Gigger v. Board of Fire and Police Com'rs of City of East St. Louis

• Decision Date: 23 December 1959
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 5901
• Citation: 163 N.E.2d 541,23 Ill.App.2d 433
• Parties: James GIGGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, Illinois, and David G. Morgan, Gus Schaefer and Thomas Horrigan, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 541

163 N.E.2d 541

23 Ill.App.2d 433

James GIGGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF CITY OF EAST ST LOUIS, Illinois, and David G. Morgan, Gus Schaefer and Thomas Horrigan, Defendants-Appellants.

Gen. No. 5901.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Dec. 23, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1960.

Robert F. Godfrey, East St. Louis, for appellant.

McRoberts & Hoban, East St. Louis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Justice.

This appeal involves the judicial review of a decision of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of East St. Louis dismissing plaintiff from the Police Department of said city.

Under the provisions of Chapter 24, Sec. 14-11, Illinois Revised Statutes, written charges were preferred by the Chief of Police of East St. Louis against the plaintiff alleging conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct detrimental to the morale and welfare of the police department. Following a hearing before the defendant Board, plaintiff was discharged. Upon judicial review of this proceeding, pursuant to the Administrative Review Act (Chapter 110, Sec. 264 et seq., Illinois Revised Statutes), the Circuit Court found that the order of the Board was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed the Board and ordered plaintiff reinstated. From this order of the Circuit Court, defendant Board appeals to this Court.

'The purpose of judicial review of any administrative agency is to keep that agency within the judicial bounds described by law, and to guard the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Statutes * * *', Curtis v. State Police Merit Board, 349 Ill.App. 448, 457, 111 N.E.2d 159, 163. See also Hankenson v. Board of Education of Waukegan Tp., 10 Ill.App.2d 79, 98, 134 N.E.2d 356. In order to fulfill this purpose, it is our duty to review the entire record to ascertain whether or not the Board's decision and order is justified. Anderson v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 70, Winnebago County, 10 Ill.App.2d 63, 134 N.E.2d 28; Stehl v. County Board of School Trustees, 7 Ill.App.2d 257, 129 N.E.2d 297. This we have done.

The record indicates that charges filed against plaintiff related to an occurrence while he was off duty and out of uniform. He had driven to a certain location within the city to procure two truck loads of compost for his yard. While there, he became involved in a dispute with the operators of the company selling the compost concerning the payment therefor and the right of the plaintiff to remove the compost. As a result, one of the operators orally complained to the Chief of Police, and the latter preferred the charges from which this appeal arises.

After plaintiff's dismissal by the Board, he filed his complaint in the circuit court charging that the order of the Board was manifestly against the weight of the evidence and that he was denied a fair hearing by the Board. His complaint specifically set forth that he was denied an opportunity to be fully heard, that his evidence was limited, and that the Board's counsel arbitrarily and capriciously made rulings without the sanction of the Board.

We have not related the occurrence in more detail because we are convinced, from our study of the transcript, that the plaintiff did not receive the fair and impartial hearing to which he is entitled under the law and, for that reason, we must affirm the trial court's order reinstating plaintiff.

The hearing before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners was conducted entirely by the Board's attorney. He presented, interrogated and cross-examined the witnesses. He ruled on all questions of law and evidence, and he decided whether a continuance would be granted. A search of the transcript reveals that on only one occasion did a board member ask a question. Not one ruling was made by the board. The members of the board remained entirely mute throughout the hearing, and, except for the one question asked, did not participate in any way. The examination of witnesses by the board's attorney, in its presentation in chief, consisted of one leading and suggestive question after another. There were many instances of argumentation and interruption of witnesses to secure the desired answer. Objections by plaintiff's counsel to such questions, or to their relevancy, were brushed aside. Much of the testimony developed by the board's attorney consisted of unfounded opinions, conclusions of the witnesses and suggested answers. On occasions the questions assumed that a specific fact supporting the charge of guilt had been proved, when there was but little, if any, evidence to support it. Rulings of irrelevancy upon the plaintiff were followed by rulings of relevancy for the board upon the same subject matter. At the time of the first appearance of the plaintiff, he was told by the board's attorney that his case would be heard on a certain night whether he had an attorney or not and 'whether you are here or not.' In addition, the plaintiff was limited in his cross-examination of the board's witnesses, and at times, he was not given an opportunity to explain his answers.

An individual's rights before an administrative agency have been spelled out by the courts in a number of cases. An administrative agency, the creature of statute, must pursue the procedure and rules laid down upon it by ...