Curtis v. Medeiros, Docket: Pen–15–618

• Decision Date: 15 December 2016
• Docket Number: Docket: Pen–15–618
• Citation: 152 A.3d 605
• Parties: James–Robert G. CURTIS v. Florania Da Silva MEDEIROS
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

152 A.3d 605

James–Robert G. CURTIS

v.Florania Da Silva MEDEIROS

Docket: Pen–15–618

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: October 27, 2016

Decided: December 15, 2016

Corrected: December 22, 2016

Christopher R. Largay, Esq. (orally), Largay Law Offices, P.A., Bangor, for appellant Florania Da Silva Medeiros

Jason C. Barrett, Esq. (orally), Eaton Peabody, Ellsworth, for appellee James–Robert G. Curtis

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Florania Da Silva Medeiros (Medeiros) appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Bangor, Campbell, J. ) denying her motion to enforce her 2011 divorce from James–Robert G. Curtis and modifying the terms of that 2011 divorce judgment. Medeiros contends that the court erroneously interpreted the original divorce judgment concerning her authority to take her and Curtis's minor child on an annual trip to Brazil, and that the court violated her fundamental right to parent by modifying the divorce judgment to award contact with the child to the paternal grandparents pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(B) (2015). We agree with Medeiros and vacate the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Medeiros and Curtis were married in 2002 and divorced by a judgment of the District Court (Ende, J. ) in 2011. The parties, who both reside in Maine, have one minor child. Medeiros has American and Brazilian dual citizenship, and her mother lives in Brazil.

[¶ 3] In the 2011 divorce judgment, the court awarded the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities, and awarded Medeiros the right to provide the child's primary residence. The court also established a schedule for Curtis's contact with the child that accommodated his out-of-state work schedule. With regard to Medeiros's request to travel annually with the child to Brazil, the divorce judgment states as follows:

7. TRIPS TO BRAZIL WITH [THE CHILD] : The parties disagree over whether [Medeiros], who is a citizen of Brazil as well as a naturalized United States citizen, may take [the child] with her on her annual visits to Brazil each August, which are usually 10 to 14 days in duration. Their arguments are set out in the Interim Order, dated August 24, 2010, and won't be repeated here. [Medeiros] may take [the child] with her as of August 2013, or such earlier time as:

a. the parties agree to such in writing; or

b. either of the parties complete the [legal] process of registering this Divorce Judgment in Brazil.

8. [Curtis] shall return [the child's] passport to [Medeiros], by February 1, 2013 or six months before any earlier trip that the defendant makes, pursuant to paragraphs 7a or 7b, immediately above. [Curtis] shall cooperate and shall promptly sign upon request all necessary paperwork from either the United States government or the Brazilian government for [Medeiros] to travel to Brazil with [the child] in August 2013 or such earlier time as to enable [Medeiros] to make an earlier trip, pursuant to paragraphs 7a or 7b, immediately above.

No appeal was taken from the divorce judgment.

[¶ 4] On February 20, 2014, Medeiros moved to modify the divorce judgment to request an amended contact schedule, noting that the child would be starting school the following September. In the same motion, Medeiros requested that child support be modified, and that Curtis be required to complete the documents necessary to renew the child's passport. Curtis opposed this motion, asserting there had been no substantial change in circumstances. Four months later, on June 12, 2014, while the motion to modify was still pending, Medeiros moved to enforce the divorce judgment, and asked that the motion be heard on an expedited basis because she was seeking an order that would allow her to take the child to Brazil in 2014. Curtis opposed both motions.

[¶ 5] In July of 2014, the court (Campbell, J. ) denied Medeiros's request for an expedited hearing. Fourteen months later, on September 16, 2015, more than eighteen months after Medeiros's motion to modify was filed, the court finally conducted a hearing on Medeiros's motions to modify and enforce. After that hearing, the court denied Medeiros's motion to enforce the divorce judgment regarding annual trips to Brazil, concluding that the divorce judgment provided for Medeiros to take the child to Brazil on only one occasion, in August of 2013, and that Curtis therefore had not violated the divorce judgment by refusing to allow Medeiros to take the child to Brazil in 2014 or 2015.

