Haley v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Health
| Decision Date | 13 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:12-cv-00016 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | KATHRINE HALEY, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Defendant. |
By: Jackson L. Kiser
Before me is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[ECF No. 5] , which was filed on September 9, 2012. Plaintiff filed a timely Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion [ECF No. 11] on October 5, 2012, and Defendants followed by filing their Response in Support of Defendant's Motion [ECF No. 13] on October 9, 2012. On November 6, 2012, I heard oral argument from both sides outlining their respective positions on the law, the facts, and the nature and extent of the record. Having thoroughly reviewed the briefs, the record, and the arguments of counsel, the matter is now ripe for decision. For the reasons stated below, I will GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS the case from the docket, and DENY AS MOOT any other pending motions in this case.
The present action arises from the allegedly wrongful termination of Katherine Haley ("Plaintiff") by Virginia Department of Health ("Defendant"). Plaintiff is a fifty-six (56) year old female and resident of Pittsylvania County, Virginia. (See Compl. ¶ 7.) According to theComplaint, Plaintiff suffers from severe psoriatic arthritis, which began in 2000, as well as fibromyalgia and reflex sympathetic dystrophy. (See id. ¶ 8.) Defendant is an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia located in Richmond, Virginia. (See id. ¶ 10.)
According to the Complaint, Defendant hired Plaintiff in June 2005. (See id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff worked as a medical facilities inspector, which involved "working from home, traveling to nursing homes and inspecting, typing, walking, and carrying." (Id.) Prior to her termination, Plaintiff never had any performance or disciplinary issues. (See id. ¶ 16.) According to the Complaint, however, Defendant terminated Plaintiff in December 2006 and placed her on long-term disability. (See id. ¶ 14.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff had surgery on her left rotator cuff on June 15, 2006. (See id. ¶ 13.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff tore the meniscus in her knee in November 2006. (See id.) Then, in December 2006, Plaintiff requested an accommodation to work from home for two weeks while she was recovering from surgery, which the Defendant allegedly denied. (See id.) After denying the accommodation, Defendant terminated Plaintiff on December 15, 2006. (See id. ¶14.) Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that the "sole cause of Plaintiff being taken out of work in December, 2006 is the discriminatory actions taken against her by the Defendant." (Id. ¶ 18.)1
On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed the above-referenced Complaint, alleging a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or"Title I"), seeking reinstatement of benefits, as well as compensatory, liquidated and punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000.
On September 9, 2012, Defendant filed a timely Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 5], and Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 6].) Defendant argues that this action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. On October 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11] (hereinafter "Pl.'s Resp. in Opp."), requesting that I deny Defendant's Motion. On October 9, 2012, Defendant filed a Response in Support of Defendant's Motion [ECF No. 13] (hereinafter "Def.'s Resp. in Support"), further delineating the basis for dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment.
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. "Thus, when a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the action must be dismissed." United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). A challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and is properly considered on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion rests with the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995).2
When the defendant makes a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff is afforded "the same procedural protection as he would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration," such that "the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true." Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Defendant's Motion is a facial challenge, as Defendant does not allege any new relevant facts or dispute Plaintiff's pled facts. (See Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss.) As a result, I must determine whether the Complaint "fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based." Id.; see also Beckham v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 (D. Md. 2008).
The Eleventh Amendment provides, in part, that, "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. Although the language of the Eleventh Amendment expressly refers to suits by citizens of another state, the United States Supreme Court "'has drawn on principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal court by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.'" Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990)). As such, the "ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting states may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueductand Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) ("[T]he doctrine's central purpose is to 'accord the States the respect owed them as joint sovereigns.'").
The Eleventh Amendment has also been interpreted to extend immunity to "'state agents and state instrumentalities.'" Lee-Thomas, 666 F.3d at 248 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)); see also Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2001). It is clear, and the parties do not dispute, that Defendant is a state agency shielded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Medicenters of America, Inc. v. Comm. of Va., 373 F. Supp. 305, 306 (E.D. Va. 1974) ().
The Eleventh Amendment's bar to suit is not absolute, however. There are three recognized exceptions. First, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (citing Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000)). Second, a state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002). Third, a plaintiff can seek relief under the principles set forth in Ex Parte Young. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). As discussed below, however, none of these exceptions are applicable to the present case.
"'Congress may abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of congressional authority.'" Lee-Thomas, 666 F.3d at 249 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363).3 Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity derives from its enforcement powers in § 5 of the FourteenthAmendment. See Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004). Congress's power to abrogate is not without limits, however. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-34 (1997).
To determine whether an intended abrogation is within the scope of Congress's § 5 powers, the United States Supreme Court has set forth a three-part "congruence and proportionality" test. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518-34. Under this test, a reviewing court should: "1) identify the constitutional right that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted the statute; 2) determine whether there is a history and pattern of unconstitutional conduct by the States; and if so, 3) analyze whether the statute is an appropriate, congruent, and proportional response to the history and pattern of unconstitutional treatment." Sarkissian v. W.Va Univ. Bd. of Governors, Case No. 1:05-cv-144, 2007 WL 1308978, at *6 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff cannot rely on abrogation to survive this Rule 12(b)(1) challenge. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Garrett forecloses Plaintiff's argument. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. In Garrett, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims by private citizens under Title I of the ADA. Id.; see also Lee-Thomas, 666 F.3d at 249.4 Because Plaintiff is pursuing an employment accommodation claim under Title I of the ADA, Garrett controls.5
A state may also waive its Eleventh Amendment protections. It is well settled, however, that a...
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