Cutledge v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1936
• Docket Number: 25463.
• Citation: 186 S.E. 208,53 Ga.App. 473
• Parties: CUTLEDGE v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

186 S.E. 208

53 Ga.App. 473

CUTLEDGE v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO.

No. 25463.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division

June 11, 1936

Error from City Court of Albany; Clayton Jones, Judge.

Petition by Mittie Cutledge against the Aetna Life Insurance Company. To review a judgment dismissing her petition on demurrer plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court.

Certificate of insurance issued to employee under group policy, which provided for automatic cancellation of certificate upon termination of employment of insured with employer, was not extended thirty-one days after termination of employment by provision giving insured privilege of applying for individual policy without proof of insurability within thirty-one days after termination of employment for any cause.

J.N Peacock, Jr., of Albany, for plaintiff in error.

Leonard Farkas and W.H. Burt, both of Albany, for defendant in error.

GUERRY Judge.

This is an action by Mittie Cutledge, wife of Thomas R. Cutledge deceased, upon a certificate of insurance issued to deceased, under a group policy between defendant, Aetna Life Insurance Company, and Flint River Cotton Mills, employer. The certificate was issued on November 20, 1928. Deceased contributed towards the purchase of this insurance sixty cents per month from November 20, 1928, until August 22, 1935, when his employment with the Flint River Cotton Mills terminated. He died August 25, 1935. The certificate issued to the employee recited that: "Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut has insured the lives of certain employees of Flint River Cotton Mills by a group policy of insurance, No. 1120-S, issued and delivered to the employer. Under and subject to the terms and conditions of said policy, and the application therefor, the life of Tom Cutledge an employee, is insured for the sum of $500 payable in event of death to Mittie Cutledge--wife. Beneficiary. This insurance may be terminated whenever said employee for any reason whatsoever ceases to be in the employ of said employer." The group policy provided: "all insurance on the life of any employee shall automatically cease upon termination of employment." The certificate further provided: "In case of the termination of the employment for any reason whatsoever the employee shall be entitled to have issued to him by the Aetna Life Insurance Company, without further evidence of insurability and upon written application made to the Insurance Company within thirty-one days after such termination and upon the payment of the premium applicable to the class of risk to which he belongs and to the form and amount of the policy at his then attained age, a policy of life insurance in any one of the forms customarily issued by the company, except term insurance, in an amount equal to the amount of his protection under such group-insurance policy at the time of such termination."

The provisions of the group policy and the certificate issued thereunder should be construed together. Carruth v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 608, 122 S.E. 226; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Harrod, 46 Ga.App 127, 166 S.E. 870; AEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Padgett, 49 Ga.App. 666, 176 S.E. 702, 703. So taken, the provisions definitely provide for an automatic cancellation of the certificate of insurance issued to the employee upon the termination of his employment with the Flint River Cotton Mills, employer. Such a provision has often been upheld by the courts. Curd v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 51 Ga.App. 306, 180 S.E. 249; Joiner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 43 Ga.App. 1, 157 S.E. 703; Joiner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 40 Ga.App. 740, 151 S.E. 540; Douglas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Mo.App.) 297 S.W. 87; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 156 Va. 720, 158 S.E. 877; Greeley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 Wash. 611, 274 P. 106; Kowalski v. AEtna Life Ins. Co., 266 Mass. 255, 165 N.E. 476, 477, 63 A.L.R. 1030; Bradley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (C.C.A.) 70 F. (2d) 988. The petition in the present case expressly alleges that the employment of insured terminated with the employer three days before his death. Therefore the petition set out no cause of action, unless, as contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, the conversion clause, which we have already set out above in quotations, had the effect of extending the coverage of insurance upon an employee thirty-one days after his cessation of employment, during which time he might apply for an individual policy, without proof of insurability. This argument, however, is not sound, and is not in accordance with the plain provisions of the policy, which provide that upon termination of employment, the certificate is automatically canceled. While "policies of insurance will be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished, and provisions therein will be strictly construed against the insurer" (New York Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 45 Ga.App. 638, 165 S.E. 847, 848; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Padgett, supra, and cit.), "the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. If that intention be clear, and it contravenes no rule of law, and sufficient words be used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced, irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construction." Code 1933, § 20-702. "Insurance is purely a matter of contract (North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga.App. 380, 58 S.E. 110); 'there is no greater sanctity and no more mystery about a contract of insurance than any other' ( Clay v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 97 Ga. 44, 25 S.E. 417, 420). Courts are not called upon, because of the rule that contracts of insurance are to be strictly construed against the insured, and because the contract itself is one of insurance, to call forth doubt, through construction of plain and unambiguous provisions of such a contract. They should not make hypercritical construction of such contracts. 'The language of the contract should be construed in its entirety, and should receive a reasonable...