Curry v. Ozarks Ecectric Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 July 2000
• Docket Number: SD23368
• Parties: Robert L. Curry, Claimant, v. Ozarks Electric Corporation, Employer-Appellant, and Continental Western Insurance Company, Insurer-Appellant, and Cox Health Systems, Health Care Provider-Respondent. 23368 Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Robert L. Curry, Claimant v Ozarks Electric Corporation, Employer-Appellant, and Continental Western Insurance Company, Insurer-Appellant, and Cox Health Systems, Health Care Provider-Respondent

23368

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

07/14/2000

Appeal From: The Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission

Counsel for Appellant: Kenneth H. Reid and Jeffrey T. Davis

Counsel for Respondent: Jason N. Shaffer and Steve Marsh

Opinion Summary: None

Crow, P.J., recuses; Parrish and Montgomery, JJ., concur.

Kenneth W. Shrum, Judge

This is a workers' compensation case¹ in which the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) ordered Employer and Insurer² to make a $105,968.35 direct payment to Hospital³ This payment was for treatment Hospital gave Robert L. Curry (Employee) for injuries he sustained while on the job. Commission's direct payment order came after Employee had settled his claim with Employer and Insurer for $33,597.20. Commission relied on section 287.140.13(6) as its authority for ordering the additional payment directly to Hospital.⁴ Appellants urge reversal of Commission's award on the basis that Hospital's services were not "authorized in advance" within the meaning of section 287.140.13(6). We never reach Appellants' complaint, however, because Commission lacked authority to enter the award; consequently, the award is void. We dismiss the appeal.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 11, 1997, Employee was working for Employer when he fell from a scaffold and was injured. He was immediately taken to Hospital where he was treated until his discharge on December 12, 1997. Hospital charged $112,573.22 for the care given Employee during this period.

In January 1998, Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with Missouri's Division of Workers' Compensation (Division). Because Hospital's bill was not paid within ninety days of its first billing, Hospital filed a "Notice of Services Provided and Request for Direct Payment" in Employee's case. By this notice, Hospital attempted to avail itself of the benefits of section 287.140.13(6), which provides:

"A hospital . . . whose services have been authorized in advance by the employer or insurer may give notice to the division of any claim for fees or other charges for services provided for [a work-related injury] that is covered by this chapter, with copies of the notice to the employee, employer and the employer's insurer. Where such notice has been filed, the administrative law judge may order direct payment from the proceeds of any settlement or award to the hospital . . . for such fees as are determined by the division. The notice shall be on a form prescribed by the division."

Employee's claim and Hospital's request were both set for hearing before an Associate Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on January 10, 1999. Just before the hearing, Employee and Appellants "entered into [a] compromise settlement under the provisions of sections 287.390, RSMo, for payment of the lump sum of $33,597.20 to the claimant." Afterward, the ALJ held an evidentiary hearing on Hospital's request for direct payment for its services. The ALJ denied Hospital's request because "the medical care provided by [Hospital] . . . was not authorized in advance by the employer or its insurer."

At Hospital's request, Commission reviewed the ALJ decision. With one member dissenting, the Commission ruled that Appellants were liable to Hospital "for direct payment of $105,968.35 . . . because the medical services were authorized in advance."⁵

This appeal followed.DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Appellants' single point on appeal asserts there was insufficient, competent evidence in this record to support Commission's finding that Employer gave advance authorization to Hospital to provide medical services to Employee. They contend the Commission clearly misinterpreted and misapplied section 287.140.13(6) to the facts; consequently, they urge this court to reverse Commission's decision.

Preliminarily, however, we address sua sponte our concern that Commission's award to Hospital was void. When it appears from the face of the record that Commission made an award it had no authority to make, then the award is void and may be impeached in any proceeding, even on appeal. Woodruff v. Tourville Quarry, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Mo.App. 1964), overruled on other grounds by Keener v. Black River Electric Co-operative, 443 S.W.2d 216 (Mo.App 1969). When that situation attends, it "is as if the award never existed." Woodruff, 381 S.W.2d at 19. This court does not have jurisdiction to review an appeal of a void judgment. Pritz v. Balverde, 955 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo.App. 1997). As in any case, we must probe our jurisdiction in workers' compensation cases sua sponte. Cable v. Schneider Transp., Inc., 957 S.W.2d 802, 803(Mo.App. 1997); Metcalf v. Castle Studios, 946 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Mo.App. 1997).⁶

