Curtis v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 11 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 78-2203,79-2244,s. 78-2203 |
| Citation | 625 F.2d 645 |
| Parties | Margarette CURTIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Alvin J. TAYLOR, Individually and as Secretary of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Defendant-Appellant. Margarette CURTIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Alvin J. TAYLOR et al., Defendants, Alvin J. Taylor, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Chester G. Senf, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Charles T. Collett, Atty., Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Stephen Maher, Perrine, Fla., Marcia K. Cypen, Legal Services of Greater Miami, Miami, Fla., for Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc.
David Frederic Chavkin, Washington, D.C., and Lucien Wulsin, Jr., Santa Monica, Cal., for National Health Law Program.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.
Before RUBIN and POLITZ, Circuit Judges, and POINTER *, District Judge.
These appeals concern the adequacy of notice of changes in benefits provided by a state Medicaid program and the validity of a limitation in benefits for physicians' services to three visits per month.
In October, 1977, Florida mailed a notice 1 to all state Medicaid recipients informing them that, effective November 1, 1977, it was instituting several reductions in its Medicaid program because of a deficit in its Medicaid budget. Six days later, plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of all Florida Medicaid recipients seeking an injunction against the proposed reductions and a declaration that they were illegal.
In these consolidated appeals Florida challenges two decisions by the district court granting summary judgment on separate claims of the complaint and enjoining implementation of the proposed reductions. We dismiss the appeal involving only the adequacy of notice (No. 78-2203) as moot. We hold that the state's payment for physicians' services was sufficient to "reasonably achieve" the purpose of such care even though limited to three visits per month, and, therefore, reverse the court's decision on the substantive change in benefits. (No. 79-2244).
In April 1978, the district court granted a summary judgment on that part of the complaint that contended the notice to Medicaid recipients was insufficient to comply with federal regulations. The complaint alleged that a notice covering a number of reductions in Medicaid benefits mailed to Medicaid recipients in October did not satisfy federal requirements for notice prior to state Medicaid reductions. On March 1, 1978, Florida had mailed a revised notice relating to only one of the proposed reductions, a requirement that each Medicaid recipient pay 50cents on each drug prescription. 2 Finding the original notice (which recited a number of proposed reductions) inadequate, the district court rendered a summary judgment on this count and enjoined Florida from implementing any of the changes until it provided adequate notice. Simultaneously, the district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from implementing the 50cents payment per drug prescription on the basis that the March 1 revised notice was also inadequate.
On April 29, 1978, Florida issued a notice covering all the reductions. The district judge and the plaintiffs found this notice acceptable. Florida thereby fully complied with the judgment below. In addition, the Florida defendants have repealed their regulation dealing with one substantive change to which the plaintiffs had objected, which required a payment of 50cents on each drug prescription. No objection was made to the other substantive changes save the limitation on physicians' visits. Therefore, except for the physicians' visits limitation, which we will hereafter consider, the Medicaid reductions enjoined by the district court are either no longer planned, or have been adequately noticed. Florida concedes that ordinarily its full compliance with the judgment below and its repeal of the 50cents prescription co-payment requirement would render an appeal from that judgment, and the accompanying injunctions, moot.
Florida argues, however, that the appeal is not moot for three reasons. First, it contends that the decision below will forever bar it from using the form of notice that the district court held inadequate. That position is simply incorrect. Florida may use any form of notice it desires when announcing future changes in its Medicaid program. Its choice of notice may again be challenged, and the changes may again be enjoined if the notice is determined to be inadequate. Should that happen, Florida can at that time appeal the injunction and gain an appellate determination of the adequacy of the notice. This is not a case that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 161 (1973). Florida made its own decision to issue a satisfactory notice after the proceedings below. It could have waited until this court had determined the merits of the appeal before issuing such a notice, and thereby obtained review of the lower court's decision. Its very compliance with the order renders the appeal moot.
Florida also argues that a favorable appellate determination on the question of adequacy of the notice will allow it to recoup Medicaid payments it would not have made but for the injunction. Florida provides us with no authority for this proposition. We have been unable to find support for it. The district judge merely prevented Florida from changing its regulations; he did not order any Medicaid payments other than those authorized by existing regulations. The district court's action in enjoining the reduction of Medicaid benefits does not entitle Florida to recover payments lawfully made to Medicaid recipients even if the district judge made a mistake in enjoining the change in law. 3
Finally, Florida contends that plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees prevents the appeal from being moot. We have recently determined that a claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not salvage an otherwise moot case. Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1980). The district court may still determine whether the plaintiffs were the prevailing party and award attorney's fees without regard to whether or not its issuance of the injunctions was ultimately correct in our eyes.
Because Florida has issued a satisfactory notice, our decision on the questions presented by the appeal from the district judge's determination of the adequacy of the notices cannot affect the rights of these litigants. The case is, therefore, moot.
The Medicaid program is administered by the states but funded principally by federal grants. Because of the federal participation, the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., supplemented by HEW regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 440 prescribes substantive requirements governing the scope of each state's program.
A portion of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Florida's plan to reduce Medicaid expenses by paying for a maximum of three physicians' visits per month, except for emergencies, violated federal regulations and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district judge agreed that the limit on physicians' visits conflicted with federal regulations and entered summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor, permanently enjoining implementation of that reduction in Medicaid benefits. Florida still seeks to implement its proposed three-physician-visit-per-month limitation and contests both the jurisdiction of the district court and its judgment on the merits.
While the plaintiffs predicate their cause of action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is only remedial; it recognizes a cause of action but it does not of itself bestow jurisdiction of the action on federal courts. Recognizing this, plaintiffs assert jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), the text of which is set forth in the footnote. 4
In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), the Supreme Court held that § 1343(3) jurisdiction does not extend to claims "that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act." In order to obtain federal jurisdiction under § 1343(3), the complaint must state a claim arising under the federal constitution, one that is not merely superficial or frivolous, but is substantial. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 645 (5th Cir. 1980).
The complaint charges that the limitation on physician visits fails to provide the plaintiffs equal protection. The constitutional issue does not appear to be of serious moment, 5 but for jurisdictional purposes the question is not whether the claims are without merit 6 but whether "prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1379, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), quoting Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 858-59, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 (1973). See Bussey v. Harris, 611 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th Cir. 1980) (); Atwell v. Nichols, 608 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1979) ().
Defendants urge that equal protection requires only minimal scrutiny of the state welfare regulations and that the equal protection claim is, therefore, patently meritless. It is correct that, when state welfare statutes are challenged under the equal protection clause, they are subject to examination only for some rational relationship to a proper state end, an examination minimally exacting....
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