Curtin v. Benson
| Decision Date | 11 April 1910 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 222 U.S. 78,32 S.Ct. 31,56 L.Ed. 102 |
| Parties | J. B. CURTIN, Appt., v. H. C. BENSON et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Marshall B. Woodworth and J. B. Curtin, in propria persona, for appellant on original submission.
Mr. W. C. Prentiss for appellant on oral argument.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 78-80 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney General Harr for appellees.
Assistant Attorney General Harr for appellees.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 80-82 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Mckenna delivered the opinion of the court:
This suit was brought in the superior court of Tuolumne county, state of California, against the appellee Benson, and others, who were soldiers under Benson, to enjoin them from driving appellant's stock from his lands, or by any means interfering with them, and from preventing appellant driving his stock to his lands over certain toll roads. The case was removed to the United States circuit court for the northern district of California, where, after hearing, final judgment was rendered dismissing the bill of complaint.
The facts agreed to, and established by evidence supplementing the agreement, are as follows: Appellant is the owner of certain lands within the Yosemite National Park (the park was regularly and legally established, act October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 650, chap. 1263, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 572; Joint Res. June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 831, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 584), and lessee of other lands therein. Leading to the lands there are certain toll roads, which were established many years prior to the creation of the park.
Appellee Benson is a captain in the United States Army and superintendent of the park, and, as such, it was and is his duty to enforce the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior for the government of the park, and for this purpose he has a body of troops under his command.
The Secretary established and promulgated the following rules:
'9. Owners of patented lands within the park limits are entitled to the full use and enjoyment thereof; such lands, however, shall have the metes and bounds thereof so marked and defined as that they may be readily distinguished from the park lands. Stock may be taken over the park lands to patented lands with the written permission and under the supervision of the superintendent.
Appellant claims the right, without complying with these rules, to drive his cattle over the toll roads and to graze them on his lands. On one occasion appellant placed cattle on his lands, and appellee Benson immediately removed them, and refused to allow them to be grazed thereon until appellant complied with the rules; and, prior to the commencement of the suit, refused to allow appellant to drive his cattle over the the toll roads to his lands, or to use the lands until he complied with the rules.
The testimony gave some particularity to the facts as agreed to. It appeared that appellant has within the park a few hundred acres, and, it may be inferred, 23,000 acres in the vicinity. He asserted that he had not complied with the regulations, and did not intend to do so until required And it was admitted that the largest part of the land was unfenced.
The following from the report of the superintendent of the park to the Secretary of the Interior for the year 1901 was put in evidence: 'After due consideration, based upon the best evidence I have been able to obtain, I can see no objection to property owners and those holding leased land within the park limits grazing cattle near their own premises, under the supervision of the park authorities.'
Testimony was introduced on the part of appellees (their counsel expressing a doubt of its admissibility) 'to show that the regulation is a reasonable one, and the reason for it, and what effect will be produced if the regulation is not carried out.' To the offer counsel for appellant replied that he denied the power of the Secretary. 'It is simply a question of his power,' he said, and stated that if defeated on that point, he could show that the rules were not reasonable under the circumstances. The court, saying that it understood, heard the evidence, which was to the following effect: Appellee Benson had been superintendent of the park since April 10, 1905, and on duty there for several years prior to that time. Numerous people claimed land in the park as their ranges, and a number of them had the places surrounded by fences, 'sometimes inclosing, instead of 160 acres which they had, as high as several thousand acres of land.' They drove their cattle to the so-called ranges and immediately let them loose, and they strayed throughout the entire reservation. 'Senator Curtin's cattle have been in that condition for a great many year.' This he (Benson) Knew of his personal knowledge, because he was present at the time and had a correspondence with Mr. Curtin as far back as 1895, 1896, and ...
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...on petitioner's land; they rarely support prohibition of the ‘essential use’ of land." Id. (quoting Curtin v. Benson , 222 U.S. 78, 86, 32 S.Ct. 31, 56 L.Ed. 102 (1911) ). And the Court cautioned that "to win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration th......
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...The question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others. Thus, in Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 32 S.Ct. 31, 56 L.Ed. 102 (1911), the Court held that the Government, in prohibiting the owner of property within the boundaries of Yosemite National P......
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