Here, the award appealed from is captioned "Final Award Allowing Direct Reimbursement." The award includes the Commission finding that "[t]he employee and the employer/insurer settled the employee's claim for compensation resulting from injuries employee Robert Curry sustained in a fall at work on November 11, 1997."⁷ It is this finding and the ALJ's recital that Employee and Appellants settled Employee's claim pursuant to section 287.390 which triggers an inquiry into whether Commission had authority to make a subsequent award to Hospital. This follows because ordinarily a compromise lump sum settlement approved via section 287.390 is deemed final and conclusive and the system, including the appeal process established therein, loses jurisdiction. Morgan v. Duncan, 236 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo.banc 1951); 29 Mo.Prac., Worker's Compensation Law and Practice, section 7.63, p. 360 (1997). The rationale for this rule is found in Mosier v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 205 S.W.2d 227 (Mo.App. 1947):

"[I]n approving a compromise agreement, the Commission is not called upon to render an award, but merely to enter an order approving the settlement. Where a compromise settlement is proposed under Section [287.390], the only power of the Commission is to either approve or reject it, . . . depending upon whether it was found to be in accordance with the rights of the parties under the act."

. . . .

Section [287.390] contemplates the settlement of the entire claim and the discharge of the employers's entire liability, and not the splitting up of the claim into component parts, some of which are settled and released, and the others left to be adjudicated by the Commission. . . . [W]ith a settlement effected under Section [287.390], the whole of the parties' respective rights and liabilities were disposed of once and for all, and the Commission could thereafter acquire no jurisdiction to act under the provision of Section [287.400]."

Id. at 232-33 (citations omitted). See also Haase v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo.App. 1990) (holding "the policy of the law is to encourage settlement of Workers' Compensation benefits and to make conclusive and irrevocable such settlements once they are approved.").

As with any administrative agency, the Commission is a creature of the legislature and has only that jurisdiction or authority which the legislature conferred upon it. Mikel v. Pott Industries, 896 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo.banc 1995) (citing Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 346 MO. 710, 142 S.W.2d 866, 871 (1940). Apparently, the Commission views section 287.140.13(6) as authorizing it to award additional medical benefits via a direct payment order although it previously approved a compromise lump sum settlement pursuant to section 287.390. Whether the legislature intended such a result when it enacted section 287.140.13(6) is an issue we must now resolve.

When considering the Law, our primary responsibility is to discover the intent of the legislature, Mayfield v. Brown Shoe Co., 941 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Mo.App. 1997), give effect to that intent if possible, and consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning. Id.; Frazier v. Treasurer of Missouri, 869 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo.App. 1993). Words used in the Law must be considered in their context and sections of the statutes in pari materia in arriving at the true meaning of the words. Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Mo. banc 1959).

The Law is specifically designed to benefit injured employees, De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Mo. 1930), and from its inception it made "medical and hospital services [part of the] compensation" that an employer must provide an injured employee. Stookey v. Midland Flour Milling Co., 171 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Mo.App.1943). The medical benefit is specifically provided in section 287.140.1 as follows: "In addition to all other compensation, the employee shall receive and the employer shall provide such medical . . . and hospital treatment . . . as may reasonably be required . . . to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury." (Emphasis supplied.) The unambiguous language of section 287.140.1 (and also that of its predecessors) reveals a legislative intent that the medical benefit shall belong to "the employee," and no one else. Moreover, when the legislature in 1994 enacted section 287.140.13(6) and thereby gave ALJs discretionary authority to make direct payments to medical care providers from the "proceeds of any settlement or award[,]" it did not amend section 287.140.1 or other parts of the Law to expressly give medical care providers standing to assert a separate claim in the compensation system independent of an employee's claim.

Although never previously addressed in Missouri, other jurisdictions having workers' compensation acts with similar language have held that a health care provider may not independently assert a claim in the compensation system for services provided an employee. For example, Eastern Elevator Co. v. Hedman, 290 So.2d 56...