Curry v. Lehman

• Decision Date: 14 May 1908
• Citation: 55 Fla. 847,47 So. 18
• Parties: CURRY et al. v. LEHMAN.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

47 So. 18

55 Fla. 847

CURRY et al. v. LEHMAN.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

May 14, 1908

Appeal from Circuit Court, Manatee County; Joseph B. Wall, Judge.

Bill by Henry R. Curry and another against D. Lehman, praying that an execution sale of real estate be restrained, and that the record of the judgment on which the execution issued be canceled as a cloud on the title of such real estate. From an order refusing an application for a temporary injunction complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In construing the provisions of section 1603 of the General Statutes of 1906, the provisions of sections 1600 and 1601 must be considered, as these three sections are in pari materia. They relate to the same subject and must be construed together as though they had originally constituted one enactment.

The intention of the Legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although is may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The court will not follow the letter of the statute, when it leads away from the true intent and purposes of the Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.

Undoubtedly the general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmakers is to be found in the language that has been used, and the courts have no function of legislation, but simply seek to ascertain the will of the Legislature. If however, from a view of the whole law, or from other laws in parimateria, the evident intention is different from the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intention should prevail for that, in fact, is the will of the Legislature.

The evil to be corrected, the language of the act, including its title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in existence bearing on the subject, are all properly considered by the court in arriving at the legislative intention, because the Legislature must have resorted to the same means to arrive at its purpose.

It is to be presumed that different acts on the same subject passed at the same session of the Legislature are imbued with the same spirit and actuated by the same policy, and they should be construed each in the light of the other. The legal presumption is that the Legislature did not intend to keep really contradictory enactments in the statute book, or to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intent to do so. An interpretation leading to such a result should not be adopted, unless it be inevitable. The rule of construction in such cases is that if courts can by any fair, strict, or liberal construction find for the two provisions a reasonable field of operation, without destroying their evident intent and meaning, preserving the force of both, and construing them together in harmony with the whole course of legislation, it is their duty to do so.

When the meaning of a statute is clear, its consequences, if evil can only be avoided by a change of the law itself, to be effected by the Legislature, and not by judicial construction. An interpretation of a statute, however, which must lead to consequences which are mischievous and absurd, is inadmissible if the statute is susceptible of another interpretation by which such consequences can be avoided. For this purpose all parts of a statute are to be read and compared.

Where a judgment was recovered in the circuit court for Duval county on the 14th day of May, 1897, in a suit wherein W. Lehman was plaintiff and John A. Graham was defendant, and an execution thereon was issued on the 10th day of June, 1897, out of said court, and a certified transcript of said judgment was recorded in the judgment docket of the public records of Manatee county on the 11th day of November, 1902, a lien was thereby created upon the real estate of the defendant situated in Manatee county in favor of the plaintiffs; and the lien so established and the notice of the judgment and lien continued in full force, although record of the judgment in Duval county was destroyed by fire on the 3d day of May, 1901, and no legal proceedings to re-establish the same in the last-named county was begun until the 15th day of December, 1903, and no final order or decree has been made therein.

Where the bill of complaint alleges that the complainants had no actual notice of a judgment, but the bill also shows that a certified transcript of the judgment was recorded in Manatee county before complainants purchased real estate belonging to the judgment debtor in said county, they will be considered purchasers with constructive notice.

COUNSEL

Singeltary & Reaves, for appellants.

Axtell & Rinehart, for appellee.

OPINION

PARKHILL J.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order refusing an application for a temporary injunction.

The bill of complaint filed on the 13th day of February, 1908, by Henry R. Curry and Eugene Turner in the circuit court for Manatee county, alleges, briefly, that they are the owners in fee simple of certain described lands in the city of Bradentown, purchased from one John A. Graham by a warranty deed dated the 9th day of May, 1907; that the defendant, D. Lehman, claims an adverse estate or interest in said property as a judgment creditor of said Graham; that the sheriff of Manatee county, by the direction and instructions of the said defendant, has levied upon said property and is now advertising the same to be sold on the first Monday in March, 1908, under and by virtue of an execution issued out of the circuit court of Duval county, Fla., dated the 10th day of June, 1897; that the judgment upon which said execution was issued was recovered in the circuit court for Duval county on the 14th day of May, 1897, in a suit wherein D. Lehman was plaintiff and John A. Graham was defendant; that a certified transcript of said judgment was recorded in the judgment docket on page 238 of the public records of Manatee county on the 11th day of November, 1902; that the records of Duval county and of the circuit court thereof, showing the rendition and entry of said judgment, were entirely destroyed by fire on the 3d day of May, 1901, and no legal proceeding to re-establish the same was begun until the 15th day of December, 1903; that said proceeding to re-establish said judgment is still pending, and no final order or decree has been made therein; that at the time the said complainants purchased said property they had no notice, information, or knowledge of the existence of said judgment, nor that said Lehman had any interest in or lien upon said property; that the said judgment is void, and the record thereof constitutes a cloud upon complainants' title to said property. The bill prays for a restraining order, enjoining and restraining the said Lehman and his agents and attorneys from selling the said property under said execution for the purpose of satisfying said judgment, and that the record of said judgment be canceled as a cloud upon the title of said property. The bill was sworn to.

The defendant filed an affidavit, by his counsel, showing his recovery of the judgment against Graham for the sum of $8,433.65 and costs in the Duval county circuit court on the 14th day of May, 1897; that judgment was duly entered and recorded in the minutes of said court; that on the 24th day of June, 1897, affiant caused to be made a certified transcript or copy of said judgment by the clerk of said court under the seal of said court; that on the 10th day of November, 1902, the said copy or transcript of said judgment, certified as aforesaid, was filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for Manatee county in judgment docket at page 238, one of the public records of said county, in the book in which are recorded all transcripts of foreign judgments filed with the clerk of said county; that neither said judgment, nor any part thereof, has been paid; that on or about the 29th day of January, 1904, the said Graham instituted a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida to restrain the enforcement of said judgment, and that a temporary injunction issued by said court remained in force until the 3d day of January, 1908, when it was dissolved, and said bill dismissed. To the said affidavit was attached a copy of said certified transcript of the judgment and a certificate of the clerk of Manatee county showing that it was recorded in said county as stated, and a certificate of the clerk of the circuit court of Jefferson county showing that said transcript of the said judgment was recorded in the book of foreign judgments of that county on the 25th day of June, 1897. The court denied the application for the temporary injunction, and the complainants appealed.

To decide the questions presented here, we must construe the provisions of chapter 4919, p. 51, Acts of 1901, brought forward as section 1603 of the General Statutes of 1906. In this connection we must consider the provisions of the act of February 12, 1834 (Duval's Comp. Laws 1839, p. 369), brought forward as sections 1601 and 1602 of the General Statutes of 1906. These sections relate to the lien of judgments, and are as follows:

'Sec. 1600 (1173). In Counties Where Rendered.--Every judgment at law (and decree in equity) which shall be entered in any of the circuit courts of this state shall create a lien and be binding upon the real estate of the defendant in the county where rendered.

'Sec. 1601 (1174). In Other Counties.--Such judgments and decrees shall create a lien upon the real estate of the defendant situated in any other county than the one in which the same shall have been rendered, when

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