Cutrone v. Cutrone, 1

• Decision Date: 25 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 1,1,2
• Citation: 225 A.D.2d 767,640 N.Y.S.2d 568
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: In the Matter of Christine CUTRONE, Respondent, v. Angelo CUTRONE, Appellant (Matter). In the Matter of Angelo CUTRONE, Appellant, v. Christine CUTRONE, Respondent (Matter).

Page 568

640 N.Y.S.2d 568

225 A.D.2d 767

In the Matter of Christine CUTRONE, Respondent, v. Angelo CUTRONE, Appellant (Matter No. 1).

In the Matter of Angelo CUTRONE, Appellant, v. Christine CUTRONE, Respondent (Matter No. 2).

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

March 25, 1996.

Stephen M. Jackel, New York City, for appellant.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and SULLIVAN, SANTUCCI and KRAUSMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In two related family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Angelo Cutrone appeals from (1) an order of protection of the Family Court, Queens County (Torres, J.), dated December 31, 1990, which, after a hearing, excluded him from the family residence until April 25, 1991, and (2) an order of the same court, also dated December 31, 1990, which, after a hearing, dismissed his petition against Christine Cutrone.

ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Although the order of protection excluding the appellant from the family residence has expired, in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from an adjudication that a party has committed a family offense, we find that this appeal is not academic (see, Matter of Bickwid v. Deutsch, 87 N.Y.2d 862, 638 N.Y.S.2d 932, 662 N.E.2d 250; Matter of Williams v. Cornelius, 76 N.Y.2d 542, 561 N.Y.S.2d 701, 563 N.E.2d 15). However, we find no basis to disturb the Family Court's determination that the appellant harassed his wife and daughter in violation of a previous order of protection. The question of whether the appellant committed acts of harassment was a disputed factual issue for the court to resolve, and the determination of the Family Court, as the trier of fact, regarding credibility of the witnesses is entitled to great weight (see, Matter of Bart v. Bart, 219 A.D.2d 710, 631 N.Y.S.2d 542; Matter of Croce v. Tsombanis, 209 A.D.2d 516, 619 N.Y.S.2d 72). While the wife did not claim that the appellant had engaged in physical violence, the record supports the court's conclusion that the appellant willfully engaged in a course of conduct intended to harass both the wife and the parties' daughter (see, Matter of Croce v. Tsombanis, supra; Matter of Dutz v. Colon, 183 A.D.2d 715, 586 N.Y.S.2d 511; Rogers v. Rogers, 161 A.D.2d 754, 556 N.Y.S.2d 107; Merola v. Merola, 146 A.D.2d 611, 536 N.Y.S.2d 842).

Furthermore, we find no merit to the appellant's claim that the Family Court abrogated his right to present...