Curtis v. State Police Merit Bd.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1953
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 9847
• Citation: 111 N.E.2d 159,349 Ill.App. 448
• Parties: CURTIS v. STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 159

111 N.E.2d 159

349 Ill.App. 448

CURTIS v. STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al.

Gen. No. 9847.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

March 3, 1953.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen., William C. Wines, John T. Coburn, A. Zola Groves, Raymond S. Sarnow, Assts. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for appellants.

William C. Bates, Jr., Lincoln, for appellee.

REYNOLDS, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Sangamon County reversing an order of the State Police Merit Board dismissing Harry I. Curtis from his position as a captain in the State Highway Police. Harry I. Curtis was from 1941 to January 1, 1945, a captain in the State Highway Police Force. On January 1, 1945, he was appointed by the then Governor of the State of Illinois, to the position of Superintendent of the State Highway Maintenance Police. On December 4, 1950, he was relieved of his duties as Superintendent and was reinstated to his previous position as Captain. On May 10, 1951, Curtis received a letter informing him that he was not a member of the State Highway Police and was relieved of his position as Captain as of May 15, 1951. This letter stated that the State Police Merit Board had made a decision that Curtis was not a member of the Illinois State Highway Police. The letter was signed by Thomas J. O'Donnell, Superintendent of State Highway Police. On June 12, 1951, Curtis filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, for administrative review of the action of the State Police Merit Board, and for an interim order that the decision of the State Police Merit Board, the Director of the Department of Public Safety and the Superintendent of State Highway Police, purporting to remove the said Curtis from his office as Captain of State Highway Police be stayed in its entirety pending the final disposition of the case, and for re-instatement as Captain. To this the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, supported by affidavit; and this was followed by a motion by Curtis to strike the motion to dismiss. On September 13, 1951, the Circuit Court struck the affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss, granted defendants time to file additional affidavits in support of the motion to dismiss, and to amend the motion to dismiss by September 24, 1951. The court at the same time granted leave to the plaintiff to reply to the motion to dismiss by September 28, 1951, and all motions were set for hearing on September 28, 1951. On September 24, 1951, the defendants filed their amended motion to dismiss the complaint, supported by affidavits. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike, supported by affidavits. On September 28, 1951, the court denied the motion of the plaintiff to strike the amended motion to dismiss and denied the motion of the defendants to dismiss, and granted leave to defendants to answer by October 11 1951. On October 10, 1951, the defendants filed their answer by filing the minutes of the meetings of the State Police Merit Board held March 28, 1951 and on April 13, 1951. These minutes showed that the matter of Curtis' being a member of the State Police Force was discussed by the board with Superintendent O'Donnell and that the Chairman of the Board, Mr. Henry A. Gardner, wrote to the Attorney General for an opinion; that the Attorney General rendered an opinion of the effect that when Curtis became the Superintendent of the State Highway Police, he severed his connection with the Highway Police Force and that before he could again become a member he would have to be appointed by the present Superintendent in conformity with the provisions of the State Highway Police Act. This opinion was based on the theory that when Curtis became the Superintendent he became an executive or administrative officer in the Department of Public Safety and consequently was no longer a member of the Highway Police Force.

After the filing of the answer, the plaintiff Curtis filed a motion for the defendants to produce a carbon copy or copies of a letter dated on or about January 1, 1945, granting Curtis a leave of absence from his duties as Captain of the State Highway Police, at the time he took over the office of Superintendent. In answer to this, several affidavits were filed showing that they had no carbon copy of such letter and that they had no knowledge of such a letter. Curtis filed affidavits supporting his contention that such a letter was sent to him by the Director of the Department of Public Safety on or about January 1, 1945. On November 5, 1951, the trial court denied all motions before it and found:

1. That Curtis was a police captain on leave of absence immediately prior to his appointment as Superintendent and was an employee of the Department of Public Safety.

2. That Thomas J. O'Donnell, Superintendent of Highway Police, on December 4, 1950, reinstated Harry I. Curtis as Captain of Police and that on December 4, 1950 to May 9, 1951, his status as a Captain of the State Highway Police was unchanged.

3. That after January 1, 1951, Curtis' status as a police officer was subject to the provisions of the State Highway Police section of Chapter 121, and particularly paragraph 307.14 in that he could not be removed, demoted or suspended without a hearing as provided by the Act.

4. That the State Police Merit Board determined on the 13th day of April, 1951, that Curtis was not a member of the State Highway Police Force during the time he was Superintendent and that he would have to again be appointed by the Superintendent.

5. That Thomas J. O'Donnell, acting on such determination by the State Police Merit Board, discharged Harry I. Curtis on the 9th day of May, 1951.

6. That no written charges were ever filed in this matter before the Merit Board, and no hearing was ever had before that board. Upon these findings, the Court held and ordered that the findings of the State Police Merit Board that the said Harry I. Curtis was not a police officer was contrary to law and the finding was reversed. From that order the defendants appeal to this court.

The defendants assign three errors as grounds for reversal. 1. That the trial court erred in ruling that the Administrative Review Act applied to the instant case. 2. That if the Administrative Review Act applied to the instant case, then the trial court erred in considering evidence dehors the administrative record. 3. If the Administrative Review Act applied to the instant case, the trial court erred in not reversing and remanding the cause to the State Police Merit Board with instructions to grant a hearing and to take further evidence in the matter.

In considering the claim that the trial court erred in its ruling that the Administrative Review Act applied to the instant case, it is necessary to consider the Administrative Review Act and the sections of the State Highway Police Act, applicable. An Administrative Agency is defined in Section 1 of the Administrative Review Act, Paragraph 264, Chapter 110 as 'a person, body of persons, group, officer, board, bureau, commission or department * * * of the State, or of any political subdivision thereof or municipal corporation therein, having power under law to make administrative decisions.' Section 2 of the Act, Paragraph 265, Chapter 110, provides that the act shall apply to and govern 'every action to review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of this Act.' Thus, if the State Police Merit Board is an administrative agency, and it must be conceded that it is, and the Act creating the State Police Merit Board has by reference adopted the provisions of the Administrative Review Act, then this is a proper case for administrative review, provided the Board made a final decision. If the Act creating the State Police Merit Board has by reference adopted the provisions of the Administrative Review Act, it is the only method of...