[¶ 6] In addition, the court modified Curtis's contact schedule and, apparently in response to Medeiros's motion to modify,¹ the court modified the divorce judgment in two other respects. First, the court ordered that Medeiros could take the child on a trip to Brazil only every other year and, second, it awarded contact with the child to the paternal grandparents, citing 19–A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(B) :

The court has the authority pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(B) to award reasonable rights of contact with a minor child to a third party .... The court agrees with [the guardian ad litem's] opinion regarding the importance of ordering that the paternal grandparents are [to] have contact with [the child] one weekend a month. The court finds, that not only is it in the best interest of the child for [her] to have contact with her paternal grandparents one weekend a month, but also that it is necessary to protect her from a psychological perspective. The court further finds that this contact will not interfere with the mother's fundamental right to parent her own child, nor will it infringe on the mother's right to make decisions regarding her child.

Therefore, the court modifies the prior contact Orders in this case and hereby ORDERS that one weekend a month, while [Curtis] is working out of State, [the paternal grandparents] shall have contact with [the child from Saturday morning to Sunday evening] ....

[¶ 7] Medeiros moved to reconsider and for further findings and conclusions as to the Brazil travel and grandparent contact issues. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e), 120(c). The court declined to reconsider its decision, but issued further findings, and again invoked 19–A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(B) as its authority for awarding reasonable rights of contact with a nonparent. Medeiros timely appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Travel to Brazil

[¶ 8] We first address Medeiros's contention that the court misinterpreted the 2011 divorce judgment to provide only for a single trip to Brazil in 2013, and that the court therefore erred by declining to enforce the term in the 2011 divorce judgment allowing her to take the child to Brazil on an annual basis beginning in 2013. We review de novo whether a provision in a divorce judgment is ambiguous, i.e., "reasonably susceptible to different interpretations," by examining that provision in the context of the divorce judgment as a whole. Ramsdell v. Worden , 2011 ME 55, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1224 ; Stockwell v. Stockwell , 2006 ME 114, ¶ 11, 908 A.2d 94. "An unambiguous judgment must be enforced in accordance with the plain meaning of the language in the judgment." Ramsdell , 2011 ME 55, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1224. When the judgment is unambiguous, the court "may not, under the guise of a clarification order, make a material change that modifies the provisions of the original judgment." Burnell v. Burnell , 2012 ME 24, ¶ 15, 40 A.3d 390 (quotation marks omitted). If the divorce judgment is ambiguous, however, the court has the inherent authority to construe and clarify the decision. Bonner v. Emerson , 2014 ME 135, ¶ 12, 105 A.3d 1023.

[¶ 9] We conclude that the unambiguous language of the original 2011 divorce judgment allows Medeiros to take the child on an annual trip to Brazil. It specifically refers to plural "TRIPS TO BRAZIL" and discusses Medeiros's request to take the child "with her on her annual visits to Brazil each August, which are usually 10 to 14 days in duration." (Emphases added.) By their plain terms, the references in the divorce judgment to the trip in August of 2013 concern the timing and practicalities of the first trip, and not the exclusivity of that trip.

[¶ 10] Indeed, any other interpretation would create the absurd result that Medeiros would be forced to litigate the issue of travel every year that she wanted to take the child to visit her maternal grandmother. See Griffin v. Griffin , 2014 ME 70, ¶ 18, 92 A.3d 1144 (requiring courts to interpret plain language to avoid "absurd, illogical or inconsistent results" (quotation marks omitted)). To interpret the divorce judgment to invite or require a yearly motion to modify is contrary to the strong public policy in favor of finality in divorce judgments and in decisions regarding the care of children.² SeeBlack v. Black , 2004 ME 21, ¶ 15, 842 A.2d 1280 ; Spaulding v. Spaulding , 460 A.2d 1360, 1364 (Me. 1983) (recognizing the "compelling need to give a measure of finality to custody decrees in order to [ensure] a more stable environment for the child"). "If the divorce judgment had intended that the [order] would deviate so substantially from the approach contemplated by the ... statute, it would have so provided." Corcoran v. Marie , 2011 ME 14, ¶ 16, 12 A.3d 71.

[¶ 11] Because the divorce judgment unambiguously provides for the child's annual travel to Brazil, the denial of the motion to enforce that provision and the court's modification of that provision were error. See Burnell , 2012 ME 24, ¶ 15, 40 A.3d 390 ; Ramsdell , 2011 ME 55, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1224 ; see also Corcoran , 2011 ME 14, ¶ 17, 12 A.3d 71 ("[T]he court's amendment of the judgment exceeded its clarification authority because the amendment was not required to give effect to the [terms] established by the divorce judgment, and it materially altered the substance of the ... award."). We therefore vacate both (1) the denial of Medeiros's motion to enforce this provision of the judgment and (2) the portions of the modified divorce judgment providing for biennial trips...