Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution

Decision Date06 April 1973
Docket NumberNo. 71-2068.,71-2068.
Citation475 F.2d 1364
PartiesJoseph F. CUTHRELL, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Charles F. Morgan, Baltimore, Md. (Court-appointed counsel) (Michael Millemann, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.

Harry A. E. Taylor and Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Attys. Gen. of Maryland (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Edward F. Borgerding, Chief, Crim. Div., Asst. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:

The petitioner in this habeas proceeding is a Maryland prisoner who seeks to invalidate his guilty plea as involuntary because he was not advised, before his plea was accepted, that he might, as a result of his plea, be sent to Patuxent Institution for evaluation and treatment under procedures spelt out in the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act.1 The proceeding followed an unsuccessful appeal for post-conviction relief by the petitioner at the hands of the State Court. The District Court dismissed the proceeding as without merit and the petitioner has appealed. We affirm.

The law is clear that a valid plea of guilty requires that the defendant be made aware of all "the direct consequences of his plea." Wade v. Coiner (4th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 1059, 1060. By the same token, it is equally well settled that, before pleading, the defendant need not be advised of all collateral consequences of his plea, or, as one Court has phrased it, of all "possible ancillary or consequential results which are peculiar to the individual and which may flow from a conviction of a plea of guilty, * * *." United States v. Sambro (1971) 147 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 454 F. 2d 918, 920; United States v. Ready (4th Cir. 1972) 460 F.2d 1238, 1239; Johnson v. United States (9th Cir. 1972) 460 F.2d 1203, 1204; Tindall v. United States (5th Cir. 1972) 469 F.2d 92.

The distinction between "direct" and "collateral" consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment. Thus, when a defendant is sentenced under a guilty plea to the crime of escape, it is not required that the Court advise the defendant, before accepting the plea, that he is subject to the loss of his "good time" credit, previously earned, since, while the loss will increase the period of his actual confinement, it is not "a definite, practical consequence of the plea" but is discretionary with the prison authorities under Section 4165, 18 U.S.C. Hutchison v. United States (10th Cir. 1971) 450 F.2d 930, 931. Similarly, the fact that the Court fails to advise the defendant that his plea, if accepted, makes him subject to deportation proceedings, a result said to be equivalent to the "loss of both property and life; or all that makes life worth living" (Ng Fung Ho v. White, 1922, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938) or to "a life sentence of banishment" (Jordan v. De George, 1951, 341 U.S. 223, 232, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson)), is deemed a collateral consequence and will not render the plea involuntary. United States v. Sambro, supra; United States v. Holton (7th Cir. 1956) 228 F.2d 827, 830, cert. den. 351 U.S. 963, 76 S.Ct. 1027, 100 L.Ed. 1484; United States v. Parrino (2d Cir. 1954) 212 F.2d 919, 921, cert. den. 348 U.S. 840, 75 S.Ct. 46, 99 L.Ed. 663; Joseph v. Esperdy (D.C.N.Y. 1966) 267 F.Supp. 492, 494. On the other hand, when a defendant pleads guilty to an offense under which he is not eligible for parole, he should be made aware of that fact before the acceptance of his plea. Paige v. United States (4th Cir. 1971) 443 F.2d 781, 782-783. The reason for this conclusion is that the right to parole has become so engrafted on the criminal sentence that such right is "assumed by the average defendant" and is directly related in the defendant's mind with the length of his sentence. Moody v. United States (8th Cir. 1972) 469 F.2d 705, 708.

Applying the distinctions evidenced by the foregoing authorities, we are of the opinion that the fact that the acceptance of the petitioner's plea of guilty to the crime of criminal assault placed him in a class, where he might, as a result of the judgment in an entirely separate civil proceeding, in which he would be afforded counsel and all due process rights, including the right to a jury trial, be committed to Patuxent Institution for treatment and not punishment was such a collateral consequence of his plea that the failure of the trial court to advise him of such possibility will not render his plea involuntary. Commitment to the Institution was not an automatic or immediate result of his plea. His plea simply made him a member of a class as a result of which he might be ordered to be evaluated by trained experts, and one, who, if the trained experts concluded, after examination, he was a defective delinquent, would be subject to a civil trial, before...

To continue reading

Request your trial
219 cases
  • Doe v. Weld, Civ. A. No. 96-11968-PBS.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • December 17, 1996
    ...consequence" and that failure to inform defendant did not make plea constitutionally infirm); see also Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973) (rejecting contention that the failure to inform a juvenile delinquent that his guilty plea might result in civil c......
  • State v. Olivas
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • August 12, 1993
    ...1119 (1987)).75 Brief of Appellants, at 20-22.76 State v. Barton, supra, 93 Wash.2d at 305, 609 P.2d 1353 (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973)).77 "Written Statement. A written statement of the defendant in substantially the form set forth below shall be filed o......
  • Miller v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 29, 2010
    ...result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment", Cuthrell v. Director of Patuxent 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir.1973).(Emphasis supplied).Padilla v. Kentucky The appellant now appeals from that denial, claiming that Padilla v. Kentuc......
  • State v. A.N.J.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 28, 2010
    ...definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.'" Id. (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973)). A.N.J. argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because, he contends, his counsel misled......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Pleas
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Criminal Practice
    • April 30, 2022
    ...immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.” Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution , 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (1973). Thus, an essential objective of the Rule 11 colloquy is to insure “that an accused is apprised of the significant effects of his plea ......
  • 9.7 Pleas
    • United States
    • Defending Criminal Cases in Virginia (Virginia CLE) Chapter 9 Pretrial Proceedings
    • Invalid date
    ...790, 793 (1976).[401] Id. at 665, 222 S.E.2d at 793.[402] Harlow v. Murray, 443 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Va. 1978).[403] Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973).[404] Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).[405] See Appendix 9-19.[406] Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 169 S.E.2d 569 (1......
  • A change of heart or a change of law? Withdrawing a guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e).
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology No. 2001, September 2001
    • September 22, 2001
    ...changed after the plea was entered."). (67) Bryant v. Cherry, 687 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Cuthrell v. Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. (68) See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 601 F.2d 1100, 1101 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court was required ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT