Curtis v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 1923 |
| Docket Number | 17807 |
| Citation | 140 N.E. 522,108 Ohio St. 292 |
| Parties | Curtis, Safety Director, Et Al. v. The State, Ex Rel. Morgan. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Municipal corporations-insufficient funds for salaries-Civil service-Lay-off or suspension of employe-Statutory notice and explanation unnecessary-No appeal lies, when- Section 486-17a, General code-Employe retains title and preference-Purpose of civil service.
1. Where an employe in the classified service of a municipality is temporarily laid off by the safety director in the interest of economy and for the sole reason of the lack of sufficient funds with which to pay salaries of the entire working force in such department, the statutory provisions for written notice to such laid-off or suspended employe and for opportunity to make and file an explanation have no application.
2. No appeal lies from the action of the appointing authority except in cases of removal on the grounds set forth in section 486-17a, General Code.
3. In all cases of temporary layoff or susPension of a municipal employe In the classified service, such susPended or laid-off employe retains title to the office or position, and is entitled to be reinstated therein, upon the same again being refilled, in preference to all persons.
4. The fundamental purpose of civil service laws and rules is to establish a merit system, whereby selections for appoint- ments in certain branches of the public service may be made upon the basis of demonstrated relative fitness, without regard to political considerations, and to safeguard apointees against unjust charges of misconduct and inefficiency, and from being unjustly discriminated against for religious or political reasons or affiliations. Those laws and rules may not be invoked by an appointee, where no discrimination is claimed and no charges have been made involving misconduct, inefficiency, or other delinquency.
This cause originated in the court of common pleas of Stark county as a mandamus suit by the relator, Catherine E. Morgan, which was first tried in that court, and findings of fact there made, which are the basis of the error proceedings in the Court of Appeals and in this court. Those findings are as follows:
(1) That the ordinances of the city of Canton, Ohio, provide for the position of a Police matron, and for assistant police matrons; that Catherine E. Morgan was lawfully appointed as police matron,
(2) That E, E, Curtis is the safety director of the city of Canton, Ohio, and that C. C, Curtis' is the mayor of the city of Canton, Ohio, and that in the latter part of March 1922, both the safety director and the mayor notified orally said Catherine E. Morgan that, by reason of the lack of sufficient funds with which to pay the salaries, it was necessary to reduce the force in the safety department, and orally notified Catherine E. Morgan that she was laid off as police matron for the reason of the shortage of funds in the safety department and for economy; that said Catherine E Morgan was laid off; that she was not reduced in pay or position; that she was not suspended; that she was not discharged; that she was not discriminated against by either the safety di- rector or the mayor for religious or political reasons or affiliations.
(3) That said safety director acted in good faith in laying off said Catherine E. Morgan As police matron and in notifying her that she was laid off for the reason of the lack of sufficient funds to pay salaries in the safety department.
(4) That an appropriation was made for the safety department for the first half of the year 1922, and that not sufficient funds were then in the treasury, or in the process of collection, to meet such appropriation.
(5) That the semimonthly pay roll of the safety department for the last half of March, 1922, was $12,834.09; that on April 24, 1922, at the beginning of the week in which this case was heard, there was a balance of $12,823.92 in the safety fund and that no other money was provided for to be placed in said fund until the August, 1922, distribution of taxes; that the safety fund was over-appropriated in the sum of $115,389.22, and the general fund over-appropriated in the sum of $11,835.01; and that on April, 1922, there was a balance of $38,100.22 in the safety fund.
(6) That no written copy of the order of lay-off was given to said Catherine E. Morgan; that written notice was sent to the Civil Service Commission as set out in the answer.
(7) That rules were adopted by the civil service commission of the city of Canton as set out in the answer, and as shown by the exhibits offered in evidence.
(8) That Catherine E. Morgan was laid off for the purpose of economy, and for the reason that the funds in the safety department were nearly exhausted.
It will be observed that the findings of fact, in paragraph 7, refer to rules adopted by the Civil Service Commission of the City of Canton, and a complete copy of those rules was attached to the bill of exceptions; but the only part which was claimed as important To this controversy was Section 4 of rule 7 thereof, as follows:
From the foregoing findings the court of common pleas reached the conclusion that the writ of mandamus should be denied. Error was prosecuted from that judgment to the Court of Appeals, and that court was of the opinion that the relator was entitled to a judgment in her favor upon the findings of fact, and therefore reversed the court of common pleas, rendered final judgment in relator's favor, and ordered her reinstated and restored to all rights lost by reason of her removal.
Mr. Thomas M. Miller, city solicitor, and Mr. James E. Kinnison, for plaintiffs in error,
Mt. William B. Quinn, for defendant in error. MARSHALL, C. J.
This proceeding in error involves the interpretation of the civil service statutes of Ohio, more particularly Sections 486-17,486-17a, 486-19, of the General Code, and Section 4 of rule 7 of the civil service regulations of the city of Canton. It is necessary to determine from those sections and other Ohio statutes the powers and duties of the safety director and Civil Service Commission of the city, ad their relations toward each other. The difficulty in interpreting these statutes lies not so much in ambiguity of any of their provisions as in the fact of apparent conflict between these statutes and those statutes which confer upon the safety department of a city the power to appoint and suspend employees in the classified public service. It should be stated at the outset that the constitutionality of the civil service statutes is not questioned, and we have reached the conclusion that when those statutes are properly understood all apparent conflict can be obviated.
There is nothing complex or difficult to understand about civil service laws and rules. The fundamental purpose is to establish a merit system, whereby selections for appointments in certain branches of the public service may be made upon the basis of demonstrated relative fitness, without regard to political considerations. To carry out this purpose elaborate rules have been formulated, designed to facilitate its operation, but not to extend it beyond its legitimate limits. By the provisions of Section 486-2, General Code, it is declared that appointments and promotions in the classified service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained as far as practicable by competitive examination. By the provisions of Section 486-19, General Code, municipal commissions are empowered to prescribe, amend, and enforce rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the General Code of Ohio, All of these statutes and rules must be construed together, and wherever conflicts appear, the same must be reconciled. The most important thing to keep clearly in mind is that the civil service is not a new and in-dependent governmental power, but that, on the contrary, it is a regulation of one of the old, well-established, independent governmental powers that of appointing and discharging employees in certain branches of the public service.
Whether a police matron is essential to the welfare of the city of Canton is a question of governmental policy, with which the Civil Service Commission has nothing to do. When that question of policy was determined by the city officials who were charged with that responsibility, the Civil Service Commission began to function to determine the fitness of the applicants, and, in accordance with established rules, to make recommendations. When the appointment was made, the duty of the Commission was a continuing one to guard the appointee against unjust charges of misconduct and inefficiency and from being unjustly discriminated against...
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