Curtis v. Close, Case No. 2:14-cv-24624
| Decision Date | 11 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-24624 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | MICHAEL CURTIS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER JUSTIN CLOSE, OFFICER JASON BRAGG, OFFICER BRANDON LEAZURE and MAJOR ROBERT RHODES, in their individual capacities, and WARDEN DAVID BALLARD and COMMISSIONER JIM RUBENSTEIN, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
This matter is assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United States District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Pending before the court are a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 4-2), and two Motions for Preliminary Injunction (ECF Nos. 4-3 and 7-2), filed by the plaintiff. Also pending is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims (ECF No. 19).
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the presiding District Judge DENY AS MOOT the plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 4-2, 4-3 and 7-2), and GRANT the defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims (ECF No. 19).
On August 12, 2014, the plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants Close, Bragg and Leazure used excessive force against him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when they twice deployed pepper spray into his cell on April 11, 2014. The Complaint further alleges that defendants Ballard, Rhodes and Rubenstein, as supervisors, have permitted the pervasive use of excessive use of force against inmates on the segregation units at the Mount Olive Correctional Complex ("MOCC"), and have failed to properly investigate, train, supervise and discipline their subordinates who have engaged in such conduct. The plaintiff contends that their deliberate indifference to this substantial risk of harm proximately caused his constitutional injury.
On April 16, 2015, the plaintiff filed a document that was construed, inter alia, as a three-part motion: a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 4-1) (which has been addressed by separate Order), a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 4-2), and a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 4-3).1 In that motion, the plaintiff contends that correctional officers are assaulting older and weaker inmates, such as himself, and that he is in constant pain and suffering and fears for his safety due to alleged physical and sexual assaults and other misconduct by these correctional officers, against whom no disciplinary action has been taken, despite grievances having been filed by the plaintiff to alert supervisors of this misconduct. Thus, the plaintiff requests a Temporary Restraining Order against these officers and placement in protective custody, with no inmate contact and supervised and video-recorded staff contacts. (ECF No. 4 at 3).
On May 4, 2015, the plaintiff filed another document which was construed as a Letter-Form Motion for Docket Sheet (ECF No. 7-1), Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 7-2), and a Motion for Status Conference (ECF No. 7-3). The motions for a docket sheet and a status conference have been addressed in a separate Order. The second Motion for Preliminary Injunction again requests "immediate placement into safe keeping facility due to severe fear of my personal bodily harm and safety." (ECF No. 7 at 2). He reiterates his request for no inmate contacts and supervised and video-taped staff contacts. (Id.)
Since the filing of these motions, the plaintiff has been transferred from MOCC to the Huttonsville Correctional Center ("HCC"), which is within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. Based upon the plaintiff's transfer, his requests for all forms of declaratory and injunctive relief are now moot.
The power of the federal courts to adjudicate claims turns on the existence of a case or controversy. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). "When a case or controversy ceases to exist because the issue is no longer live or a party 'lack[s] a legally cognizable interest in the outcome[,]' preventing the court from granting effective relief, the claim becomes moot, and the court lacks the constitutional authority to adjudicate the issue." Taylor v. Riverside Regional Jail Authority, 2011 WL 6024499 *4 (E.D. Va., Dec. 2, 2011) ().
As noted in Taylor, well-established Fourth Circuit precedent has recognized that "the transfer or release of an inmate from the facility where he suffered the challenged conditions 'moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief' pertaining to hisimprisonment." 2011 WL 6024499 at *4; see also Rendellman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) () For these reasons, the undersigned proposes that the presiding District Judge FIND that the plaintiff's requests for preliminary injunctive relief contained in ECF Nos. 4 and 7 and the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief made in his Complaint (ECF No. 2) must be denied as moot, and those claims must be dismissed.
In light of the plaintiff's transfer to a facility located within the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, this court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff's custodian. Thus, if the plaintiff should wish to seek any further injunctive relief based upon the conditions of confinement in his current facility, he must pursue such relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia after exhausting the available administrative remedies.
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the presiding District Judge DENY AS MOOT the plaintiff's Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF Nos. 4-2, 4-3 and 7-2).
Defendants Close, Bragg and Leazure have also filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims against them (ECF No. 19) and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof (ECF No. 20). Although the defendants' Memorandum of Law notes that the style and body of the Complaint indicate that the plaintiff was suing these three defendants in only their individual capacities, the Memorandum of Law further indicates that, in correspondence to defense counsel, the plaintiff has indicated that he is, in fact, suingthese defendants in both their individual and official capacities. As noted above, the Complaint further indicates that defendants Ballard, Rhodes and Rubenstein have been sued in both their individual and official capacities.
In Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), the Supreme Court observed that a case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." While the complaint need not assert "detailed factual allegations," it must contain "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. at 555.
The Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), a civil rights case. The Court wrote:
556 U.S. at 678-79. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct." Id. at 678.
The defendants' motions will be reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Twombly/Iqbal standard. Furthermore, as noted recently in Haley v. Virginia Dep't of Health, 4:12-cv-0016, 2012 WL 5494306, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2012), "[t]he Fourth Circuit has not resolved whether a motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment is properly considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) . . . The recent trend, however, appears to treat Eleventh Amendment immunity motions under Rule 12(b)(1) []."
These defendants assert that, to...
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