Curry v. Lou Rippner, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1908 SECTION: "G"(4) |
| Parties | ANNETTE CURRY v. LOU RIPPNER, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Defendant Lou Rippner, Inc. ("Lou Rippner") "Motion for Attorneys' Fees."1 Local Rule 7.5 of the Eastern District of Louisiana requires that memoranda in opposition to a motion be filed eight days prior to the date set for hearing on the motion. No opposition to the pending motion, which was set for hearing on June 10, 2015, was submitted, timely or otherwise. Accordingly, this motion is deemed unopposed. District courts may grant an unopposed motion as long as the motion has merit.2 Having considered the motion, the memorandum in support, the record and the applicable law, the Court herein grants the motion.
Plaintiff Annette Curry ("Curry") filed a complaint in this Court on August 20, 2014, alleging claims of sexual harassment and race discrimination against Defendant, her former employer.3 In her complaint, Curry alleged that on several occasions, a coworker made unwanted and sexually suggestive remarks toward her.4 Curry alleged that she reported these remarks tomanagement, but no action was taken and no investigation was conducted.5 According to the complaint, on July 30, 2012, the same coworker 6 Curry alleged that she again complained to management, but that no action was taken against the co-worker.7 According to the complaint, "the employer advised Curry that 'we can't have you people doing these things in our store,' and subsequently terminated Curry's employment."8 Curry alleged that "the actions of defendant" constituted sexual harassment and racial discrimination.9
On November 19, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,10 which Curry opposed.11 On May 8, 2015, the Court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed Curry's Title VII claims against it.12
Defendant filed the instant motion seeking attorneys' fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and Local Rule 54.2 on May 22, 2015.13 Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
In support of its motion, Defendant argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows a district court toaward a prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.14 Defendant argues that in Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the rationale for awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant under Title VII stemmed from Congress's desire to deter the bringing of lawsuits that were frivolous, unjustified, or without foundation.15 Here, Defendant argues that several factors weigh in favor of granting attorneys' fees, namely: (1) Plaintiff did not seriously pursue her action; (2) this Court held that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of harassment or discrimination under Title VII; and (3) although this case did not result in a full trial, the Court expended judicial resources—and Defendant expended monetary resources—to resolve the motion to dismiss.16
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not seriously pursue her action, as evidenced by the fact that the "scant Complaint contained a few scarce allegations;" Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss; said opposition was just one-and-a-half pages in length and did not contain "a single citation to any law or case to support her argument;" the opposition failed to controvert the issues raised in the motion to dismiss; Plaintiff failed to respond to any of Defendant's discovery requests, which required it to bring a motion to compel discovery; and Plaintiff never propounded any discovery or took any actions to prosecute her claim.17 Defendantargues that despite Plaintiff's failure to prosecute her claim, it had to expend resources to defend itself.18
Furthermore, Defendant contends, Curry failed to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, as set forth by the Court in its Order dismissing her claims.19 Defendant argues that Curry's claims of sexual harassment and racial discrimination—based on an incident in which "Plaintiff (an African-American) violently swung her fist at co-worker (an African-American) who engaged Plaintiff in innocent horseplay while at work"—were groundless and lacked foundation.20 Defendant argues that, as the Court noted, Plaintiff did not allege any facts showing she was treated differently from any other employee, did not allege any facts regarding the content or frequency of the allegedly offensive remarks made against her, failed to identify the allegedly harassing coworker, and cited no legal authority for her argument that a single instance of touching her hair could constitute sexual harassment.21 Furthermore, Defendant notes, the Court stated that Plaintiff had not provided any reason to believe she could remedy the deficiencies in her complaint by amendment, and despite a "lengthy and exhaustive investigation by the EEOC," the agency also dismissed her charge.22
Finally, Defendant argues that the requested attorneys' fees of $6,808 are reasonable under the "lodestar" method, by which the reasonable number of hours expended on litigation is multipliedby a reasonable hourly rate.23 Defendant contends that, from August 20, 2013 through April 30, 2015, its attorneys expended 33.5 hours litigating the case, excluding time spent addressing the charges at the administrative agency level.24
Furthermore, Defendant contends, the requested attorneys' fees are reasonable in light of the twelve "Johnson factors" utilized by the Fifth Circuit to decrease or enhance the amount of the lodestar.25 Defendant notes that it is requesting only the actual amount billed over the course of litigation and that it obtained a favorable judgment.26 Defendant asserts that when an attorney's requested rate is his customary billing rate and within the range of prevailing market rates, a court should consider the rate prima facie reasonable if not contested.27
Defendant contends that its representation was led by Angella Myers ("Myers") and Mark Carver ("Carver"). According to Defendant, Myers is the founding partner of the Myers Law Group, LLP, focuses her practice on labor and employment law, has practiced for more than 15 years, and a reasonable regular hourly rate for her to defend a Title VII case is $300 per hour.28 Here,Defendant avers, she charged only $210 per hour.29 According to Defendant, Carver is a senior attorney with the Myers Law Group, has practiced law for more than 21 years, is an acclaimed attorney, and regularly charges $190 per hour.30 Defendant contends that both rates are "well within range of prevailing market rates," and in fact lower than rates that have been approved in the Eastern District of Louisiana.31
"It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorney's fees."32 Pursuant to § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, a Court may, in its discretion, award attorneys' fees to either a plaintiff or a defendant who prevails in a Title VII suit.33 In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court may award such fees "in its discretion . . . to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."34 When considering whether a suit is frivolous, a district court should look to factors such as whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, whether the defendant offeredto settle, and whether the court held a full trial.35
"Congress sought to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis" in civil rights cases by shifting a prevailing defendant's attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in certain circumstances.36 However, although prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII actions can usually recover attorneys' fees from defendants, a prevailing defendant must satisfy a "more rigorous standard" to obtain an award of attorneys' fees than would a prevailing plaintiff because of differing policy considerations.37 The Fifth Circuit has further cautioned: "a court must 'resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.'"38 Instead, the court must ask whether "the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful."39
Defendant argues that attorneys' fees ought to be awarded because (1) Plaintiff did not seriously pursue her action, and (2) this Court held that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of harassment or discrimination under Title VII. As evidence, Defendant cites Plaintiff's "scant" Complaint, her untimely and equally brief filings, and her failure to respond to or propounddiscovery.40 Defendant also points to this Court's Order dismissing the case, as well as the EEOC's dismissal of her charge, as evidence that Curry's claims were groundless and lacked foundation.41
A district court may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII suit only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."42 Defendant cites no authority stating that a failure to vigorously...
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