff's papers in opposition to a motion to dismiss to effectively amend the allegations of the complaint, to the extent such assertions are consistent with the allegations of the complaint. See Robles v. Bleau, No 9:07-CV-0464, 2008 WL 4693153, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2008) (citations omitted).

At the same time, the court is mindful that, according to Second Circuit precedent, it

cannot read into pro se submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se litigant's allegations, or arguments that the submissions themselves do not suggest, ... [and it] should not excuse frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants, and that pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law[.]

Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir.2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the court notes that it "is not obliged to reconcile [a pro se] plaintiff's own pleadings that are contradicted by other matter asserted or relied upon or incorporated by reference by a plaintiff in drafting the complaint." Koulkina v. City of New York, 559 F.Supp.2d 300, 314 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (internal citation omitted). Thus, where such contradiction exists, the pro seplaintiff's allegations "are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Id.

IV. Factual Background

The court will, as it must, accept the following allegations of fact in the Plaintiff's complaint ("the Complaint") as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See supra, at 256.

On or about May 18, 2008, Plaintiff sent a "Letter of Trespass Notice" to one Daniel Bebber.² Mr. Bebber is apparently employed as a delivery person at a local pharmacy. At one time Mr. Bebber delivered medications to Plaintiff as well as to Plaintiff's parents, through which association Plaintiff and Mr. Bebber became acquainted.

On May 23, 2008, Plaintiff was arrested at his residence for aggravated harassment. It is unclear from the complaint the exact number of arresting officers, but Plaintiff alleges that an officer or officers from both SPD and Syracuse Housing Authority Security were involved. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the "Syracuse Police Department and Syracuse Housing Authority Security came to [his] residence ... with two police officers[;] ... [o]ne was a detective working for the Syracuse Police Department and Syracuse Housing Authority Security, ... [and] the other was in the police uniform ...." Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges a "Detective" entered his residence, showed him "the Letter of Trespass Notice" and accused him of aggravated harassment, then arrested Plaintiff by putting handcuffs on his wrists. See id. ¶¶ 15, 16. It should also be noted that Plaintiff contends the Syracuse Housing Authority Security arrested him in retaliation for litigation he filed in this court, alleging violations of his rights under the Fair Housing Act. See Compl. ¶ 50. ³

Plaintiff alleges he was not read his " Miranda rights," and that the Detective would not let Plaintiff put on his socks or notify his mother that he was leaving prior to defendants removing him from his residence. See id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff further contends the "Detective grabbed [him] and literally dragged him to the elevator" and gave him "little pushes ... here and there" while defendants transported Plaintiff to the police car. See id. Finally, Plaintiff claims that at...