Cushing v. McKee

• Decision Date: 03 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1:10–cv–330–GZS.,1:10–cv–330–GZS.
• Citation: 853 F.Supp.2d 163
• Parties: Andre E. CUSHING III, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Walter F. McKEE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

853 F.Supp.2d 163

Andre E. CUSHING III, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Walter F. McKEE, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:10–cv–330–GZS.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

April 3, 2012.

Recognized as Unconstitutional

21–A M.R.S.A. § 1125(9).

Anita Y. Woudenberg, James Bopp, Jr., Josiah Neeley, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, IN, David P. Crocker, Portland, ME, for Plaintiffs.

Phyllis Gardiner, Thomas A. Knowlton, Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Docket # 69). As explained herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing their Complaint (Docket # 1) on August 5, 2010. The Complaint contained five counts alleging that provisions of Maine law governing campaign finance—specifically, 21–A M.R.S.A. §§ 1015(1), 1019–B(1)(B) & (3), and 1125(9)—violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Count I alleged that the independent expenditure reporting requirement, § 1019—B(1)(B) & (3), fails strict scrutiny. Count II alleged that the independent expenditure reporting requirements set forth in § 1019–B(1)(B) & (3) are overbroad. Count III alleged that the rescue funds provision in § 1125(9) unconstitutionally burdens and penalizes speech and fails strict scrutiny. Count IV alleged that the public funding scheme contribution limits in § 1015 fails intermediate scrutiny. And, finally, Count VI alleged that the contribution limits in § 1015 were unconstitutionally low.¹

Also on August 5, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket # 4), seeking to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the three challenged laws before the November 2, 2010 elections; a Motion to Consolidate (Docket # 5), seeking to combine their Preliminary Injunction with a trial on the merits under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2); and a Motion to Expedite (Docket # 6), seeking to shorten State Defendants' response deadlines.

On August 27, 2010, 2010 WL 3463749, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motions to Consolidate and Expedite ( see Docket # 21) on the grounds that the Court could not at that stage in the proceedings determine that there was no dispute as to the material facts and because of a need to conduct discovery. Four days later, on August 31, 2010, with their Preliminary Injunction pending, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Docket # 22), seeking to enjoin the issuance of any matching funds to political candidates. The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motions for TRO and Preliminary Injunction (Docket # s 31, 32) on September 15 and 17, 2010, respectively, concluding that Plaintiffs had no chance of success because the First Circuit's decision in Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir.2000), had addressed—and rejected—the same arguments raised by Plaintiffs in the instant case.

With Maine's elections fast approaching, on September 20, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an appeal with the First Circuit and a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (Docket # 34) with this Court. Following this Court's denial of the Motion, Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for injunctive relief pending appeal with the First Circuit, seeking relief before the November 2, 2010 elections in Maine. See Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir.2010). The First Circuit heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' emergency motion on October 5, 2010 and issued a denial the same day, concluding that the issues raised by Plaintiffs' challenge required “careful analysis” on “a fully developed record” and that Plaintiffs had not made a showing of immediate injury necessary for issuance of an emergency injunction. Id. at 15. The First Circuit further concluded that in weighing Plaintiffs' claims, it considered the “emergency” to be “largely one of [Plaintiffs'] own making” because they chose not to bring suit until August 5, 2010, “shortly before the November 2 elections,” whereas Plaintiffs in Daggett filed their challenge almost two years ahead of the 2000 elections. Id. at 16 & n. 3.

Undaunted, Plaintiffs pressed ahead, filing an Application for a Writ of Injunction with Justice Breyer on October 7, 2010 and, after its denial, a Renewed Application for a Writ of Injunction with Justice Kennedy. The Renewed Application was referred to the Supreme Court and denied on October 22, 2010. See Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 445, 178 L.Ed.2d 346 (2010) (Mem.). On October 29, 2010, the First Circuit affirmed this Court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.² As a result, on November 2, 2010, Maine's election proceeded unaffected by this case.

Ten days after the election, on November 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc with the First Circuit. On November 29, 2010, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in McComish v. Bennett, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 644, 178 L.Ed.2d 476 (2010) (Mem.),³ which involved a challenge to a substantially similar matching funds provision under Arizona law. Accordingly, on November 30, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Stay the First Circuit's consideration of their Petition for Rehearing En Banc. The First Circuit denied both the Petition for Rehearing and the Motion to Stay on December 2, 2010.

On December 22, 2010, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Stay of Proceedings (Docket # 56) asking the Court to stay all proceedings in connection with this action, including discovery,⁴ pending the Supreme Court's decision in McComish v. Bennett. The Court granted the parties' motion the next day.

On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court decided McComish v. Bennett via Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011), which ruled that Arizona's matching funds law violated the First Amendment. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the parties in this case filed a Stipulation Regarding Judgment on Count III (Docket # 64), declaring Maine's matching funds provision unconstitutional, and a Stipulation of Dismissal as to Counts I, II, IV, and VI (Docket # 63). On July 21, 2011, the Court issued an Order (Docket # 65), which ruled that the matching funds provision of Maine's Clean Election Act, 21–A M.R.S.A. § 1125(9), violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and therefore was unconstitutional. The Court entered judgment the same day. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses followed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court awards “a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs” to “the prevailing party” in a case involving the vindication of civil rights. “Typically, achieving prevailing party status requires a plaintiff to show that he succeeded on an important issue in the case, thereby gaining at least some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit.” Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). In other words, “a plaintiff ‘prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)).

As the Supreme Court recently (and unanimously) reiterated: “A civil rights plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected a violation of federal law and, in so doing, has vindicated Congress's statutory purposes. That result is what matters....” Fox v. Vice, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2214, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, “[a] court should compensate the plaintiff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome, even if the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). Even where a party has prevailed, however, a court may properly deny reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party where “special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” De Jesus Nazario v. Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).

The calculus of what award the Court will approve initially requires that the Court determine the appropriate “lodestar,” which is “the product of the number of hours appropriately worked times a reasonably hourly rate or rates.” Hutchinson v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2011) (internal citations omitted). The party seeking the fee award, in this case, Plaintiffs, bears the burden of providing the Court with the materials necessary to construct the lodestar. See id. This includes the “burden of establishing the prevailing hourly rate (or schedule of rates) in the community for the performance of similar legal services by comparably credentialed counsel.” Id. at 16 (internal citation omitted).

The Court “has the discretion to adjust the lodestar itself upwards or downwards based on several different factors, including the results obtained, and the time and labor required for the efficacious handling of the matter.” De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d at 207 (citing Torres–Rivera v. O'Neill–Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir.2008)). Accordingly, the Court may eliminate hours billed that were “unreasonably, unnecessarily, or inefficiently devoted to the case,” Torres–Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336, and discount time the Court considers “duplicative, unproductive, or excessive.” Gay Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 295.

Where a prevailing party achieves only limited success on his or her claims, the Court “may reduce the fee request to an amount that reasonably reflects that circumstance.” United States v. One...